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Abstract
The usage of single-core–based microprocessors is slowly disappearing, while multi-
core–based devices are becoming the only normally used nowadays. This is true also
for the critical domains, like for instance avionics domain. However, the key point for
such domains is that the multi-core microprocessors are de facto used as single-core
devices. In fact, all-but-one executing cores are powered off. Meanwhile, the market
offers more and more sophisticated solutions, proposing so called Multi-Processor
System-on-Chip (MPSoC) device generation. These devices integrate tens or even
hundreds of processing cores and peripherals on the same chip, connected through
the network-on-chip (NoC) interconnection
The main obstacle for the usage of multi-core and MPSoC devices in the context
of critical systems is the high certification effort required to ensure the proper level
of dependability (and especially safety) for a system based on such kind of devices.
Considering the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) devices, these do not present any
safety-dedicated features as the critical domains market size is relatively negligible.
In fact, the high non-recurring engineering cost prevents the development of any
COTS MPSoC specifically designed for the safety-critical applications.
This thesis presents several solutions to address the main dependability issues,
preventing the usage of MPSoC-based systems in the critical systems context. In
particular the avionics domain is considered, and the main focus is put upon the
safety issues related to the usage of a shared interconnection, for what it concerns the
temporal isolation between the software components. Although, the avionics domain
is explicitly considered, the techniques presented are expected to be applicable for
a generic safety-critical and even mission-critical domains, given that the required
adaptation to the domain-specific peculiarities is done. As further contribution, this
dissertation presents solutions to easier the dependability assessment of software
components at executing core level.
vi
Considering the executing core level, a proper fault tolerance against radiation
induced soft errors was and remains crucial for the space applications. However,
as the geometries keep shrinking and power saving techniques are becoming more
and more aggressive, the issue of soft errors is no longer a space domain’s preroga-
tive. This thesis proposes an approach to rank a set of candidate software modules
according to their intrinsic robustness to the soft errors. The main advantage of the
proposed approach is that it’s almost agnostic of the actual architectural details of the
executing platform as it is based on software-level fault injections. The information
collected during the proposed high-level analysis can also be used optimize the
hardening phase.
As main contributions of this thesis, I address the main safety issues concerning
the shared (NoC) interconnection of an MPSoC, both considering COTS and custom
components. In particular, I focus on the temporal isolation of software components
running on the same MPSoC. A typical safety-critical scenario is considered, where
the software components have different levels of criticality (or severity of failure),
i.e., mixed criticality scenario. As the main contribution, I propose some partitioning
techniques to enable the usage of (NoC-based) MPSoC for the mixed criticality
systems, both considering COTS and custom devices. For what it concerns the
usage of COTS devices, where the main effort was spent, the proposed technique
exploits the deterministic routing algorithm of the NoC. The proposed solution is
suitable for an ample range of MPSoC devices as its requirements consider a fairly
common MPSoC characteristics. The partitioning technique is intended to have a
purely software implementation, as a module of a real-time operating system, which
targets both the certification potential and reusability aspects. For what it concerns
the custom NoC architectures, a set of simple solutions has been derived with the
specific purpose of high certification potential.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the distant 1971, the first commercial microprocessor was born to create a calcu-
lator. That microprocessor was Intel 4004 and the calculator was Busicom 141-PF.
Nowadays it is hard to imagine a system which does not contain a computer, from a
refrigerator to an aircraft, computer systems penetrated all the areas of technology.
Among the processor-based systems, mission-critical systems (e.g., satellite
systems) and safety-critical systems (e.g., power plain control, avionics) form a
niche domain. These systems (from now on referred as critical systems) are both
characterized by the fact a failure of one of such systems can lead to extremely
negative consequences. For a safety-critical system such consequences can be
injuries or death of people and/or severe environmental damage, for a mission-
critical system – a huge economic damage.
For such systems, the nonfunctional requirements (such as cost and energy
efficiency) become secondary with respect to requirements like dependability and in
particular safety. The dependability can be defined in many ways, one of which is
presented in [1] as:“the trustworthiness of a computing system that allows reliance to
be justifiably placed on the services it delivers.” The safety is an important attribute
of the dependability, and concerns the “absence of catastrophic consequences” [2].
On the other hand, each new generation of processors exhibit higher densities
and lower operating voltages [3]. This decreases the dependability of such devices as
several phenomena (e.g., susceptibility to hardware faults caused by electromagnetic
radiation) become more and more relevant.
2 Introduction
Unfortunately, the history knows some episodes when the hypothetical conse-
quences of a critical system failure actually took place. Among the most known
cases there is the one concerning some Toyota car models. These cars were reported
to autonomously accelerate and even contemporary reduce the controllability of the
car by the driver. This issue was active between 2000 to 2010 and led to at least 89
casualties [4, 5]. The exact cause is unknown, but the radiation induced bit flips (and
no protection against them) are assumed to be a possible cause [6].
Driven by the incidents like the aforementioned, by the end of 2011, first edition
of ISO26262 standard [7] was created. The standard, entitled Road vehicles –
Functional safety, became indispensable for automotive companies to assure their
products are as safe as possible. The ISO26262 derives from the IEC-61508 standard
[8] and it is adopted for the specific requirements of automotive domain. Other safety
critical domains have similar standards as for instance RTCA DO-178C [9] and the
RTCA DO-254 [10] for avionics. For a safety-critical system to have a dependability
certification in general — and safety certification in particular — is a must. The
standards are developed, among other, to reduce the certification effort as the latter
is extremely high for a safety-critical system.
Apart from facing the issue of faults (and bugs) as such, a critical system must
provide a proper level of isolation between the functions it implements. This isolation
is required in order to assure a faulty function will not be able to corrupt other
functions of the system. I.e., given a function, made of a set of hardware and
software components, it is mandatory to assure that a fault can not propagate from
one of its components to a component of another function.
Given this isolation requirement, for a critical system it was historically strongly
discouraged to execute multiple applications on the same processing platform, while
in some domains (e.g., avionics) this was explicitly forbidden [11]. Thus, each
application (or a set of tightly correlated applications) was deployed on a dedicated
computer, isolated from the resources of the other, although the computers could
be interconnected. This paradigm is called federated architecture and aims to
minimize any resource sharing. The reason was the difficulty to assure, in case a
set of application would share a resource, one of those application will not corrupt
the data or degrade the timing properties of the other applications. For the same
reason the usage of multi-core processors was absolutely disregarded for critical
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systems. In fact, a multi-core processor will for sure have at least the interconnection
infrastructure to be shared between the cores.
Section 2 will provide precise terminology and more insight into concepts briefly
introduced so far (as well as related to those concepts introduced by the following
part this introduction chapter). The following Section 1.1 will briefly introduce the
context of this dissertation – MPSoC-based critical systems. Then, in Section 1.2 and
Section 1.3 the contributions of this dissertation will be briefly introduced. Section
1.4 gives an outline of this dissertation.
1.1 Mixed-Criticality System: NoC-based MPSoC
The concept of level of assurance against failure is crucial for the design of a safety-
critical system and thus for this dissertation. Considering an avionic example, the
flight control system and the system in charge of in-flight entertainment, are both
systems expected to work properly. However, the flight control system is expected to
be developed in such a way to assure the related component will never fail during
the functioning of the system. On the other hand, the failure in-flight entertainment
is a function much less important with respect to the previous one.
The concept of level of assurance against failure is adopted by each critical
domain or sector with slightly different peculiarities and it is referred to with different
names. Safety integrity level (SIL) defined by IEC-61508 as generic functional
safety concept, automotive safety integrity level (ASIL) is defined by ISO 26262 for
automotive domain, design assurance level (DAL) is defined by RTCA DO-178C
for avionic domain, etc. Considering for instance the avionic domain, if a certain
function is considered of the highest DAL (i.e., DAL A), then the developer is
required to certify that a failure of such function is virtually impossible. Analogously,
a function is considered DAL E if its failure will have no effect. A key consequence
is a much lower effort required to develop a DAL E component.
Industrial standards usually define four or five levels of criticality. However, in
this introduction (and in the rest of the dissertation) I will consider two levels of
criticality. This simplification will allow a simpler problem modeling (and solution
description), without removing nothing from the latter. In detail, I refer to them as
low-criticality (LO) task (or application) and the high-criticality (HI) one. I will also
4 Introduction
consider LO to be a non-critical application (NC_app), while HI to be a critical
application (C_app). Thus, in this dissertation LO and HI are synonyms of NC_app
and C_app respectively.
The existence of the concept of a component having a given level of assurance
against failure directly implies the existence of the concept of isolation between the
components. If the independence between components cannot be demonstrated that
all the components must be considered as a single macro-component. In this case
the DAL assigned to this macro-component is the highest among the DALs of the
components it is made of. This eventuality will result in much higher development
cost, which can easily make the product economically unfeasible. In the first place,
several components would require a higher DAL, as all the components should have a
DAL equal to the highest among the DALs of the components the macro-component
is made of. Furthermore, this macro-component will exhibit a complexity level well
above the one related to the set of independent components.
From the aforementioned, it is clear how the federated architecture was an easy
solution to assure the isolation between the components of the system. However, the
ever-growing number of functions and their complexity made federated architecture
paradigm no longer sustainable. Driven by the growing maintenance cost and
other factors, industry developed several standards (e.g., [12], [7]) to allow multiple
functions or applications to run on the same hardware platform. Furthermore, even
the execution of software components having different DAL (or level related to
the specific domain) was standardized. Thus, the mixed-criticality systems (MCS)
paradigm was born, as components having different levels of assurance against
failure was executed on the same platform.
When academic literature and the industrial standards are considered, the term
criticality is used to indicate similar — but still different — concepts. In this
dissertation level of criticality will be used as a synonym of level of severity of
consequences of failure.
Nowadays, the mixed criticality is a common practice, for most critical domains
and it is supported by the widely accepted standards. However, the executing
platform of such systems have be single-processor–based. Considering the avionic
domain, in case multi-core processors are used, the certification authority requires
the designer to disable all the cores but one and to demonstrate that the disabled
cores will remain disabled even in case of unexpected behavior.
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On the other hand, the cutting-edge COTS processors can integrate tens of
intellectual property (IP) cores on the same chip. These devices, generally referred to
as multiprocessor system-on-chip (MPSoC), make use of a network-on-chip (NoC)
interconnection which meets the scalability needs. From the aforementioned, it is
evident the gap between the market products and the industry single-core–based
systems.
As the number of required functionalities (and its complexity) keeps growing, it
is reasonable to consider that the single-core–based system paradigm will become
no longer sustainable, the same way it was for federated architecture paradigm. For
instance, considering the avionics and space domains, the space, weight and power
(SWaP) are extremely important from the economic point of view. The usage of
multi-core would allow to move applications currently running on a set of single-core
processors to much smaller number of multi-core processors. Thus, an important
reduction of number of onboard hardware components will be achieved.
Both academic and industrial sectors are active in the study of issues related
to the usage of multi-core systems in the context of mixed criticality. Considering
avionics domain, some certifications are expected by the end of 2019 [13], while
currently no certified (thus, no deployed on the field) multi-core–based MCS exists.
The main reason the multi-core–based systems are not used by most critical
domains is the high complexity to certify a proper dependability level. The main
issue is represented by the resources shared by the applications (or tasks) running
on a multi-core processor or a MPSoC. This sharing can create data corruption and
unacceptable delays. As already briefly introduced before, the isolation between
the components must be demonstrated, otherwise the very concept of component
disappears and the whole system can only be seen as monolithic entity.
For a critical system a missed deadline is (generally) considered a failure. Thus,
it should be certified a sufficiently low probability of a system failure provoked,
among the other, by different tasks competing for the same resource. In practice,
this requires estimating, with a sufficiently high confidence, the worst-case interfer-
ence between applications running on the different cores of a multi-core processor.
This estimation should consider both hardware and software faults, and should be
sufficiently convenient for the certification entity.
An additional factor for the complexity to achieve such estimation is the fact that,
on one hand the custom design struggles to justify the non-recurring engineering
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(NRE) as the number of required components is relatively small; on the other hand,
the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components have almost no mechanism to
enforce the bounded interference or at least facilitate the interference analysis (as
many micro-architectural details remain confidential).
From the certification point of view, the usage of MPSoC-based systems re-
quires a further effort with respect to the multi-core-based systems. This is due
the additional complexity of NoC interconnection with respect to the classic bus
interconnection used multi-core processors. In order to get closer to the creation
of MPSoC-based MCS we need a set of sufficiently simple techniques to face the
issues currently open [14].
The thesis focuses on safety improvement and reliability analysis techniques for
a MPSoC-based MCS creation, in particular in avionics and space domains.
1.2 Functional Safety: Temporal Partitioning
The main focus is put on deriving techniques to create a COTS MPSoC-based
MCS with a certification potential. As already described in the previous section,
the presence of shared resources is the main reason the MPSoC technology is not
used for critical systems design. A shared resource which is for sure present in any
realistic usage of MPSoC is its on-chip interconnection infrastructure, i.e., NoC. The
main contribution of this thesis are the techniques aiming to solve the issues related
to this specific component. Alongside with COTS MPSoC, this dissertation presents
some of the solutions derived considering a custom NoC architectures.
When a safety-critical system is considered, a specific set of standards must
be followed during all the phases of its developments. In this thesis I will mainly
refer to the IEC-61508 and RTCA DO-178C, where the former is a basic functional
safety standard while the latter is the standard concerning software development of
an avionic system. Functional safety of a system is defined by IEC-61508 as active
or passive means to “prevent hazardous events arising or providing mitigation to
reduce the consequence of the hazardous event”.
Considering the avionics, RTCA DO-178C describes a set of techniques to
prevent software failures and/or limit their effects to the system functions. The
main requirement to achieve this goal is to demonstrate that the software macro-
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components will execute with a sufficient independence. If this independence cannot
be demonstrated, then all those software components will be seen as a single software
component when assigning the software DAL. This, in turn will imply that the DAL
assigned to this software macro-component will reflect the highest failure severity of
the software components it is composed of. Thus, the cost of this macro-component
development will be much higher and will undermine the economical feasibility of
the system.
Under RTCA DO-178C, the following software design methods are described:
partitioning, dissimilarity (of multi-versioning) and safety monitoring. The software
component isolation should be implemented by the partitioning. This is one of the
most important design instruments (or concepts) to safety-critical systems (not only
for avionics domain). The multi-versioning consists in two or more components
implementing the same function to be developed independently. The goal of this
technique is to provide the redundancy (thus to improve the reliability) to the system,
while avoiding common source of errors. Finally, the safety monitoring is an active
mechanism to implement the protection against specific failures. This mechanism
also monitors the correct functioning of the partitioning technique.
The partitioning mechanism, described by the RTCA DO-178C, must address
both the extent and the scope of the interactions between the partitioned components
as well as how to isolate the components from each other. The isolation must be
achieved in both spatial and temporal domains. Spatial isolation means that one
application shall not corrupt data of another application. Temporal isolation on other
hand concerns the timing properties and means that one application shall not cause
failure (i.e., deadline miss) of another application by blocking a shared resource (e.g.,
CPU, interconnection). To achieve spatial isolation is relatively easy as the hardware
means like memory management unit (MMU) can be exploit. The situation with the
temporal isolation is more complex. The safety-critical domain is niche market so
the COTS MPSoC features no hardware means to address with temporal isolation
issue. On the other hand, the development of custom solutions should justify the
related NRE cost.
An eventual timing interference between applications is due to implicit contention
for micro-architectural resources (e.g., processor caches, interconnection) and by
explicit contention for resources (e.g.., processor time, peripherals, shared data
structures). In this dissertation I target a specific source of implicit contention: NoC
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interconnection. On the other hand, the explicit contention is out of the scope of this
thesis.
1.2.1 State-of-the-art
To cope with the temporal isolation issue in MPSoC, the literature provides several
solutions. Some of these solutions are adopted from bus-based multi-core related
techniques, while the other have been created specifically for NoC-based MPSoC.
The main issues with these solutions are certification potential, as them do not
consider the industrialist’s perspective. A more extended discussion on the state-
of-the-art is presented in the chapters dedicated to the single contributions of this
thesis.
An important distinction I make in this thesis is whether a technique can be
applied for COTS components or relies on some custom hardware design. This
distinction is done as this thesis contributions concerning the timing isolation can be
classified in the aforementioned way. While the solutions from the COTS group can
be used for the custom design solutions, the contrary is not true.
The techniques that can be applied to COTS MPSoC can be further classified
according to the main idea behind them. This classification can be done according to
several criterion. In the scope of this dissertation I identify two macro-categories of
techniques, according on how the NoC resources (links, FIFOs, etc.) are managed
to ensure timing isolation: resource sharing and permanent resource reservation.
Where the techniques of permanent resource reservation (or resource privatization)
macro-category refer to the opposite situation with respect to the resource sharing
scenario. I.e., each NoC resource is dedicated to an application an it is not shared
with other applications running on the MPSoC. The QoS is often mentioned by the
techniques from resource sharing macro-group, as the HI tasks are guaranteed with
bounded transmission latency, throughput o similar metrics.
Another minor distinction concerns whether a technique is conceived for a
specific MPSoC or it can be applied for a generic MPSoC (although fulfilling a set
of requisites).
A first group of solutions are those targeting robust estimation WCET, explicitly
facing the shared (NoC) interconnection issue. Some of these solutions face the
temporal isolation issue explicitly, while other either face that issue implicitly and
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indirectly or directly ignore the issue. Those techniques which ignore the temporal
isolation issue are considered out of the scope of this dissertation. The authors in [15]
explicitly target the time partitioning issue by implementing a NoC usage monitoring
and bandwidth enforcing mechanism. The proposed mechanism is fairly simple
and does not require VCs to be implemented. However, the NoC is considered
as a black box for what it concerns the WCTT, which makes the whole solution
incomplete. In [16] the authors provide a technique to estimate WCTT of a NoC,
which could complete the solution proposed in [15]. However, the overall solution
must be carefully evaluated as it seems to induce a heavy resource under-utilization.
Furthermore, this overall solution appears to be complex and have several other small
issues. Another approach to estimate WCET is the one making usage of VCs, and
the related priority-based preemption mechanism [17]. One of the issues related to
VCs usage is the complexity of the priority-based preemptive arbitration, which will
play against the certification potential. This kind of solutions are also partial as there
is no isolation between the processes having the same level of priority, and there are
also some other minor issues. There are also some solutions aiming to monitor the
interconnection actual congestion and to identify the anomalies [18]. This technique
can be used to cope with the issues of the previously described techniques. However,
at the best of my knowledge, these solutions are so far only for bus-based systems.
Furthermore, an integration of this technique inside the previously described ones
could make to overall complexity rise above the certification feasibility threshold.
Another group of techniques is based on hierarchical scheduling. This approach
is based on the usage of a scheduling entity which queues the tasks of a certain
priority. This scheduling entity will execute the tasks starting from the queues having
higher priority. For instance, in [19] authors propose a solution which uses nodes
of the NoC as centralized arbitration units called resource managers, which are in
charge of controlling network access. The main issue of hierarchical scheduling is a
high complexity and issues to connect two distant nodes.
Apart from the techniques derived for a class of NoC architectures, there are
some conceived specifically for specific MPSoC (i.e., its NoC architecture). Among
the latter, several techniques based on hierarchical scheduling are conceived for
Kalray MPPA® 256 [20]. These techniques [21–23] exploit the special hardware
the MPSoC is featuring. The main limit of these techniques is that they rely on a
complex hardware could be an issue under the certification point of view.
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An alternative to the resources sharing techniques (presented so far) consists in
permanent resource reservation or resource privatization. In this macro-category,
the NoC is not seen as a monolithic resource, instead it is considered as a set of
resources (i.e., links, FIFOs, routers, etc.) potentially independent from each other.
One of these techniques [24] is developed for for Tilera Tile Processor [25]. This
technique (permanently) partition the NoC into regions, each node belonging to a
region can only communicate to nodes of the same region. This solution is simple,
which is an advantage from the certification point of view. The issues related to this
approach are limits of proximity requirements for the nodes, as well as the specific
hardware like the one featured by Tilera Tile Processor.
Considering the techniques relying on custom NoC architecture design, I will
use the same classification used for techniques related to COTS MPSoC.
QNoC [26] was one of the first efforts to design a NoC architecture suitable
for the creation of an MCS. The proposed architecture was based on preemptive
priority scheduling. The architecture makes use of wormhole packet-based round-
robin scheduling which is used by the NoC architectures of many modern MPSoC.
Several similar solutions, also based on the concept of priority based preemptive
packet-based usage of the NoC were derived [27–33]. Each of these solutions is
characterized by some peculiarities, but all make use of virtual channels, which is
their main disadvantage when certification potential is considered.
One of the first solutions was also Æthereal [34] architecture implementing
time-division multiplexing (TDM)-based circuit switching approach, where wires
and buffers remain reserved for certain points in time. The resources are reserved
for critical applications, while the non-critical applications use leftover bandwidth
from the critical applications. This solution however presents several problems like
the difficulty to support communication between distant nodes and presents a not
negligible complexity as well.
The authors in [35] present a NI modification to allow TT-based scheduling of
the NoC. This solution grants a bounded latency on high-criticality traffic by using
a contention-free channel. However, to support the proposed approach the overall
system should present a high level of complexity.
A different approach to the problem is link division multiplexing technique [36].
In this solution, each physical link is partitioned to simultaneously transmit serialized
packets belonging to distinct traffic flows. The idea of this solution is appealing;
1.2 Functional Safety: Temporal Partitioning 11
however, it presents a high complexity from both hardware and conceptual point of
view.
Apart from the (NoC) resource sharing technique presented so far, there are some
solutions based on avoiding resource sharing. In this macro-category, the NoC is
not seen as a monolithic resource, instead it is considered as a set of resources (i.e.,
links, FIFOs, etc.) potentially independent from each other.
The authors in [37] use hardware-enforced segregation between a safety-critical
domain and a non-safety-critical domain. The main limit of this solution, as it was
for [24], is the high cost required to connect two distant nodes. The authors in [38]
present a NoCDepend method to allow communication between critical regions,
implemented by a set of nodes used as input and output gateways. Thus, this feature
can solve the issue of connecting two (or more) distant nodes. However, this solution
presents a certain complexity which can be a prohibitive for the certification cost.
In addition, the authors in [38] present a dynamic reconfiguration technique. This
can be used as an alternative to the inter critical region communication, however this
solution presents the same disadvantages of circuit-switching–based solutions.
1.2.2 Author’s Contribution (Functional Safety)
As the main contributions of this thesis, I propose a technique to solve temporal
isolation issues related to implicit contention of NoC interconnection. Both the
COTS- and custom NoC-based MPSoC were considered, mainly targeting the avionic
field.
All the proposed techniques provide the temporal isolation to critical applications
and all are based on traffic flows isolation. For the COTS NoC–based MPSoC this
isolation is implemented purely in software, targeting several architectures. For
the custom-NoC–based MPSoC the temporal isolation is implemented purely by
hardware means.
From the QoS point of view the proposed techniques offer two levels of service:
guaranteed service (GS) and best effort (BE). An application running assigned with
GS level is guaranteed to have bounded latency and throughput. On the other hand,
applications running under BE level have no guarantees. The proposed techniques
support an unbounded number of criticality levels, as each application running under
the GS level is granted with the temporal isolation.
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The rest of this section will first describe the contribution related to COTS-based
MPSoC devices (seesectionsec:intro-contrib-NOC-COTS), then the custom NoC-
based MPSoC will be considered in seesectionsec:intro-contrib-qosinnoc. Finally,
in seesectionsec:intro-summary-contrib-functional an itemized summary of this
contributions will be provided.
RTOS filtering module: COTS NoC-based MCS
Considering the COTS MPSoC, a technique requiring few information about the
implementation details of NoC infrastructure was derived [39]. The proposed tech-
nique has been developed as a software module to be interred in a certified real-time
operating system (RTOS). Once the RTOS is upgraded with the proposed module,
the whole RTOS must undergo the certification process, as any modification inval-
idates the existing certification. This certification will be required only once, and
the proposed solution can be reused for the future projects without requiring a new
dedicated certification. It should worth to notice that generally (and especially for
avionics), a new system must be certified as a whole. However, if the proposed
solution will be already certified, then the whole certification process is easier.
This solution is based on traffic flows isolation and can be applied to a set of
architectures. From the quality of service (QoS) point of view, it features two levels
of service: guaranteed service (GS) and best effort (BE). However, the proposed
solution allows an unbounded number of applications and criticality levels to be
implemented. Each application, which is set to have GS level of service, is guaranteed
to have bounded latency and throughput. I.e., the proposed approach guarantees that
no interference from the other applications does exists. I analyze the limits of the
proposed solution especially for it concerns the connectivity issue and draw some
rules to allow an efficient usage of the proposed methodology.
QoSinNoC: framework to custom NoC comparison for mixed criticality
Concerning the custom NoC design, QoSinNoC framework [40] was developed to
analyze a set of NoC architectures and techniques to allow their usage in the context
of mixed criticality. The goal of the framework is to provide to the designer a tool
support him or her in the chose of the NoC architecture. The architectures currently
supported by the framework are:
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• a basic version of logic-based distributed routing (LBDR) [41] with no direct
support for mixed criticality;
• a modification of LBDR to better support the mixed criticality;
• a basic version of logic-based distributed routing, to also consider an architec-
ture able to support a non-minimal routing.
As low complexity is fundamental to have a certification potential, all the consid-
ered NoC architecture are intentionally chosen to be as simple as possible. Thus, the
considered architectures do not feature virtual channels and are based on a single
physical network.
The framework supports a technique, for each of the considered architectures,
to allow their usage in the context of the mixed criticality. As the placement of
the applications is fundamental when reservation-based techniques are used, the
framework helps the designer to collect precious information during design space ex-
ploration. In particular, the framework configures the chosen architecture according
to the placing and communication constrains of GS applications, eventually signaling
the impossibility to meet such constrains. If the configuration is possible, it will be
possible to collect some useful information (i.e., throughput and logical connectivity
between nodes) about the leftover resources for BE applications.
Summary: Functional Safety Contributions
The main ideas and aspects of the contributions described in Section 1.2.2 can be
represented by the following itemized list:
• COTS NoC-based MPSoC:
– software components implicit NoC contention: temporal isolation;
– purely software solution
– main idea:
* critical software component: temporal isolation (guaranteed service
- GS);
* non-critical software component: no guarantees (best effort - BE);
* traffic isolation established during application mapping phase;
* traffic isolation monitored by a dedicated RTOS module;
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– main requirement: deterministic and known routing being used by the
NoC;
– avionic field;
– certification-friendly solution: as simple as possible;
• custom NoC-based MPSoC:
– software components implicit NoC contention: temporal isolation;
– set of NoC architectures and techniques to allow their usage in the context
of mixed criticality
– main idea:
* critical software component: temporal isolation (guaranteed service
- GS);
* non-critical software component: no guarantees (best effort - BE);
* hardware-implemented traffic isolation established at application
mapping time;
* framework to perform a comparison of different NoC architectures;
– avionic field;
– certification-friendly solution: as simple as possible.
1.3 Reliability Analysis: Comparing Program Suscep-
tibility to Soft Errors
A further contribution of this thesis focuses on the reliability of the MPSoC related
to core-level. In detail, I present a technique to assess the software reliability at early
stages of the system design cycle. The technique considers the issue of radiation
induced transient hardware faults also known as soft errors. The technique is based
on fault injection and only considers the software data structures (i.e., variables).
The technique can be used when the final computing platform is not known yet, in
fact only a limited knowledge of the latter is required.
Considering the MPSoC at core level, this thesis presents a technique to assess
the software reliability at early stages of the system design cycle. In detail, this
dissertation addressed the robustness against the radiation induced transient hardware
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faults also known as soft errors. The technique is based on fault injection and only
considers the software data structures (i.e., variables). The technique can be used
when the final computing platform is not known yet, in fact only a limited knowledge
of the latter is required. Considering a candidate for final computing platform, such
information can be gathered from its compiler and an execution time estimator with
no need to actually execute the software on that computing platform.
1.3.1 State-of-the-art
Evaluating the dependability characteristics of a compression program when no
information about the target execution platform is available yet is a challenging task.
Considering the early phases of the design process, only a high-level version of the
algorithms (e.g., in C or C++) to be considered available, while the target executing
platform has still to be decided.
At this stage, a possible approach for performing reliability analysis that could
provide useful information about the robustness of the considered compression
algorithms is based on executing them using a meaningful workload, injecting faults
modeling the radiation effects and observing the resulting behavior.
From a technical point of view, such a kind of analysis typically adopts simulation-
based fault injection [42], where bit flips are injected inside the data structures of the
program [43–49]. In some cases, other representations of the compression program
may also exist (e.g., a Matlab’s Simulink model): in these cases, a preliminary
analysis can be performed by executing fault injection campaigns on this model [50].
The formal technique [51, 52] can be used as an alternative to the fault injection
simulation.
The main issue concerning the aforementioned is the lack of precision. Having
no information about the hardware, the injected faults could never precisely model
the radiation effects [53].
1.3.2 Author’s Contribution (Reliability Analysis)
As a further contribution of this thesis, I propose a solution to address the reliability
issue of COTS MPSoC used for space and avionics systems. The proposed technique
focusses on the node level of the MPSoC and considers the reliability of the software
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components against radiation induced soft errors. The purpose of the proposed
technique is to help the designer in the choice of most suitable (in terms of reliability)
software component for a given system function, when more candidates for that
function exist. The proposed technique is intended to be used in the early stages of
design phase, when the target executing platform has not been chosen yet.
The rest of this section will first describe the contribution related to High-level
technique for ranking candidate software susceptibility to soft errors (seesectionsec:intro-
focus-FI-contrib-ranking), then seesectionsec:intro-summary-contrib-reliability will
provide a itemized summary of this contribution.
High-level technique for ranking candidate software susceptibility to soft er-
rors
The proposed technique allows to perform a ranking of a set of different software
implementations of a given functionality. A typical situation, the proposed technique
is intended to be used for, is when different algorithms or even paradigms exist
to implement the required function (e.g., data compression function). Thus, the
proposed solution is intended to help the designer in the choice of the most suitable
(in terms of reliability) software implementation for a given system function, when
more candidates for that function exist. The overall solution also provides some
information to be used during an eventual hardening phase, as an extra feature
(naturally implemented by the ranking process).
The proposed solution is aware that the main drawback of any high-level approach
is the limited capability to capture the exact behavior of the hardware affected by
radiation-induced soft errors [53]. Indeed, the aim of the proposed technique is to
perform a ranking of a set of software components, while any usage to compute
the quantitative reliability figures is discouraged. Thus, this technique benefits
from the fact that a comparison requires a lower level of precision with respect to
the quantitative reliability figures computation. However, main challenge of this
technique is to achieve a sufficient precision to allow a meaningful comparison.
The proposed approach is evaluated by ranking a set of lossless compression
programs, candidate for the data logging sub-system. To validate the proposed
approach, the results of high-level fault injection have been compared with those
gathered with register-level fault injection simulation. In detail, general-purpose
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registers (GPRs) of a candidate executing platform have been considered. The
injection of faults inside the memory has not been considered, as memories (both
on chip and external) used in space applications, are typically protected by error
detection/correction capabilities [54, 55], and can be considered as immune to
radiation-induced soft errors. Despite the GPR-level injections do not provide precise
reliability figures, I explain why it is reasonable to assume that their precision allows
the comparison among candidate programs of a particular type (e.g., compression
programs). In detail I analyze how the fault not covered by GPR-level fault injection
will contribute mainly as common mode error.
Summary: Reliability Analysis Contributions
The main ideas and aspects of the contribution described in Section 1.3.2 can be
represented by the following itemized list:
• reliability analysis:
– assessing software component robustness against radiation induced soft
errors;
– ranking a set of software components implementing the same function;
– early stage design;
– almost hardware independent;
– program-variables-level fault injection simulation;
– main idea:
* hardware-specific effects obtained from low-level fault injection are
mostly common-mode.
1.4 Outline
This section gives an outline of this dissertation.
• Chapter 2 provides more background on the context of this dissertation. The
issues related to the (NoC-based) MPSoC usage in the critical domain, already
introduced in the current chapter, will be comprehensively covered. The
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chapter will provide precise terminology and will define basic terms and
metrics. The focus will be put mainly on the safety and reliability aspects.
• Chapter 3 describes the first contribution of this dissertation: a technique
to solve one of functional safety issues related COTS (NoC-based) MPSoC
usage in the context of mixed criticality. In detail, the technique addresses the
temporal isolation issue related to implicit contention of the NoC intercon-
nection. The approach is to reserve NoC resources and avoid their sharing.
This is done by virtually partition the system and to enforce this partitioning
by filtering faulty traffic (i.e., by blocking NoC usage that would break the
partitioning). The traffic partitioning exploits the deterministic routing used
by the NoC. Thus, the main requisite for the proposed solution is that the
routing algorithm (used by the NoC) is deterministic and known (which is
fairly common). The traffic filtering is implemented as purely software module
to be inserted inside the RTOS. The overall solution is deliberately simple to
exhibit a high certification potential. Furthermore, a solution to improve the
overhead of the reservation approach is proposed.
The chapter will also further extend the analysis of the-stat-of-the-art landscape,
allowing a better locate the proposed solution inside the latter.
• Chapter 4 describes the second contribution of this dissertation: a technique
to solve one of functional safety issues related (NoC-based) custom MPSoC
usage in the context of mixed criticality. In detail, the technique addresses the
temporal isolation issue related to implicit contention of the NoC intercon-
nection. The approach relies on privatization of NoC resources, thus sharing
avoidance. QoSinNoC framework was developed to analyze a set of NoC
architectures and techniques to allow their usage in the context of mixed criti-
cality. The goal of the framework is to provide to the designer a tool to support
him or her in the chose of the NoC architecture. The architectures currently
supported by the framework are:
– a basic version of LBDR with no direct support for mixed criticality;
– a modification of LBDR to better support the mixed criticality;
– a basic version of routing table–based routing, to also consider an archi-
tecture able to support a non-minimal routing.
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As low complexity is fundamental for certification purposes, all the considered
NoC architecture are intentionally chosen to be as simple as possible. Thus,
the considered architectures do not feature virtual channels and are based on a
single physical network.
The framework supports a technique, for each of the considered architectures,
to allow their usage in the context of the mixed criticality. As the placement
of the applications is fundamental when reservation-based techniques are
used, the framework helps the designer to collect precious information during
design space exploration. In particular, the framework configures the chosen
architecture according to the placing and communication constrains of GS
applications, eventually signaling the impossibility to meet such constrains.
If the configuration is possible, it will be possible to collect some useful
information (i.e., throughput and logical connectivity between nodes) about
the leftover resources for BE applications.
The chapter will also further extend the analysis of the-stat-of-the-art landscape,
allowing a better locate the proposed solution inside the latter.
• Chapter 5 describes the third contribution of this dissertation: a solution
to address the reliability issue of COTS MPSoC used for space and avionics
systems. The proposed technique focusses on the node level of the MPSoC and
considers the reliability of the software components against radiation induced
soft errors. The purpose of the proposed technique is to help the designer
in the choice of most suitable (in terms of reliability) software component
for a given system function, when more candidates for that function exist.
The proposed technique is intended to be used in the early stages of design
phase, when the target executing platform has not been chosen yet. The
proposed technique performs a reliability comparison between a set of software
components candidates, when more options exist for a given system function.
This comparison is done at high level, considering very few information
about the computing hardware platform and concerns the robustness against
radiation-induced soft errors, especially single event upset errors. In detail,
the proposed solution is based on the execution of the software component
and injecting single bit-flip faults in the program variables during its execution.
Finally, observing the effects of the injected faults on the program execution
and on its results. In this way, we can perform a first level analysis of the fault
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masking and self-convergence capabilities of the code, as well as get some
information about its intrinsic capabilities to detect errors.
The chapter will also further extend the analysis of the-stat-of-the-art landscape,
allowing a better locate the proposed solution inside the latter.
• Chapter 6 concludes my dissertation. The contributions are summarized as
well as the related current limitations. Finally, some suggestion for future
research are presented.
Chapter 2
Processor-based Critical Systems
A critical system, as the name suggests, is system which proper functioning is
strongly required. This chapter will define the basic terminology on the critical
systems and the dependability of a system. This chapter will provide background on
context of this dissertation, i.e., Multi-processor System-on-Chip (MPSoC) devices
as well as the requirements and issues of a mixed-criticality system (MCS).
This chapter will first describe (Section 2.1) what is a Multi-processor System-
on-Chip (MPSoC).
Then, in Section 2.2 it will be described the concept of dependability. In par-
ticular, it will be described how the dependability of a system can be defined and
measured (i.e., dependability attributes), which are the threats to its dependability,
and which are the means to cope with these threats.
Once the basic dependability concepts are defined, a critical system will be
defined as well as the related requirements and issues will be analyzed (taking into
account the avionics domain), respectively, in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4.
Finally, Section 2.5 will specifically target the multi-core processors in general
and the MPSoC devices in particular.
2.1 Multi-processor System-on-Chip
The first integrated circuit (IC) was produced in 1969 and contains 1,200 transistors.
These devices represented the main step of the third industrial revolution, known as
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digital revolution, and marked the beginning of the Information (or Computer) Age.
Since then, these devices followed the Moore’s law in an ever-improving size, speed,
and capacity.
However, in the early 2000s, general-purpose processors manufacturers were
observing the single-core paradigm to hit several technological walls. To overcome
these walls the multi-processor design paradigm was adopted [56]. In detail, these
are power wall, memory wall, instruction-level parallelism wall and complexity wall.
The power wall was hit by the single-core processor design around 2004. The trend
of scaling down the gate size, reducing supply voltage and increasing the clock
frequency became no longer feasible, mainly due to the heat dissipation issue [57].
The memory wall is provoked by the much slower memory performance growth,
when compared to the performance growth [58]. The sophisticated multi-level cache
hierarchy architectures became no longer sufficient to face the memory latency
bottleneck. The instruction-level parallelism wall is the impossibility (or unfeasi-
bility) to improve instruction-level parallelism extraction for singe-core paradigm
[59]. The complexity wall is the issue related to the ever-growing architectural
complexity to deal with the previously listed issues. This issue has a huge impact
as the verification costs grows enormously with complexity growth. The multi-core
paradigm overcomes the power wall by replacing the single fast-but-power-hungry
core with a set of slower cores. These slower cores will cooperate providing much
more computational power and also solving the heat generation issue (as the power
consumption is linearly proportional to the clock frequency). For what it concerns
the power wall, multi-processor paradigm faces this issue in two ways. First, as
the frequency is lower than for single-core approach, the performance-latency gap
becomes less evident. Second, the latency gap is compensated by the overall band-
width of the system, which scales much better [60]. The instruction-level parallelism
wall issue is solved by considering the task-level parallelism instead. This allows to
move at parallel programming level, rather than complex hardware to (transparently)
extract instruction-level parallelism from the instruction stream. Finally, multi-core
approach overcomes the complexity wall by considering much simpler cores. Fur-
thermore, a core must be designed once and replicated multiple times inside a chip,
which further cuts the verification effort.
Alongside with the growing number of processing cores integrated on the same
chip, also the on-chip peripherals number increases. This creates a system which is
often referred to as system-on-chip (SoC). As the number of on-chip components
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connected to the same bus-based interconnection was ever-growing, this interconnec-
tion infrastructure quickly became no longer suitable to sustain the meet intensive
parallel communication requirements. To solve this communication bottleneck an
off-chip networking approach was investigated. This led to the implementation of an
on-chip switching network, called network-on-chip (NoC), to interconnect the IP
modules in SoCs.
In the scope of this dissertation a multi-processor SoC (MPSoC) is referred to a
SoC featured with NoC interconnection infrastructure. This term will be referred to
a generic design which could be either homogeneous or heterogeneous for what it
concerns its computing cores.
This section will fill first provide the NoC background both on its structure and its
metrics. Finally, some examples of state-of-the-art MPSoC will be briefly described.
2.1.1 Network-on-Chip: Structure and Design Space
As an MPSoC is characterized by a high number of on chip IPs, a salable intercon-
nection is a must. NoC interconnection has been created to answer this scalability
requirement, as the main idea behind the NoC is the adaptation of the network con-
cept to the context of on-chip interconnection. Furthermore, a NoC allows a much
larger number of solutions for what it concerns, not only routing and arbitration
strategies, but also the organizations of the communication infrastructure as such.
This provides to the designer a large design space and thus allows him/her to adopt a
solution that better fit the project peculiarities.
The first classification of a NoC is made according to its topology. The ring
and mesh topologies are the simplest ones, but also different types of torus are used
(also for commercial products). A schematic view of a NoC with a two-dimensional
(2D) mesh topology can be seen in Fig. 2.1. The figure also shows the path taken
by a packet send by N0 towards N5, assuming XY routing algorithm is used by
the NoC. A detailed view of the same NoC can be seen in Fig. 2.2. It can be
seen how nodes connected through the links forms a network. Each node of such
network is formed by a connected element (CE) connected to a router through the
dedicated network interface (NI). The nodes are connected to each other through
the two mono-directional communication links (or channels). Thus, a NoC can be
seen as composed of tree building blocks: link, router and NI. The structure of
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the NoC is more complex than the one of the bus. This extra complexity does not
only meet the scalability requirement but also allows to implement several different
network communication protocols to better fit a specific set of requirements of a
given application. A CE is not a part of the NoC; however, it will be briefly described
as the only goal of the NoC interconnection is to implement the communication
among CEs.
Fig. 2.1 A schematic view of a 3x3 (2D) mesh topology NoC; N0 to N5 packet path under
XY routing algorithm.
Link
A communication link is made of a set of physical wires and connects two routers
in the network as well as a router and a NI. Each link can be composed of one or
more physical or logical channels, which are groups of wires connection two entities.
Typically, a NoC link has two physical channels making a full-duplex connection
between the routers, i.e., there are two uni-direction channels in opposite directions.
The number of wires per channel, called channel bitwidth, is uniform throughout the
network. A synchronization protocol between the Nsource and Ndestination must be con-
sidered as part of link implementation. Some implementation based on asynchronous
links were also proposed to implement globally asynchronous locally synchronous
(GALS) systems. However, normally synchronous links are used, implemented
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Fig. 2.2 A detailed view of a 3x3 2D mesh topology NoC; R - router; NI - network interface;
CE - connected element.
either by some dedicated wires to support the synchronization mechanism or through
other approaches such as FIFOs. It comes natural for designers to implement fast,
low-power and reliable wiring between the nodes of the NoC.
From the information point of view, a packet is composed of a set of flow control
units or flits. A flit represents an atomic unit of packet. On the other hand, the
minimum amount of data that is transmitted in one link transaction is called phit.
However, usually a flit is exactly equal to a phit, i.e., (once a transmission is initiated)
a flit is transmitted at each NoC clock cycle.
Connected Element
In this dissertation I will call connected element (CE) whatever IP core connected
(through the NI) to a router of the NoC. Thus, in the considered NoC model, a CE
can be either a passive slave (e.g., memory) or an active element (e.g., processor).
Considering the MPSoC-level scope, each CE sees other CEs as global resources
connected through the NoC interconnection. Moreover, a CE can also have local
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resources connected to the local bus. Each node of the NoC (i.e., the related CE) is
considered as a remote resource and mapped to a memory map as any local resources
(if any). Local resources are accessed as usual through the local bus, whereas remote
resources are mapped to the driver in charge of instruct the NI in order to reach the
global resources. Thus, the idea is to make NoC transparent to the CE.
Network Interface
The NI (also called as network adapter) is a peripheral on the local bus of the CE
it is connected to. It receives requests from the local CE according to the protocol
defined on the local bus. The CE can then wait for a response (bus-transaction
communication model) or it can continue its computations, pending an interrupt that
signals that requested data is available at a predefined location on a local memory
(DMA communication model).
The NI performs the following tasks (although some of these tasks can be partially
performed by a software module acting as the NI peripheral driver):
1. Receives requests from the local CE to remote resources, transforms them in
NoC packets, and injects packets inside the NoC;
2. Receives responses from remote resources and sends them to the local CE
according to the BT model or to the DMA model;
3. Receives requests from remote nodes and forwards them on the local bus to
the local CE. The local CE should respond to such requests according to the
implemented model of communication (i.e., bus-transaction or DMA).
Each NI has a look-up table to translate each global resource’s address from the
local memory map to a set of coordinates that identify the position of that resource
on the NoC. The CE in the considered NoC model is either a passive slave or a
processor. A NI can be divided into a front end and a back-end part. The front end
interacts with CE and it is usually implemented as a socket (e.g., AXI [61]). This
part purpose is to make NoC transparent to the CEs it is connected to. The back-end
part is connected to the router and actually manages the communication protocol.
The detailed description of NI is out of the scope of this dissertation.
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Router
A router can be seen as a component, having several input ports and output ports,
and which is in charge of connecting the input ports to the output ports. Apart from
defining the routing algorithm, this component is also in charge of packet collision
management and other tasks. The flow control policies (routing, arbiter, etc.) defines
the overall strategy for moving packets through the NoC. Thus, not only router-
level policies are involved, but also the NoC-level issues are addressed, for instance
deadlock-free routing. Deadlock occurs when network resources are fully occupied
and waiting for each other to be released to proceed with the communication, that
is, when two paths are blocked in a cyclic fashion [62]. Livelock occurs when the
status of the resources keeps changing (there is no deadlock) but the communication
is never completed.
The flow control policies can also address the optimization of the NoC resources
usage, and the communication guarantees insurance. The concept of quality-of-
service (QoS), adopted from its original meaning in networking, describes different
levels of quality. Each of these levels is characterized by different guarantees on the
communication performance. QoS will be detailed further on in Section 2.1.2. The
flow control is typically implemented following the distributed control paradigm,
and this dissertation will only consider this implementation. For distributed control,
each router makes decisions locally.
The concept of virtual channels (VCs) is strictly related to the concept of QoS.
VCs implement the concept of multiplexing a single physical channel over several
logically separate channels with individual and independent buffer queues. Each
of this queue buffer has a different level of priority so same does the related logic
channel. The main goal of a VC implementation is to improve performance by
introducing the concept of priority, and thus the concept of QoS.
The overall strategy of how the data, once injected into NoC by Nsource, moves
through the NoC to reach Ndestination is defined by several aspects:
• The routing algorithm selects the output port to forward the packet to. This
decision is usually based on the information contained inside the packet header
(generally contained inside the first flit). There are several possible routing
algorithms that can be used in a NoC, representing different trade-offs between
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cost and performance. There are several possible ways to classify the routing
algorithms, here on some of these classifications will be listed.
A routing algorithm can be classified according to whether the path is computed
by each router based on the destination information or whether the entire path
is already pre-computed by the sender. The source routing paradigm refers to
the latter scenario, while the former is called destination-based routing. For the
source routing all the information about the path is contained inside the packet,
so the router logic requirements are minimal. The opposite situation is with
destination-based routing, as the routers must be able to compute the path of a
packet based only its Ndestination information (as this is the only information
contained in the packet). On the other hand, source routing will require more
bandwidth with respect to the destination-based paradigm, due to the extra
information describing the path. Furthermore, the amount of this information
(and thus the bandwidth overhead) is proportional to the path length. Generally,
it is considered that to preserve the bandwidth is more valuable than a lower
router complexity. This consideration, combined with the scalability issues of
source routing, make the destination-based routing the most common type of
routing [63].
Yet another important classification regards whether, given two specific nodes,
the path of the packet is always the same or can change (e.g., to avoid a broken
node). The former approach is called deterministic routing paradigm, while the
latter is called adaptive routing. A common deterministic routing is XY routing.
In XY routing, the packet moves through the same row it is injected inside
(i.e., X axis), once it reaches the column Ndestination belongs to, the packet
moves through that column (i.e., Y axis) to the Ndestination [64]. In the adaptive
routing, alternative paths between two nodes may exist. Two examples of
adaptive routing algorithm are negative first and west first algorithms [65].
A concept similar to deterministic-adaptive paradigm is the static-dynamic
routing paradigm. In the static routing paradigm, paths between cores are
defined at system design time an does not change over time. The dynamic
routing, on other hand, generally refers to the possibility of a run-time change
of the routing strategy (e.g., to implement load balancing strategy).
Another classification is based on either there is a single target for each packet
or there are multiple targets. An unicast routing indicates that a packet has a
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single target whereas in the multicast routing a packet can be sent to multiple
NoC nodes simultaneously. Very similar to the former are the broadcast and
narrow-cast communication paradigms. In the broadcast communication, a
packet targets all nodes of the NoC. Finally, a narrow-cast communication is a
communication initiated by a master to target a set of slaves.
A routing algorithm can also be classified according to the length of the path
followed by a packet. A minimal routing is a routing which always guarantees
the shortest path. On the other hand, non-minimal routing algorithms allow
a packet to take paths which are not the shortest. In literature it does exist
several more or less curious routing algorithms, for instance deflective routing.
In this routing scheme a packet that cannot be accepted by the target node, is
deflected into the network (to return later). An example of deflective routing
scheme is potato routing, in which each packet follows the lowest-delay path.
This approach, although potentially solving some congestion issues, present a
high complexity and can potentially lead to bigger issues than the solved ones.
Finally, a routing algorithm should consider deadlocks and livelocks and be
deadlock-free and livelock-free [65, 66].
• While the routing algorithm is in charge of selecting an output port for a packet,
the arbitration policy decides which input port to select when multiple packets
are simultaneously requesting the same output port. One of the most important
classification of arbitration approach is whether a delay communication model
or a loss communication model is used. The former model allows the packets
(flits) to be delayed (stalled) but does not allow a packet to be destroyed
(dropped). In the loss model a packet can also be destroyed (e.g., to implement
preemption) [64]. However, the loss communication model is not trivial to
implement. A packet can be distributed through the network (e.g., using
wormhole routing) and its destruction will be neither immediate nor free.
Furthermore, a re-transmission logic must be implemented.
As any of the policies, also the one implemented by the arbitration logic can
be either static (fixed) or dynamic (variable).
From the strictly implementation point of view, an arbiter can be either dis-
tributed or centralized. In the centralized approach there is a unique logic,
multiple request lines are used by different input ports to request the usage
of the required output port. The centralized arbiter can guarantee fairness,
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and usually round robin arbitration scheme is used. In distributed approach is
usually more complex than centralized one. This implementation approach
associates a part the overall logic to each input port. The decision of such
sub-units is that compared based on the priority or other factors. A central-
ized implementation usually targets the fairness and the simplicity, whereas
distributed arbitration targets the latency and the priority-based schemes.
• The switching policy defines how the data is transmitted from the source node
to the destination one. The main distinction is whether between the store-and-
forward switching and packet switching approaches. In the circuit switching
(also known as store-and-forward switching) approach the whole path (includ-
ing routers and channels) from source to node is previously established (by the
header) and reserved for the transmission of the whole packet. The advantage
of such approach is to increase throughput and also requires less memory
elements (i.e., buffers) with respect to the other approaches. The cost, on the
other hand, is the increase of latency. This is in part due to the time needed to
establish a connection. But mostly there is an overall latency issue as a part
of circuit is privatized for the time of transmission, which makes many other
communications impossible for all the time, starting from circuit reservation
procedure start till the end of transmission. In the packet switching approach
on the other hand, the first flit of a packet (i.e., header flit) progressively estab-
lishes the connection as it moves through the NoC. There are several different
buffering and forward strategies to implement this approach.
In the store-and-forward strategy, a node receives (and stores) the complete
packet before it starts to forward this packet to the next node in the path. This
strategy requires that the buffer size is big enough to store the whole packet.
The advantage of this strategy is not to occupy links in case of a stall condition.
The wormhole strategy, on the other hand, the data (flit) is forwarded to next
in the path node as soon as the latter can receive it (not necessarily the whole
packet). This approach reduces the latency but, in case of stalling, many links
can remain blocked.
The virtual-cut-through mechanism can be seen as an improvement of store-
and-forward mechanism, which creates a solution similar to the approach used
in wormhole mechanism. As in store-and-forward approach, each router has
buffers capable to store the whole packet. The data transmission is similar
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to the wormhole approach but, flow control allocates buffers and channel
bandwidth on a packet level. This means that a sender node waits for a
confirmation that the whole packet can be accepted by the next node in the
path, before forwarding any data (to that next node).
The main advantage of virtual-cut-through strategy over wormhole strategy is
that the former does not occupy any links in case of stalling. This advantage
comes with a cast of bigger buffers needed, as the whole packet must be stored
in cased of stalling.
• The buffering policy is the decision on number, location and size of buffers
used to store packets data. In this dissertation I will use FIFO as a synonym
of buffer, as it is most common buffer implementation and basically the only
which is relevant in scope of this thesis. As already seen for switching policy,
the size of a buffer can be either big enough to store an entire packet of data
or it can be smaller. Additionally, it must be decided whether to have a single
shared (by all the ports) buffer or to have a dedicated buffer per each port, or
even have a dedicated buffer both for both input and output direction (two
buffers per port).
As a memory element size is much bigger with respect to the size of a logic
element, the buffering policy has a huge impact on performance, router size
and its power consumption.
A distributed approach based on a single buffer shared among all the router
ports will provide a huge chip area and power consumption advantage with
respect to the design based on per-port buffer. On the other hand, the distributed
approach and/or an unduly small FIFOs can, under certain condition, provoke
a high congestion levels and make the NoC very inefficient or even completely
blocked.
There are several very different NoC architectures, both from academic and
industrial side. However, it can be observed the presence of some common design
trends among available NoCs [67, 68]. The most common implementation is a 2D
mesh topology. The wormhole strategy is mostly used as it allows an efficient usage
of NoC resources. Considering the mesh topology XY routing is very common as it
is both simple and efficient. Concerning the buffering, usually input buffering is the
only implemented as this solution is a good trade-off between cost and performance.
Fig. 2.3 depicts a typical router architecture (used in 2D mesh NoCs).
32 Processor-based Critical Systems
Fig. 2.3 A schematic view of a simple NoC router architecture for 2D mesh topology: input-
buffered, based on a single physical network with no virtual channels, link made of two
physical channels (one per direction).
2.1.2 NoC Performance Parameters
There are three main parameters to evaluate the performance of a NoC: bandwidth,
latency and throughput.
• The bandwidth is the maximum speed at which data moves through the NoC.
The unit of measure for bandwidth is bit per second (bps) and usually the bits
of the whole packet (including heading and tail) are considered.
• Latency is the time elapsed from the moment the first data of the packet has
been injected inside the NoC to the moment the packet has been completely
received by Ndestination. The unit of measure for latency is time, and often it is
expressed in terms of (NoC) clock cycles. Normally the NoC is considered as a
whole and the average latency is inferred as well as its standard deviation [69].
However, in the context of critical systems, the maximum latency of single
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packet is the most important metric. The maximum latency is also called as
worst-case traversal time (WCTT)
• Throughput is defined as the maximum traffic accepted by the network, i.e.,
the maximum amount of information delivered per time unit [69]. The unit of
measure for throughput is packets per time (i.e., per second or per clock cycle).
Normally the throughput is normalized by the size of the messages and by the
size of the network. One can have a normalized throughput (independently
from the size of the messages and of the network) by dividing it by the size
of the messages and by the size of the network. In this way, normalized
throughput will refer to the number of bits each node on average is sending
per a unit of time (i.e., per second of per clock cycle).
QoS for on-chip networks is an adaptation of the off-chip QoS. It is used for
the packet-switched telecommunication and does not measure the service quality,
instead it describes the traffic prioritization policies and resource reservation control
mechanisms. A possible definition of QoS is as service quantification that is provided
by the network to the demanding core [64]. The previous definition needs a definition
of a required service and a quantification measure. Usually, a required service is
defined as a set of figures of the performance metrics of the network (e.g., latency,
throughput) QoS levels can be grouped in two macro-groups [70]:
• best-effort (BE) QoS level: as the name suggests, this level does not provide
any guarantee on the transmission. The only guarantees that are provided are
those directly implied by the particular NoC architecture. For instance, in case
arbitration has been implemented by the delay communication model, then it
is guaranteed that the packet will not be destroyed (i.e., if not stuck forever,
will sooner or later arrive to its Ndestination).
• guaranteed services (GS) QoS level: the traffic having this level is granted with
a set of specific guarantees. For instance, a maximum latency or a minimum
throughput.
In the scope of this dissertations, GS level will only refer to case where the guaranteed
metric is formally computed (i.e., not statistically inferred). The main reason for
this, is the fact that predictability is a crucial aspect for a critical system. In case an
architecture provides a stochastic GS, for instance minimum latency is statistically
inferred, this architecture will be considered to be unable to provide a sufficiently
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high level of QoS. There are several intermediate QoS levels proposed, which can
be positioned somewhere in the middle between GS and BE levels. However, in
the scope of this dissertation, the only relevant distinction is GS QoS level versus
non-GS QoS level, where the latter will be referred as BE.
2.1.3 MPSoC examples
In this section I briefly present some of the MPSoC platforms. The scope of this
section is to provide a general idea, while a more complete and detailed description
can be found in literature [68, 67, 71].
• Arteris FlexNoC
Arteris FlexNoC [72] is not a MPSoC rather a suite for analyzing, synthesizing,
and optimizing NoCs. Arteris, currently acquired by Qualcomm, is one
of the leading commercial NoC tool providers [73], working with major
semiconductor houses like Baidu, Mobileye, Samsung, Huawei / HiSilicon,
Toshiba and NXP. The FlexNoC allows to automatically generate network
topologies and to edit these interconnects down to the router level.
• Xeon Phi
Xeon Phi [74] denotes the Knights family of x86-based MPSoCs by Intel.
This MPSoC was developed for high-performance computing and especially
supercomputers, servers, and high-end workstations. It comprises up to 38
computing elements (called tiles), several memory controllers, I/O controllers
and other IPs. These CEs are interconnected through a cache-coherent 2D
mesh NoC. Each tile is composed of two cores, two vector processing units
(VPUs) per core, and a 1-Mbyte level-2 (L2) cache that is shared between
the two cores. Each core is an Intel Atom adaptation, heavily upgraded to
incorporate features necessary for high-performance computing.
However, Xeon Phi line was not the success that Intel was expecting. However,
the serious issues Intel facing with the 10 nanometer manufacturing processes
is the main factor for the sunset of Xeon Phi. Intel will ship Xeon Phi 7200s
until July 19, 2019 [75].
• Tilera Tile
The Tile architecture was conceived as a research processor developed at
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MIT [76]. Then Tilera start-up, founded by the original research group, first
commercialized it. The Tile architecture was one of the first examples of a
cluster-based many-core, featuring a NoC interconnection. Currently, TILE-
Gx™ family is optimized for intelligent networking, multimedia and cloud
applications. The device includes up to 72 identical processor cores (tiles)
interconnected with the iMesh™ NoC. The latter is a 2D mesh NoC actually
made of five distinct networks, using XY routing and wormhole switching.
Each tile contains a single processor core, with local L1 (64 KB) and a portion
(256 KB) of the distributed L2 cache.
• STMicroelectronics STHORM
STHORM [77, 78] stands for a ST(microelectronics) Heterogeneous lOw
poweR Many-core, also known as Platform 2012. This MPSoC has been devel-
oped targeting to imaging, video, computational photography and augmented
reality. STHORM is composed of four clusters, a fabric controller and memory
controllers interconnected via two asynchronous NoC. Each cluster contains
16 STxP70 Processing Elements, each of which has a 32-bit dual-issue RISC
processor with an operating frequency ranging up to 600 MHz. STHORM
delivers up to 80 GOps (single-precision floating point) with only 2W power
consumption.
• Kalray MPPA-256
The Kalray MPPA-256 processor [20] has been developed by the company
KALRAY, targeting low-to-medium volume professional applications, where
low energy per operation and time predictability are the primary requirements.
The processor is manufactured in 28 nm CMOS technology and integrates
a total of 288 identical very long instruction word cores. These cores are
composed of 256 processing engines and 32 resource manager cores and are
organized in 16 compute clusters and four I/O subsystems interconnected
through the NoC. Each cluster is holds 17 cores: 16 processing engines and 1
resource manager core.
The NoC is implemented by the two identical networks having 2D-wrapped-
around torus topology and based on wormhole approach. It features bi-
directional links providing a full duplex bandwidth up to 3.2 GB/s between
two adjacent nodes.
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2.2 Dependability
The dependability can be defined in many ways, one of which is presented in [1] as:
“the trustworthiness of a computing system that allows reliance to be justifiably
placed on the services it delivers.”
The dependability concept can be simplified to the concept of “likelihood that
the system will function properly”. At this point it is important to identify what does
exactly means that a system is functioning properly, i.e., to identify dependability
attributes. It is as well important to identify which are the threats to this proper
functioning and which are the means to cope with these threats.
2.2.1 Attributes
There several accepted definitions for the dependability attributes. The definitions
used in this thesis are [79]:
• availability: the readiness for service or the probability that service delivered
by a system is correct at any given time;
• reliability: the probability that the system delivers a service correctly at a time
T given that it was continuously delivering correct service from a time T0,
T0 < T ;
• integrity: the capability of avoiding improper alterations:
– system integrity: the ability of detecting a fault and to inform the user;
– data integrity: the ability of preventing and correcting errors in the system
database.
• safety: the capability of avoiding injuries for the individuals or catastrophic
consequences for the environment;
• maintainability: the capability of being repaired and evolved.
Safety and reliability are the aspects this dissertation puts focus upon. There are
three aspects of system safety, which are [80]:
• primary safety: consequences inflicted directly by hardware (e.g., burns, elec-
tric shock);
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• functional safety: consequences directly inflicted by a system failure (e.g.,
aircraft crash due to the flight-control system failure);
• indirect safety: the indirect consequences of a system failure (e.g., corruption
of a medical database).
2.2.2 Threats
Dependability threats are any phenomena that can negatively affect the dependability
of a system. In this thesis I will use the following terminology [79]:
• fault: a defect in a system, which presence may or may not lead to a failure of
the system;
• error: a fault evolved into a discrepancy, inside the system boundary, between
the intended behavior of a system and its actual behavior. The presence of an
error may or may not lead to a failure of the system;
• failure: an error evolved into a discrepancy, outside the system boundary,
between the intended behavior of a system and its actual behavior. I.e., a
discrepancy affecting the functionalities provided by the system.
In the literature it can be found several slightly different definitions of the term
defect, especially for what it concerns its relationship with the concept of fault.
From the above definition of fault, it is implied that a defect is defined as a variance
between expected and actual of any aspect of the system. In order to avoid confusion,
the term fault can be defined as: “any aspect of the system able, under a given
circumstances, to provoke an error.”
A fault inside the system can exist both inside a hardware component (hardware
fault) or inside a software component (software fault or more commonly bug). The
nature of a fault can be very different as very different can be the time the fault
appears. In order to evolve into an error, a fault must be excited. For instance, a fault
present in a system module which is never used, will never be exited and will never
become an error.
Once a fault evolves into error, the same way seen for fault excitement, this error
may or may not affect the services delivered by the system. For instance, a variable
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can have a wrong value, but if this variable is never used, then the error will never
have a chance to evolve into system failure.
An error is located, by definition, inside the system boundary. This means that
the function delivered by the system is not affected and thus the presence of the
error cannot be understood by observing the functionalities delivered by the system.
However, the presence of an error can be identified by the dedicated mechanisms.
Taxonomy of Faults
The faults are normally classified in eight elementary fault classes, according to the
following basic viewpoints [79]:
• Phase of creation or occurrence:
– Development faults;
– Operational faults;
• System boundaries:
– Internal faults;
– External faults;
• Phenomenological cause:
– Natural faults;
– Human-Made faults;
• Dimension:
– Hardware faults;
– Software faults;
• Objective:
– Non-Malicious faults;
– Malicious faults;
• Intent:
– Non-Deliberate faults;
– Deliberate faults;
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• Capacity:
– Accidental faults;
– Incompetence faults;
• Persistence:
– Permanent faults;
– Transient faults;
This section will not go into detail of each and every of these classes, an interested
reader can find more information in [2, 79]. The classes relevant in the scope of the
dissertation are:
• The life cycle of the system is divided into two periods: a development phase
and a use phase (also called mission phase). Development faults are those
introduced during the development phase, while the operational faults are
related to the mission phase of the system.
• Human-made faults, as the name states, are introduced by the human. On the
other hand, natural faults are caused by natural phenomena without human
participation.
• An important, although obvious distinction is the one of hardware faults which
appear inside a hardware component and the software faults which appear
inside software components.
• Finally, a permanent faults is a fault which can never disappear once it is inside
the system, while a transient fault can disappear. An intermittent faults are
often considered as a further type of fault for the persistence class. This fault is
a particular type of transient fault and it is characterized by the high frequency
it appears and disappears.
Taxonomy of Errors
When errors are considered, a slightly different notation is adopted. Often, the same
word is used to describe slightly different situations, which can create confusion. In
order to avoid this confusion, in this thesis I will use the following terminology:
• Damage level:
40 Processor-based Critical Systems
– Destructive errors;
– Non-destructive errors;
• Persistence:
– Soft errors;
– Hard errors;
This classification is important to distinguish different situations. The destructive
errors are defined as those which will persist inside the system once they appear.
The non-destructive errors are the opposite of the former. For what it concerns soft
errors they are defined as errors for which “a reset or rewriting of the device causes
normal device behavior thereafter.” On the other hand, a hard error is not defined as
the evolution of a permanent fault, instead it is the opposite of a soft error. In practice
that can either mean that normal device behavior can be restored by a power cycle or
that it cannot be restored. This classification allows to identify the case in which a
transient fault evolves in a non-destructive hard error. As the error is non-destructive
and fault is transient, this means that the problem is only located inside the logical
dimension and can be removed by a computer reboot. An implication of the above
definitions is that a soft error can only be non-destructive.
Thesis Contribution Focus
The main contribution of this thesis (Chapter 3) targets the software faults of whatever
class. The second contribution of this thesis (Chapter 4) targets the software faults
of whatever class as well. The third contribution of this thesis (Chapter 5) concerns
the hardware natural mission-phase transient faults. In particular, the focus is on the
radiation-induce soft errors, which are described in detail in the following part of
this section.
Radiation-Induced Faults and Errors
A radioactive environment is defined as an environment capable of exchange energy
with the system in the form of radiation particles. This exchange can induce failure
into the system.
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Originally these radiation-induced faults were a prerogative of aerospace systems,
as these systems can operate inside highly radioactive environment. However, due to
the extremely shrink technology and low threshold voltages, this issue is becoming
more relevant for avionics and even on ground for high performance computing and
automotive.
A detailed analysis of either the effects of radiation on electronic circuits, or
physical mechanisms radiation act, are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
The main effect of radiations on an electronic system concerns its integrated
circuits. A particle strike on a transistor, if the particle has a sufficient energy, can
create a current which can create a fault.
First classification of the radiation effects distinguishes between:
• single event effect (SEE): the effect of a single particle;
• total ionizing dose (TID): the effect of the total exposition to radiation;
The TID effect is a cumulative effect of the damages suffered by the system due to
the particle strikes. TID effect is important when long space missions are considered,
especially those operating inside the highly radioactive regions (e.g., Van Allen belts)
of the space [81]. When the TID of a component exceeds its tolerable threshold, the
component breaks down. As TID is a permanent fault, the system is incapable of
providing its service till the damaged components are replaced. However, for a space
mission it is often impossible to replace a component. This means that components
with a sufficiently high TID tolerable threshold should be selected at design phase.
The focus of thesis, for what it concerns the contribution described in (Section
5), is put upon SEE instead. The effects of SEE are generally classified as follows:
• single event upset (SEU)
(non-destructive, soft error)
• single event latchup (SEL)
(non-destructive or destructive, hard error)
• single event burnout (SEB)
(destructive error)
A single event upset SEU is a non-destructive soft error is defined by NASA [82]
as: “a change of state or transient induced by an energetic particle such as a cosmic
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ray or proton in a device.”
A SEU can be further classified according to the spatial characteristic of the effect:
• single event transient (SET);
• single-bit upset (SBU);
• multiple-bit upset (MBU);
A single-bit upset SBU refers to the flipping of one bit inside a memory element
of the system. A multiple-bit upset MBU is the bits causing simultaneous flipping
of multiple bits of the memory elements of the system (provoked by the same SEU.
Finally, the single event transient (SET) error considers the particle strike of the logic
circuit and represents a voltage disturbance inside the latter. A SET can eventually
propagate through the logic becoming either an SBU or an MBU.
A single event upset SEL is an either destructive or non-destructive hard error
which can be defined as an error caused by a high current state. This error can
be provoked, for instance, (considering CMOS technology) by PNPN parasitic
structures activation. Although this is not a destructive error, a high current can
induce several distributive faults.
A single event burnout SEB is a destructive error and identifies a permanent
device destruction due to the high current state in a power transistor.
For what it concerns the failure classification, single event functional interrup-
tion (SEFI) failure is defined to identify a specific type of SEU induced failure.
A SEFI is defined as a SEU-induced failure, with is abrupt and immediately ob-
served. The main characteristic of a SEFI is that this failure does not require power
cycling of the device (i.e., turn off and back on) to restore its normal functioning.
A SEFI has been defined to describe a situation in which a bit flip (often in a bit
register) makes the system restart or hang. This means that a (radiation-induced)
fault immediately evolve in a severe failure of the system. The immediacy aspect
of a SEFI is fundamental, as this means that no software-implemented approach
can be adopted to prevent the error (SEU) from evolving into a failure. This means
that, if hardware-implemented fault tolerance is not properly implemented a single
ionization particle strike will provoke a complete failure of the system. It worth to
notice how a SEFI differs in many aspects from a SEL induced failure. The more
apparent difference concerns the fact that, to restore the correct functioning, the latter
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will require to power cycle the device. However, the most important difference lies
in the immediacy a SEU becomes a SEFI, which does not allow the error detection.
2.2.3 Means
The literature [2] categorizes means to achieve a desired dependability as:
• Fault prevention: means to prevent the occurrence or introduction of faults;
• Fault tolerance: means to avoid service failures in the presence of faults;
• Fault removal: means to reduce the number and severity of faults;
• Fault forecasting: means to estimate the present number, the future incidence,
and the likely consequences of faults.
Fault prevention means aim to prevent the occurrence or introduction of faults.
Examples of this category are: software development process improvement, chip
manufacturing processes improvement, packaging protecting from radiations.
Fault tolerance means means aim to avoid service failures in the presence of
faults. As the main contribution of this thesis falls in this category, this is particularly
relevant in the scope of this dissertation. are the most relevant in the scope of this
thesis, as it concerns the main contribution of the latter. Fault tolerance means
aim at failure avoidance by either detection and recovery and/or masking. The
detection can be done at both fault- and error-level and it is generally achieved
by means of redundancy, which can be done at any system hierarchy level. An
important classification of fault tolerance strategies concerns whether a fault detection
takes place or not as well as the moment it takes place (in case fault detection is
implemented). Detection and recovery implementation strategy is characterized by
first detect the error and then to perform a recovery action. Masking (and recovery)
implementation strategy, on the other hand, uses the redundancy means to mask
the error and to provide the service continuation. Normally the error is also the
detection feature, as this will allow a more efficient error handling (e.g., corrective
maintenance process activation). Thus, this approach normally implements fault
recovery features as well. The term resilience is sometime used in literature as a
synonym of fault tolerance and sometime as the general characteristic of the system
to resist the fault appearance (e.g., usage of packages shielding against radioactivity).
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To avoid such ambiguity, in this dissertation I will use the term resilience in a broad
sense, targeting both the previously listed cases.
Fault removal means aim to reduce the number and severity of faults. This means
can be both applied at design time and mission time. Fault removal means applied
at design time are based on verification, diagnosis, correction; An example of this
case is the housekeeping sensor data analyses used to diagnose potential design
problems, thus, the design is modified accordingly. An interested reader can refer to
[83], where the author gives a small contribution to the described example, which is
not described in this thesis. Fault removal means can be also applied at mission time
by replacing physically damaged parts or applying patches.
Fault forecasting means aim to estimate the present number, the future incidence,
and the likely consequences of faults. The main approaches for probabilistic fault-
forecasting are modeling and (evaluation) testing, which are complementary.
2.3 Safety-critical, Mission-critical and Non-critical
Systems
A mixed-criticality system can be seen as a generic case of a critical system; thus,
the latter is a crucial concept of the context of this dissertation.
The term critical system is a generic name which can refer either to safety-critical
system or to a mission-critical system. The difference between those systems is
relevant also for this dissertation, so the following distinction must be done:
• safety-critical system;
• mission-critical system;
• non-critical system.
A safety-critical system is a system that in case of failure can provoke injuries
or death of individuals. In some case a safety critical system also concerns severe
environmental damage. The main requirement for such systems is safety (see Section
2.2.1). Typical examples of such systems are automotive, avionics and railway
systems.
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A mission-critical system, which failure will provoke considerable financial
losses, but not the consequences characterizing a safety-critical system. The main
requirements for such systems are reliability, availability and maintainability (RAM)
(see Section 2.2.1). Typical examples of such systems are satellite systems.
Finally, a non-critical systems is a system which neither safety-critical nor
mission-critical. The failure of such system is not able to affect the health of people,
provoke environmental damage or considerable economical loss.
2.4 Mixed-criticality: Requirements and Issues
This section has two goals, first of all, to describe the requirements a mixed-criticality
system (MCS) must fulfill, according to the industrial standards. Secondly, to identify
the MCS-specific issues for what it concerns the usage of MPSoC.
First of all, it is fundamental to understand the relation between an MCS and
the industrial standards it must fulfill. In fact, an MCS is just a particular type
of a critical system, and there are industrial standards specifically targeting the
mixed criticality nature of this system. In other words, industrial standards do not
provide any requirements specifically for an MCS and the latter must fulfill the
same requirements as any other critical system. Thus, the main point is that mixed-
criticality attribute presents several additional issues, rather than a set of additional
requirements.
In this dissertation I will mostly refer to the avionic standards (e.g., DO-178C
[9]) and space standards (e.g., ECSS-Q-ST-80C [84]). However, the basic functional
safety standard IEC-61508 [8] will be considered as well.
2.4.1 Critical System Design
During the development phase of a critical system lifecycle, a list of requirements
must be created to list the system expected behavior and characteristics. These
requirements are included the functional requirements, i.e., which are the services
a system should provide, but also the non-functional ones. The latter concerns the
dependability attributes desired figures and other constrains like energy budget.
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This section briefly explains the main aspects of a safety-critical design flow,
with a particular focus on avionic standards. The mission-critical system will not
be explicitly considered; however, the fundamental concepts are essentially the
same [14]. At a certain extent, a mission-critical system can be seen as a sort of
safety-critical system in which the concept of human safety is replaced with the
concept of mission safety. I.e., the focus is moved from avoiding harm to individuals
to avoiding the mission failure and the key attributes become reliability, availability
and maintainability (RAM).
The most important aspect for a safety-critical system, as the name suggests, is
the safety aspect (attribute) of the system dependability. In this section and in this
dissertation in general, I will only consider functional safety (see Section 2.2.1) as
the latter is the more relevant for the topic of the dissertation. The safety assessment
process is in charge of characterizing the failure conditions from the safety point
of view (e.g. through a hazard analysis). Starting from desired safety figures,
safety assessment process derives a list of safety-related requirements, concerning
both hardware and software components. These requirements can be classified as
mechanisms to:
• prevent a fault occurrence;
• mitigate the effects of errors and/or failures;
• avoid the propagation of errors and/or failures.
The rest of this Sub-section will first describe an avionic safety-critical system
development lifecycle, providing a brief overview of the safety assessment process
and the related the development assurance level (DAL) assignment. Then, the
partitioning concept will be specifically considered.
Safety Assessment Process
A modern aircraft is an example of a complex system, for which the safety aspect
is of paramount importance. Due to its complexity this system can be seen as a
system of systems, thus a rigorous methodology is required to effectively address
this complexity. The first revision (ARP4754 [85]) of ARP4754A (Guidelines For
Development Of Civil Aircraft and Systems) [86] was published in 1996, written
by a team of aircraft and avionics manufacturers with participation of certification
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authorities. The current version purpose is to define an accepted development
assurance process, where the development is related to entire system development
process. ED-79A (Guidelines for development of civil aircraft and systems) [86]
is an European equivalent of ARP4754A. In this thesis I will refer to the standards
recognized by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which is governmental body
of the United States. However, for each of them, an European equivalent exists,
recognized by European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE).
With the purpose of the aircraft safety assessment, according to ARP4754A,
the first task to be performed is typically the Safety Program Plan. It identifies the
process to follow in order to assess the aircraft safety, safety standards will be applied,
and other aspects related to the former process. This thesis will not go into detail on
the ARP4754A process as such, nor into the details of all the integral processes it
defines. Only the safety assessment process will be taking into consideration.
The safety assessment process identified by ARP4754A is intended to run parallel
to the system development process and achieved by the means described in ARP4761
[87] (entitled Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process
on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment).
The first step of the safety assessment is hazard assessment. It is performed
after the basic functionalities (and their conceptual design) are defined. A hazard
is defined in FAA Order 8040.4 [88] as a “condition, event, or circumstance that
could lead to or contribute to an unplanned or undesired event.” Chap. 2 of FAA
System Safety Handbook [89] states that hazard identification and analysis shall
“identify the safety risks associated with the system or operations under evaluation.
The risks shall be characterized in terms of severity of consequence and likelihood
of occurrence ...”
The following step, which can be generically called "fault analysis", assigns
the severity levels to the functions associated with the identified hazards. Table 2.1
shows the severity classifications with the assurance levels and required probabilities
for a large transport category aircraft.
The design assurance level (DAL) according to ARP4761 [87] is:
the measure of rigor applied to the development process to limit, to a
level acceptable for safety, the likelihood of errors occurring during the
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Table 2.1 DAL: failure condition severity, probabilities [1/flight hour], and levels
Severity Classification Design Assurance Level Probability
Catastrophic A 1×10−9
Hazardous B 1×10−7
Major C 1×10−5
Minor D 1×10−3
No safety effect E 1
development process of aircraft/system functions and items that have an
adverse safety effect if they are exposed in service.
A simplified view of the DAL concept is considered in this thesis. Considering the
reliability attribute to describe the continuity of service (as described in Section 2.2.1,
each severity level implies a given reliability figure. Thus, a DAL can be seen as a
set of design process requirements, aiming to assure that the estimated reliability
(e.g., of a component) is trustworthy.
Safety assessment process performs, among others, DAL assignment at the
system level. The software and electronic hardware components are called items in
ARP4754A. RTCA DO-178C is applied to the software items, while RTCA DO-254
is applied to hardware items. Item DAL (IDAL) concerns the software and electronic
hardware, while functional DAL (FDAL) concerns the system’s functional level and it
is out of the scope of this thesis. ARP4754A explains the IDAL assignment approach,
specifying what DO-178C objectives apply for software or DO-254 objectives for
electronic hardware. An interested reader will find more information in [90]. The
IDAL is called a software level in DO-178C. However, in order to avoid confusion,
in this thesis the term DAL will be normally used.
The means to perform the DAL assignment, as any other means used for safety
assessment process, are specified in ARP4761. The most known techniques are
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA).
The first is a top-down technique while the second is generally used as a bottom-
up approach. These can be seen as complementary techniques and Section 3.2 of
ARP4761 explains how these techniques relay on each other.
Once safety assessment process is performed, each item is assigned with a DAL,
which is the highest among the DAL of the functions that item implements. Each
DAL implies a set of strict requirements concerning:
2.4 Mixed-criticality: Requirements and Issues 49
• failure prevention;
• failure propagation avoidance;
• failure effect mitigation.
Most importantly, a DAL specifies requirements in terms of methodologies to be
used, to fulfill the aforementioned.
Fault Effects Isolation: Partitioning
As seen in the previous section, a DAL establishes a set of requirements on failure
prevention and failure propagation avoidance. To achieve these requirements the
components (i.e., items according to ARP4754A) must be properly isolated from
each other to prevent error propagation and/or failure propagation.
The partitioning concept is of paramount importance for any critical system
(not only for a safety-critical system nor for the avionics domain). The partitioning
goal is to provide system components with sufficient independence, without which
the very concept component falls. In fact, given two components (e.g., software
components), if a sufficient independence cannot be demonstrated between two,
then these are actually not components for what it concerns the hazard analysis
(Section 2.4.1). Instead, these two objects have be considered as macro-component,
having the highest failure severity of the two. For instance, if the isolation is not
implemented at all, then there will not be a component severity level but only a
severity level of a system as the whole.
The partitioning can be seen as tool to achieve hierarchical design and thus to
implement the well-known divide et impera principle (i.e., the principle of splitting
a problem into two more simple ones and solve them separately). In fact, given
two independent functions, these can be implemented by (i) a monolithic system or
(ii) by a dedicated sub-system each and the overall system done by the cooperation
of these sub-systems. The second solution is the well-known hierarchical design
approach, and it is possible if the sub-components are sufficiently isolated from each
other (otherwise the design will result monolithic). It is easy to understand that in
case it’s crucial to assure a system will (virtually) never fail, it is essential to split the
system into simpler sub-systems to achieve a manageable level of complexity.
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The software partitioning described in DO-178C is very similar to the description
provided in IEC-61508. Under RTCA DO-178C, the following software design
methods are described: partitioning, dissimilarity (of multi-versioning) and safety
monitoring. The software component isolation should be implemented by the par-
titioning. This is one of the most important design instruments (or concepts) to
safety-critical systems (not only for avionics domain). The multi-versioning con-
sists in two or more components implementing the same function to be developed
independently. The goal of this technique is to provide the redundancy (thus to
improve the reliability) to the system, while avoiding common source of errors.
Finally, the safety monitoring is an active mechanism to implement the protection
against specific failures. This mechanism also monitors the correct functioning of
the partitioning technique.
The partitioning mechanism, described by the RTCA DO-178C, must address
both the extent and the scope of the interactions between the partitioned components
as well as how to isolate the components from each other. The isolation must be
achieved in both spatial and temporal domains. Spatial isolation means that one
application shall not corrupt data of another application. Temporal isolation on other
hand concerns the timing properties and means that one application shall not cause
failure (i.e., deadline miss) of another application by blocking a shared resource (e.g.,
CPU, interconnection). To achieve spatial isolation is relatively easy as the hardware
means like memory management unit (MMU) can be exploit. The situation with the
temporal isolation is more complex. The safety-critical domain is niche market so
the COTS MPSoC features no hardware means to address with temporal isolation
issue. On the other hand, the development of custom solutions should justify the
related NRE cost.
DO-178C requires the designer to address the partitioning implementation rigor-
ously defining:
• all the interactions that will be allowed between the (partitioned) components;
• the (hardware, software or hybrid) techniques used to isolate the components
from each other.
DO-178C also establishes five requirements on the partitioning implementation:
• the code and data of a software component must be isolated from the other
components;
2.4 Mixed-criticality: Requirements and Issues 51
• software component is only allowed to consume CPU time during its scheduled
period of execution;
• each component must implements proper error and failure containment tech-
niques;
• software that implements the partitioning, should have the same or higher DAL
than the highest DAL among the partitioned components.
• if the partitioning is implemented via hardware, the safety assessment per-
formed on that hardware must explicitly consider its partitioning functionality.
2.4.2 Mixed-criticality System: Processor Level
A mixed-criticality system (MCS) is a critical system composed of components
having different DALs (SIL, ASIL, etc.).
When academic literature and the industrial standards are considered, the term
criticality is used to indicate similar — but still different — concepts. In this
dissertation level of criticality will be used as a synonym of level of severity of the
component failure.
Being an airplane a complex system, basically a system of systems, the mixed
criticality concept can be applied at different hierarchical levels. The mixed-criticality
concept concerning the high level, i.e., view of systems being themselves components
of the overall system (i.e., airplane system), is not an open issue and it is out of the
scope of this thesis. In fact, the open issue is a creation of a MPSoC-based system
integrating multiple software components on the same processing platform, not the
isolation between such systems (as the latter will be implemented in the exactly the
same way it is implemented currently for non-MPSoC systems).
In this thesis I will focus on a particular case of MCS: software components
having different DAL running on the same processing platform. I.e., mixed-criticality
paradigm adopted to the computer level: functions (the related software modules)
with different DAL running on the same processing element. From now on, I will
use the term MCS to refer to this particular kind of MCS only.
The partitioning concept, described in Section 2.4.1 in not an MCS’s prerogative
(i.e., not an MCS’s uniqueness). However, the partitioning is critical for such systems
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and it can be identified as the main issue preventing multi-core and MPSoC from
being used.
From the requirements and issues presented in Section 2.4.1, it should be clear
how the federated architecture (i.e., one function - one computer) paradigm was
an easy solution to assure the isolation between the components of the system.
However, the ever-growing number of functions and their complexity made federated
architecture paradigm no longer sustainable. Driven by the growing maintenance cost
and other factors, industry developed several standards (e.g., [12], [7]) to standardize
the possibility for multiple functions (related software components) to run on the
same hardware platform. Furthermore, even the execution of software components
having different DAL (or level related to the specific domain) was standardized.
Thus, the mixed-criticality paradigm was adopted at processor level.
For avionics, ARINC 653 [12] defined APplication EXecutive (APEX) appli-
cation programming interface (API) standard. This API was intended to decouple
the operating system from the application software. This allowed to run more
applications, even having different DAL, on the same computer.
2.5 MPSoC-based Mixed-criticality System
The concepts presented in the previous sections are related to a general processing
element, without specifically targeting either single-core or multi-core processing
element (chip). However, as the system evolution started from single-core processors,
the standardization did the same. Currently, at the best of my knowledge, there are
no multi-processor–based MCS standardized for the main critical domains.
The aviation domain community constantly increase their attention towards
multi-core processor–based MCSs. Considering the avionic domain, the question on
whether the DO-178B/C and DO-254 are adequate and sufficient to cover multi-core
processor seems to be still unanswered. However, the issue is under investigation
and it is addressed by several technical reports issued by or in collaboration with
the certification authorities. These both considers the selection (and evaluation)
of microprocessors [91, 92] and the specific issues related to the usage of COTS
microprocessors [93].
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Recently, a technical report was issued by FAA entitled Assurance of multicore
processors in airborne systems [94]. This report identifies the lack of predictability as
the main concern regarding the use of MCPs in the safety-critical aerospace domain.
It also, among other things, explicitly targets the interference-aware safety analysis,
identifying three sequential steps:
1. the identification of an interference path;
2. performance of an interference analysis to tag each interference channel as
acceptable, unacceptable, unbounded, or faulty;
3. determination of interference mitigation.
Among the expected-soon certificated multi-processor–based MCS, the closest
one seems to be the one in process by Rockwell Collins [13], which is expected by
the end of 2019. This certification targets the NXP T2080 processor, featuring four
cores and several peripherals.
The MPSoC device (discussed in Section 2.5) is an evolution of multi-core pro-
cessor. The issues related to this kind of devices are identical to those related to
multi-core processors. The key difference is the presence of NoC interconnection
which presents an additional complexity with respect to the classic bus-based inter-
connection. However, the NoC brings more flexibility. This can be the key to cope
with its complexity. Furthermore, the MPSoC paradigm is based on the concept of
integrating more-but-simpler-cores, with respect to the tread of creating complex out
of the order computing cores of a classical multi-core processor. Thus, the MPSoC
paradigm is offering a complexity reduction at core level, which can be a precious
aspect from the certification point of view.
Chapter 3
NoC partitioning and RTOS filtering
module: COTS NoC-based MCS
This chapter describes the first contribution of this dissertation: a technique to solve
one of functional safety issues related COTS (NoC-based) MPSoC usage in the
context of mixed criticality. In detail, the technique addresses the temporal isolation
issue related to implicit contention of the NoC interconnection. The proposed
solution is based on a one-to-one bound of each NoC internal resource to a software
module (i.e., application). Thus, the NoC is partitioned between the applications
and the resources are prioritized to avoid any traffic interference. Furthermore, the
solution does not allow any inter-application resource sharing. In this way, the
temporal partitioning between software modules is achieved by denying any NoC
internal resource sharing. This partitioning scheme is monitored, and it is enforced
by filtering faulty traffic (i.e., by denying any NoC usage that would break the
partitioning scheme). This traffic filtering exploits the deterministic routing used
by the NoC. Thus, the main requisite for the proposed solution is that the routing
algorithm (used by the NoC) should be deterministic and known. To leverage the
connectivity reduction, innate for any resource privatization technique, a redirection
feature is granted for the non-critical traffic. The filtering module, in charge of
monitoring, is implemented as purely software module to be inserted inside the RTOS.
The overall solution is deliberately simple to exhibit a high certification potential.
The proposed solution also implements spatial partition between critical applications.
However, the focus put on the temporal domain as the spatial partitioning is much
easier to achieve and does not represent an open issue. Some of the security issues,
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for instance DoS attack, are solved by the proposed solution as well. However, the
security aspects are out of the scope of this dissertation and will not be considered.
The proposed approach allows to overcome a strict domain-based partitioning by
performing NoC resource reservation at router level, instead of node level.
The solution described in this chapter was first presented in [39] and extends
the technique supporting only two levels of criticality presented in [95]. Where the
technique proposed in [95] is an improved version of the original solution proposed
in [96].
The rest of this chapter is structured as following: Section 3.1 presents the
state-of-the-art solutions to face the NoC temporal partitioning issue; Section 3.2
presents proposed solution from the theoretical point of view; Section 3.3 presents the
implementation of the proposed solution for what it concerns its core functionality;
Section 3.4 presents the implementation of an auxiliary technique to mitigate the
cost of the core functionality of the proposed solution; Section 3.5 presents the
experimental evaluation of the proposed solution; finally, Section 3.6 summarizes
the key aspects of the proposed solution;
3.1 COTS NoC-based MCS: State-of-the-art
To cope with the temporal isolation issue in MPSoC, the literature provides several
solutions. Some of these solutions are adopted from bus-based multi-core related
techniques, while the other have been created specifically for NoC-based MPSoC.
The main issue with these solutions is certification potential, as them only indirectly
consider the industrialist’s perspective.
This section will provide an extended analysis of the state-of-the-art related to
the usage of commercial-off-the shelf (COTS) MPSoC components in the scope of
critical systems. The techniques targeting the usage of custom NoC design are out of
the scope of this chapter. Those techniques will be considered in Section 4.1.
The techniques that can be applied to COTS MPSoC can be further classified
according to the main idea behind them. This classification can be done according to
several criterion. In the scope of this dissertation I identify two macro-categories of
techniques, according on how the NoC resources (links, FIFOs, etc.) are managed
to ensure timing isolation: resource sharing and permanent resource reservation.
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Where the techniques of permanent resource reservation (or resource privatization)
macro-category refer to the opposite situation with respect to the resource sharing
scenario. I.e., each NoC resource is dedicated to an application and it is not shared
with other applications running on the MPSoC. The QoS is often mentioned by
the techniques from resource sharing macro-group, as the HI tasks are guaranteed
with bounded transmission latency, throughput o similar metrics. Another minor
distinction concerns whether a technique is conceived for a specific MPSoC or it can
be applied for a generic MPSoC (although fulfilling a set of requisites).
3.1.1 NoC Resource Sharing -based techniques
A first group of solutions are those targeting robust estimation WCET, explicitly
facing the shared (NoC) interconnection issue. Some of these solutions face the
temporal isolation issue explicitly, while other either face that issue implicitly and
indirectly or directly ignore the issue. Those techniques which ignore the temporal
isolation issue are considered out of the scope of this dissertation.
In [15] the authors propose a temporal partitioning mechanism and a WCET
estimation exploiting such mechanism. This temporal partitioning is an extension of
the solution adopted for single-core processors to solve the shared bus contention
between processor and I/O devices [97]. It is implemented by a run-time resource
monitoring and enforcement tasks. NoC is considered one of a set of shared resources
this temporal partitioning is applied to. Monitoring task, using a counter, measures
the utilization of each shared resource by each process running on the MPSoC. If
a predefined bandwidth is exhausted, then the temporal partitioning enforcement
task (called suspension task) is invoked. The purpose of this task is to deny a further
usage of that particular shared resource by that particular process for a period of time.
The WCET calculation exploits the knowledge of maximum bandwidth imposed for
each (process i, shared resource j) couple. This knowledge makes the interference-
delay analysis easier. The authors propose an interference-delay analysis which
computes the maximum possible inter-process interference and the resulting increase
in execution time. The main issue with the proposed approach is to ignore the
particular nature of NoC. For instance, considering wormhole flow control, a packet
is injected inside NoC one flit per (NoC’s) clock cycle. Let’s assume at a given time
tk), processi exhausts its bandwidth associated to NoC usage. This means processi
is prevented from injecting further flits inside the NoC. This will probably require
3.1 COTS NoC-based MCS: State-of-the-art 57
the generation of a special tail flit to release the resources and to signal the receiver
that something went wrong. This is not an issue as the time to do this can be easily
upper bounded, so the processi will stop injecting packets at time tk+δ . The true
issue is that a packet (i.e., its flits) injected by processi can remain stuck inside the
NoC for a long time, thus processi will continue using NoC although processi is not
injecting packets any more.
The main open issue of the previous solution has been addressed by [16]. The
authors adopt trajectory approach (used in the context of switched Ethernet networks)
to the context of NoC. The authors present a WCTT analysis which does not require
implementation of VCs. Although the WCTT analysis [16] could seem to integrate
the time partitioning method presented in [15], it is all to be proven. In particular,
this WCTT analysis integrated in the context of bandwidth monitoring described in
[15], will result in extremely bad (from the performance point of view) figures. In
fact, the worst scenario should consider the NoC congested (in the worst manner
possible) by faulty traffic. This situation will have a huge impact on WCTT due to
upstream and downstream indirect interference. Furthermore, this can easily make
WCET explode as a process normally need multiple usage of the NoC. Furthermore,
the overall solution exhibits a considerably high level of complexity.
Several solutions were derived which are relying on VCs to implement priority-
based preemption. Considering the more recent works, the authors in [17] address
wormhole NoCs with priority-based preemptive arbitration. This work presents an
extended analysis model to estimate delay upper bounds for all router architectures
and buffer sizes. One of the issues related to VCs is the complexity of the priority-
based preemptive arbitration, which will play against the certification potential. A
further issue is the absence of isolation between the processes having the same level
of priority. A yet further issue is the cascade effect a faulty HI traffic which can
induce starvation to all the processes having lower levels of priority.
There are some solutions aiming to monitor the interconnection actual congestion
and to identify the anomalies. This technique can be used to cope with the issues of
the previously described techniques. For instance, the authors in [18] make use of
performance counters to identify the rise of cache-dependent stall cycles for a given
application. However, these solutions are so far only for bus-based systems.
There are also several solutions based on probabilistic timing analysis (PTA) to
estimate pWCET [98, 99]. However, as already explained in the dedicated section,
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this methodology has robustness issues and it is not currently accepted by the critical
domain industry.
Another group of techniques is based on hierarchical scheduling of the NoC.
This approach is based on the usage of a scheduling entity which queues the tasks
of a certain priority. This scheduling entity will execute the tasks starting from the
queues having higher priority. The hierarchical scheduling offers a higher resource
utilization, compared to the classical time-triggered scheduling. These advantages
are especially relevant when considering the context of mixed criticality.
Considering the more recent solutions, [19] extends the approach proposed in
[100]. The authors introduce the self-aware network-on-chip control. The goal this
approach is a predictable timing of communication as well as traffic segregation
for mixed-criticality applications. This is implemented using come nodes of the
NoC as centralized arbitration units called resource managers, which are in charge
of controlling network access. The RM is equipped with a scheduler, which is
responsible for allocation and releasing of resources for ongoing transmissions. The
main issue of hierarchical scheduling solutions is a high complexity. Furthermore,
considering the proposed solution, it is not clear how the temporal isolation holds
under a faulty behavior of one of the LO nodes.
Apart from the techniques derived for a class of NoC architectures, there are
some conceived specifically for specific MPSoC (i.e., its NoC architecture). Among
the latter, several techniques based on hierarchical scheduling are conceived for
Kalray MPPA® 256 [20]. These techniques [21–23] exploit the special hardware
the MPSoC is featuring. The main limit of these techniques is that they rely on a
complex hardware could be an issue under the certification point of view.
3.1.2 NoC Resource Permanent Reservation -based techniques
An alternative to the resources sharing techniques (presented so far) consists in
permanent resource reservation or resource privatization. In this macro-category,
the NoC is not seen as a monolithic resource, instead it is considered as a set of
resources (i.e., links, FIFOs, routers, etc.) potentially independent from each other.
One of these techniques [24] is developed for for Tilera Tile Processor [25]. This
technique (permanently) partition the NoC into regions, each node belonging to a
region can only communicate to nodes of the same region. This solution is fairly
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simple, which is an advantage from the certification point of view. The issues related
to this approach are limits of proximity requirements for the nodes, as well as the
specific hardware like the one featured by Tilera Tile Processor.
3.1.3 Gaps Inside the State-of-the-art
From the state-of-the-art analysis it can derived the list of issues of the existing
approaches in dealing with temporal isolation issue. The main issue is the complexity
of the solution, which has the direct impact on the certification feasibility. On the
other hand, the low-complexity solutions are not complete as a set of issues is only
cursorily and indirectly addressed. These issues are protection against timing failure
propagation, dependency on a specific hardware, dependency on a rigid process
placement (i.e., process to CE mapping) constrains and other. The solution proposed
in this chapter aims to be a low-complexity one, still addressing the main issues of
the temporal partitioning. Considered the state-of-the-art, the proposed solution is
close to the one presented for Tilera Tile processor [24]. However, the similarity
only refers to the resource privatization approach. Differently from the [24], my
solution is not bound to a specific hardware and allows a much flexible NoC usage.
3.2 Proposed Partitioning Solution
Considering COTS MPSoC, a solution is derived to face the temporal isolation issues
related to implicit contention of NoC interconnection, mainly targeting avionic field.
The proposed solution is a partitioning technique based on resource privatization, thus
there is no resource sharing between critical software components (i.e., applications).
The overall solution can be considered composed of two parts: partitioning placement
and safety monitoring. An off-line phase, done at system design time, creates a
placement for critical applications. This placement is done in such a way to avoid
any contention for NoC internal resources (from the critical applications). Thus,
the temporal isolation is achieved for the critical applications. However, a mixed-
criticality system must provide safety monitoring task in order to assure a failure
cannot propagate from an application to another. This task is accomplished by the
second and core part of the proposed solution. In detail, a module is in charge of
monitoring the traffic attempting to enter the NoC. If this traffic, once injected inside
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the NoC, would violate the temporal partitioning, then the monitoring module filters
(discard) that traffic. The proposed solution also features a module to leverage the
connectivity reduction, innate for any resource privatization technique. In detail this
is done by means of a redirection feature for the non-critical traffic. The rest of this
section is structured as follows: Section 3.2.1 describes the NoC model the proposed
solution is intended to be applied to; Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.2.3 explain the
idea, which is behind the proposed solution, respectively for what it concerns the
off-line partitioning and the on-line monitoring and enforcement task (while the
actual implementation is described inside Section 3.3); Section 3.2.4 explains the
idea which is behind a technique to reduce the cost or the proposed solution (while
the actual implementation is described inside Section 3.4).
3.2.1 Considered NoC Model
The proposed solution is developed targeting simple NoC architectures. As already
explained, this choice allows to keep certification costs low. It is worth to highlight
that a high architecture complexity does not prevent the proposed solution as such;
the problem is instead that architecture itself, as its complexity will be a huge issue
from the certification point of view.
In the scope of this chapter the proposed solution will be explained and validated
for a specific NoC architecture, although the proposed solution can be applied to
any NoC using a deterministic routing as well as having known routing algorithm
and topology. This NoC architecture is a 2D mesh topology, using XY routing,
as can be seen in Fig. 3.1. The figure shows the path taken by a packet send by
N0 towards N5, according to XY routing algorithm. The considered NoC design
uses wormhole switching and input-buffered ports. As mentioned in Section 2.1.1
this architecture is one of the most commonly used. Finally, it is based on a single
physical network (i.e., not featuring VCs mechanism) implemented by links made
of two physical channels, one per direction. This characteristic falls under the
simplicity requirements discussed shortly above (in the previous paragraph). In case
an architecture, featuring VCs mechanism, is considered, our solution is perfectly
usable by simply not using the virtual networks. More information on the NoC
implementation choices is present in Section 2.1.1.
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Fig. 3.1 A schematic view of a 3x3 (2D) mesh topology NoC; N0 to N5 packet path under
XY routing algorithm.
Fig. 3.2, provides a detailed view of the NoC, showing how each node is made by
a connected element (CE) connected to its dedicated network interface (NI) which is
in turn connected to its router through two physical channels (one per direction). Fig.
3.3 depicts router architecture of the considered NoC design. More information on
the NoC building blocks and the router implementation is present in Section 2.1.1.
3.2.2 Off-line Partitioning: Applications Placement
The partitioning is done during the applications placing phase, and it is the first
part of the proposed solution. During this phase, for each application, it is decided
which MPSoC resources (e.g., processing elements, peripherals, memory) will
be used by that application. The NoC interconnection itself is seen as a set of
resources (i.e., links, FIFOs, etc.) to be partitioned between the applications. Each
critical application has a dedicated partition, formed by the resources dedicated to
that application. In order to exhibit the lowest complexity possible, the proposed
solution considers a scenario where no inter-partition resource sharing exist for
critical partitions. This means that each critical application is using the NoC without
its traffic being able to interfere with the traffic of any other application. Thus,
concerning the critical applications, the temporal partitioning is done not only
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Fig. 3.2 A detailed view of a 3x3 2D mesh topology NoC; R - router; NI - network interface;
CE - connected element.
between applications having different levels of criticality but also between those
having the same criticality. For what it concerns the non-critical applications, these do
not have a per-application dedicated partition. This means that it does exist a macro
partition made of all non-critical applications. Thus, the non-critical applications
share the MPSoC resources (not dedicated to any critical application). The proposed
solution does not impose any resource sharing policy for non-critical applications,
leaving in place the original MPSoC resource sharing policy. Thus, from the QoS
point of view, the proposed solution implements two levels of service: GS and BE.
Critical software modules are granted with GS level, and are guaranteed latency
and throughput as no NoC contention do exist. Non-critical applications exhibit BE
level, as only the guarantees originally provided by the MPSoC (which are usually
best-effort) are in place. The proposed techniques support an unbounded number of
criticality levels, as each application running under the GS level is granted with the
temporal isolation.
Since there is no resource sharing between critical partitions, the proposed
approach implements the spatial isolation (in the simplest way possible). However,
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Fig. 3.3 A schematic view of a NoC router architecture; a simplest input-buffered router
architecture is considered, based on a single physical network with no virtual channels; link
made of two physical channels, one per direction.
the focus put on the temporal domain as the spatial partitioning is much easier to
achieve and does not represent an open issue.
The proposed partitioning technique overcomes the classic strict domain (o
partition) segregation scheme (e.g., the one proposed in [24]), for instance, partitions
can overlap (without violating traffic isolation). The main aspect is that a router
can be used in parallel (and simultaneously) by different software components (thus
different partitions) as far as there is no contention of the router’s internal resources.
This means that a router, as the NoC itself, is shared by several software components
(even having different levels of criticality). However, de facto there is no sharing
as each component of the NoC is privatized by one and only one partition (i.e.,
software component). This is a strong point of the proposed solution as it exhibits a
much higher flexibility and allows communication between distant nodes without
reducing the overall NoC connectivity. Considering a heterogeneous MPSoC, this
flexibility characteristic allows a much better system utilization with respect to the
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strict partition segregation approach. This advantage becomes even more relevant
considering the issues like the hot spots or dark silicon.
The detailed discussion of the placement algorithms is out of the scope of
this dissertation. However, some considerations must be done. The main aspect
to consider is permanent bound of a set of NoC components to a given (critical)
partition, which deny any other partition from using those reserved NoC composts.
This represents the most delicate aspect of any solution which is based on resource
privatization instead of resource sharing. For the proposed technique, each critical
applicationi will reserve all the NoC resources it needs to communicate. This means,
for instance, that each link traversed by applicationi ’s packets will not be available
to any other application — those links will be permanently reserved by applicationi.
The direct consequence of the aspect described in the previous paragraph is the
connectivity reduction of the what-is-left after each further application is placed
(i.e., partition is created). Considering that the applications are placed one at a time,
the second application to be placed will see the overall connectivity reduced by the
placement of the first one, and so on for all the other applications. This reduction
can provoke the isolated CE issue when a CE becomes unusable because no logic
connection can be established with that CE. Furthermore, the proposed solution is
sensitive to this issue as the original routing algorithm is preserved for the critical
partitions. The reason to avoid adaptation of critical traffic routing algorithm, to
better fit the available NoC resources, is the additional complexity that would reduce
the certification potential. For non-critical traffic this is not problem, as there are
safety requirements, and in fact the non-critical routing is adopted to improve the
connectivity.
To limit the connectivity reduction overhead, the placement algorithm should
find a placement which will minimize the number of NoC components reserved
by each critical partition. It exists a direct relation between the size of a partition
and the number of NoC components it will need to sustain the intra-partition com-
munication. Thus, the placement algorithm should try to find a placement which
minimizes the size of each critical region. The obvious rule of thumb to achieve the
small size of critical regions is to minimize the distance between the nodes which
should communicate with each other. To minimize the critical partition size can
be far from being a trivial task when some issues, like for instance hot spots, are
faced in a heterogeneous MPSoC. On the other hand, placement algorithms are
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created to minimize the resource usage, optimizing communication speed, power, etc.
considering a set of constraints. However, the final goal of the placement algorithm
is to avoid isolated CE issue. The critical region minimization is a sort of necessary
condition and it is for sure not sufficient condition to achieve this goal. Based on
the routing algorithm used by the NoC some additional considerations can be done
to optimize the placement, as described in the final part of the Section 3.3. The
minimization considerations are related to critical partitions placing only, as there is
only one non-critical partition and it just uses the resources which are still available
after critical partitions have been mapped. However, the final goal is to avoid the
isolated CEs and the critical region minimization is not a necessary condition for
this goal. Thus, in case a CE is not used by non-critical partition due to its isolation,
the placement algorithm can attempt a non-minimal placement for critical partitions,
trying to make an isolated CE gain a logical connection.
3.2.3 On-line Monitoring: Filtering
The NoC components privatization described in Section 3.2.2 only provides temporal
(and spatial) partitioning under the assumption of fault-free system. Thus, this
technique represents only a partial solution as in the context of mixed criticality
the partitioning must hold under the software components unexpected behavior
(e.g., bug, DoS attack, etc.). The main element of the overall solution proposed
in this chapter is the safety monitoring and isolation enforcement feature. This
feature is implemented by a filtering module, which prevents the faulty packets
from being injected inside the NoC. Thus, the filtering module allows to ensure the
temporal (and spatial) partitioning between software modules even if one of these is
faulty. This section describes the idea behind the proposed filtering module, while
its implementation is described in Section 3.3.
In detail, the idea behind the proposed filtering approach is to exploit the knowl-
edge of a deterministic routing algorithm used by the NoC. A deterministic routing
algorithm is a routing in which, given a packet injected inside nodesource (Nsource)
with the destination nodedestination (Ndestination), the path of that packet is given by
a proper function of the only Nsource and Ndestination. I.e., considered a certain a
couple (Nsource, Ndestination) the routing is deterministic if and only if a unique path
is associated to this (Nsource, Ndestination) couple.
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The main idea behind the isolation monitoring is to check the Nsource and
Ndestination of each packet before actually allowing the packet to enter the NoC.
Given a deterministic routing algorithm, this information is sufficient to know the
path of the considered packet. Thus, it will be possible to know whether the con-
sidered packet will violate the partitioning by using some NoC resources dedicated
to another partition. This can be seen as a monitoring of whether, a partition is
generating a traffic which can interfere with traffic of other partitions, and to dis-
card such traffic before it actually enters the NoC. In this way the temporal (and
spatial) isolation, defined during off-line application mapping, is protected against
unexpected behavior like for instance bugs. This will grant the required measures
to ensure a fault inside one software module cannot propagate to other software
modules.
Considering a NoC consisting of a single physical network (i.e., without VCs or
with VCs disabled), the following requirements must be satisfied:
1. the NoC should use a deterministic routing algorithm;
2. the routing algorithm should be known;
3. the topology of the NoC should be known.
The requirement of a deterministic routing algorithm could seem to be an impor-
tant limitation, as dynamic reconfiguration solutions cannot be used. However, this is
not an actual limitation as far as critical domain is considered. In fact, for the safety
critical applications in general and especially for avionics, a dynamic reconfiguration
is unfeasible as each possible configuration must be certified separately (and of
course the sub-system in charge of re-configuring the system must be certified as
well).
3.2.4 On-line Connectivity Reduction Mitigation: Redirection
To leverage the connectivity reduction, innate for any resource privatization tech-
nique, a redirection feature is granted for the non-critical traffic. This section de-
scribes the idea behind the redirection feature, while its implementation is described
in Section 3.4.
The redirection feature goal is to allow the non-critical applications a better
usage of the system resources. The reasons why this is a relevant issue are described
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in Section 3.2.2. The main problem is that many NoC components (i.e., physical
links, FIFOs, etc.) will not be available for non-critical applications as they will
be reserved by some critical application. To leverage this connectivity reduction
cost, we propose a technique based on traffic redirection. The traffic redirection can
be simply seen as the usage of an intermediate node to re-transmit the traffic. This
means that, considering an original communication scheme in which nodeA (NA)
is transmitting packets to NB, in the redirected communication scheme there is an
extra Nre−transmitter. Thus, in the overall transmission becomes NA → Nre−transmitter
→ NB. The redirection feature de facto updates the routing algorithm for the non-
critical applications, despite the traffic always follows the original routing algorithm
provided by the NoC (i.e., NA → Nre−transmitter and Nre−transmitter → NB both follow
the original routing algorithm). A key point it worth to be pointed out, is that the
redirection feature is to non-critical traffic only. This means that no certification is
required for this technique and thus the latter does not add complexity to the solution
which should undergo the certification process. Considering the performance point
of view, the applications using the redirection feature experience a latency rice and
also the CE in charge of re-transmitting the traffic will have a performance overhead
to generate the redirection packets.
From the application placement point of view, the redirection will grant the
non-critical nodes a more flexible routing algorithm. This will make easier to avoid
the isolated CEs and fulfill connection constraints, which are the only goals of the
redirection feature. From the traffic monitoring and filtering point of view, the
redirection is completely transparent mechanism. Each traffic is checked to be
allowed to be injected inside the NoC according to the path it will take inside the
NoC. A redirected packet is just a normal packet if CE-to-CE path is considered, so
no dedicated aspect is required from filtering module.
3.3 Filtering Module Implementation
This section will explain the implementation of filtering module described in Section
3.2.3. The proposed filtering technique is intended to be implemented as purely
software module, as COTS components are targeted. The filtering module is intended
to be integrated inside the a RTOS running on a NoC-based MPSoC. The redirection
module, on the other hand, can be implemented at application level. This aspect
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represents an improvement of the proposed solution with respect to its last version
[39], where the redirection feature was embedded inside the filtering module.
The redirection module, as it only deals with non-critical traffic, can be certified
at DAL D or DAL E (according to the DAL of the related software module). This
will keep the certification process simple, as only filtering module must be certified
at the high DAL. In detail, filtering module should have the same or higher DAL
than the highest DAL of the software components this filtering module monitors
partitioning (Sect. 2.4.2. of [9]).
The proposed filtering module acts as a driver for the NoC interconnect, super-
vising and eventually filtering software requests for the NI. As the assumption is to
have a RTOS in our system, the natural position of the proposed filtering module is
inside this RTOS.
From the certification point of view, after any modification the RTOS will require
a new certification. However, the proposed module can be seen as a driver, filtering
the traffic towards the (NoC) interconnection. This means that the certification should
not reevaluate the RTOS by scratch. Furthermore, once certified, this updated RTOS
will be reusable in several applications without submitting it to a new dedicated
certification process in each new project. As stated in [9] the level of assurance should
be selected according to the nature of the application. To be as general as possible,
the module can be certified at the maximum level (DAL A), or it can be decided to
undergo a much simpler certification process and go for DAL B certification. The
latter choice will imply that the RTOS could not have DAL A certification, and thus
must be carefully evaluated. Considering the effort for certification of a high DAL
(e.g., DAL A) module, the filtering technique implementation simplicity is crucial.
Furthermore, a simple implementation will grant a low performance overhead as
well.
As already explained in Section 3.2.3, knowing both the routing algorithm
and the topology of the network, it is known the path of each packet from the
Nsource and Ndestination of this packet. This information must be exploited, in the
simplest way possible, to enforce the partitioning described in Section 3.2.2. The
proposed implementation is a small software module checking each packet and
allowing the packet to be injected inside the NoC if its Ndestination is allowed. In
fact, as the filtering modules knows the Nsource (i.e., Nsource is the CE the filtering
module is running on), there is a one-to-one relation between Ndestination and the
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path the packet will follow once it is injected inside the NoC. The table of allowed
destinations is computed offline, considering the communication paths defined during
the application placement phase (see Section 3.2.2). In case an attempt of partitioning
violation is detected, i.e., an attempt to inject a packet with not allowed Ndestination
is detected, this packet is discarded, and this event can be signaled to the system
level fault management mechanism. Thus, temporal (and spatial) partitioning is
preserved as the faulty packet is denied from entering the NoC. The system level
fault management mechanism will evaluate the severity of the failure and take the
proper countermeasures, for instance enabling space platform and restarting the
faulty one. This mechanism as well as the system level fault tolerance techniques
are out of the scope of this dissertation.
To better explain the proposed filtering module, this section will consider a simple
example of mixed-criticality system running on a (NoC-based) MPSoC. The NoC of
the example will be a 2D 4x4 mesh topology NoC using XY routing. Although, this
particular NoC architecture will be considered, the proposed approach is not limited
to the 2D mesh topology, nor to the XY routing. The only limitations to the NoC,
the proposed approach can be applied, are listed and explained in Section 3.2.
For what it concerns the software stack, the first example will consider the
simplest mixed-criticality system, I call mcs_1: one critical application and one
non-critical application. For the sake of simplicity, in this section I will call the
former C_app and the latter NC_app. To further simplify the explanation, C_app
will be using exactly two nodes, while NC_app will use all the remaining nodes.
The consideration will be done for mcs_1 are directly extendable to the design
case of one C_app and multiple NC_apps as the NC_apps all belong to the same
partition (see Section 3.2.2). On the other hand, it is not easy to extend that simple
example to the design case with multiple C_apps and/or with more than two nodes
used by a C_app. Thus, these scenarios will be separately described further on in
this section.
Fig. 3.4.a depicts a placement scenario of the mixed-criticality system we de-
scribed in previous paragraph, I will call mcs_1_a. This scenario represents the
worst-case placement, as the two critical nodes N0 and N15 are at the maximum
distance (according to the considered routing algorithm) from each other. Although,
this is an unlikely scenario, it can still happen. In fact, an MPSoC is normally a
heterogeneous system and in case it runs a realistic number of C_apps, it could
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happen that the only available instances of a given resource are far one from the
other. The hot-spot issue can also lead to this worst-case scenario.
In this dissertation I will call critical domain or critical region of a given C_app_i,
as the NoC region traversed by the traffic of C_app_i. The critical region of C_app_1
can be seen in Fig. 3.4.a.
Fig. 3.4 MPSoC with 4x4 mesh topology NoC, XY routing;
mixed-criticality system example mcs_1: one C_app, one NC_app;
black arrows: critical traffic paths;
gray-shaded: critical regions (or domains)
a) placing scenario mcs_1_a: C_app_1 - N0 and N15, NC_app_1 - all the remaining
nodes;
b) placing scenario mcs_1_b: C_app_1 - N0 and N14, NC_app_1 - all the remaining
nodes;
Algorithm 3.1 describes the filtering module implementation. Table 3.1 reports
the connectivity table for N2 (scenario mcs_1_a). As can be observed, the entire
filtering module implementation is just a one bit check inside a pre-computed array
(1D table). In case the bit is ALLOWED, the packet is sent to NI to be actually
injected inside the NoC. Otherwise, the packet is dropped, and the error event is
generated. The proposed solution does not need to perform any on-line computation
nor any synchronization with other CEs on the NoC. This means the filtering module
is extremely small and simple and does not create computational nor communication
overhead.
For what it concerns the connectivity tables, they only reflect the placing scenario
inferred during design phase of the system (see Section 3.2.2). For a critical node, the
allowed connections are created by design-time privatization of all NoC resources
3.3 Filtering Module Implementation 71
Algorithm 3.1 Traffic filtering module
1: procedure TRAFFIC_FILTERING( dst_addr, payload )
2: //connectivity_table is internally defined
3: if connectivity_table[dst_addr].ALLOWED then
4: forward packet to NI
5: else
6: return error_code
7: end if
8: end procedure
that node needs. On the other hand, the non-critical nodes do not privatize resources,
thus the connectivity table reflects the remaining connectivity. This table considers
the routing algorithm, the topology and the position of the nodes. A connectivity
table can be inferred using the rules described in Section 3.2.2. These rules can be
summarized as:
1. a node can only communicate with the nodes of the same partition;
2. a node can send a packet to another node if and only if this will not interfere
with the traffic belonging to any other partition. Where, two traffic are inter-
fering if and only if they compete for a physical link or for any internal to the
router resource.
Applying these rules to the N2 of the mcs_1_a (Fig. 3.4.a) yields the connectivity
table described in Table 3.1. It worth to be noticed that the assumption to have two
mono-directional links ensure that N2 can communicate to N12 without interfering
with the critical traffic. In fact, its traffic will flow in the opposite direction with
respect to the critical traffic, thus no physical wire (nor internal to the router resource)
will be shared between the two.
So far only the simplest example of mixed-criticality system, having only two
levels of criticality (i.e., mcs_2, has been considered. An example a system with
two C_apps and one NC_app is shown in Fig. 3.5. In both scenarios mcs_2a
and mcs_2_b, the two critical regions are overlapping, but still these scenarios are
supported by the proposed approach. In mcs_2_b it can be even observed how N5
belonging to C_app_2 is located inside the critical region of C_app_1. This example
shows the flexibility of the proposed solution with respect to the strict critical region
segregation approach.
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Table 3.1 Placement scenario mcs_1_a: connectivity table for N2
DESTINATION
NODE ALLOWED
0 0
1 1
3 0
4 1
5 1
6 1
7 0
8 1
9 1
10 1
11 0
12 1
13 1
14 1
15 0
From the performance perspective, the execution time of the proposed module
should be first of all predictable and also sufficient small. The proposed solution
meets these requirements, as the filtering module is extremely simple. The whole
filtering process can be seen as consulting a bit of a small array, according to the
destination of the packet and discard a packet in case that bit is 0. The filtering
module is embedded inside the NoC driver managing NI access. Considering this
original driver, the proposed module is added to the driver and it is the first one to
be executed. The WCET of the few lines of code are easy to be upper bounded by
means of static timing analysis, thus the overall WCET of the upgraded NoC driver
will be just increased by this amount.
Considering the example of NoC of the mcs_1 and mcs_2, some further consid-
erations on the placement can be done in addition to those seen in Section 3.2.2.
Considering the case in which more than two nodes are used by a C_app, it is
important to avoid a placing which will increase the size of the critical region. As
we have seen in Section 3.2.2, this is a rule of thumb to avoid a high overhead due
to connectivity reduction. In case of a 2D mesh topology NoC using XY (or YX)
routing algorithm, we can observe that the critical region does not increase in size if:
• a node is added to a corner of the critical region;
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Fig. 3.5 MPSoC with 4x4 mesh topology NoC, XY routing;
mixed-criticality system example mcs_2: two C_apps, one NC_app;
black arrows: critical traffic paths;
gray-shaded: critical regions (or domains)
a) placing scenario mcs_2_a: C_app_1 - N0 and N10, C_app_2 - N5 and N13,
NC_app_1 - all the remaining nodes;
b) placing scenario mcs_2_b: C_app_1 - N0, N1, N4 and N6, C_app_2 - N5 and N13,
NC_app_1 - all the remaining nodes;
• a node is arbitrary placed inside the critical region, as far as it only communi-
cates to the nodes located in the same side of the rectangle (critical region);
• a node is arbitrary placed inside the critical region, if there are no nodes
encircled by the critical region.
For instance, considering the application using N0 and N10 of the Fig. 3.5.a, more
nodes can be added in the corners (N2 and N8) without any connectivity reduction.
The nodes N1, N4, N6 and N9 can be also added without any connectivity reduction
overhead, as far as they only communicate the nodes located in the same side of
the rectangle. This means the, for instance N1, should only communicate with N0,
(and N2, if any). Fig. 3.5.b depicts another placement scenario which belong to the
same example of mixed-criticality system as mcs_2_a do. In mcs_2_b, both critical
regions are in condition described by the last point of the list, as their critical regions
does not encircle any node. This means that the critical nodes can be arbitrary located
inside the critical region without no restrictions on its connectivity, for instance N1
can communicate with all the nodes of its critical region. These considerations must
be done during the placement phase, which aim to minimize the size of the critical
regions.
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3.4 Redirection Module Implementation
This section will explain the implementation of redirection module described in
Section 3.2.4. The proposed redirection technique is intended to be implemented
as purely software module, as COTS components are targeted. Differently from
the filtering module (Section 3.3), there is no reason to implement it at RTOS level.
Thus, the redirection module can be implemented at application level, avoiding
addition complexity to the certification of the overall solution. This aspect represents
an improvement of the proposed solution with respect to the original version [39],
where the redirection feature was embedded inside the filtering module.
The redirection module, as it only deals with non-critical traffic, can be certified
at DAL D or DAL E (according to the DAL of the related software module). This will
keep the certification process of the overall solution much simpler, as only filtering
module must be certified at the high DAL.
Considering mcs_1_a scenario, from Table 3.1, it can be observed that N2 (with-
out the redirection feature) is not able to communicate to three other non-critical
nodes. This is due to limitations imposed by its position within the critical region and
the XY routing. This problem can be solved by adding a redirection functionality to
the non-critical applications. This redirection functionality is implemented by using
a reachable node as a re-transmitter (Nre−transmitter). Of course, Nre−transmitter should
be able to reach the final destination (eventually using the re-transmission itself).
The redirection module is implemented at application level. It is composed of
transmission and receiving parts which are executed whenever a packet must be
transmitted, or it is received by any NC_app accordingly.
The transmission part of redirection module is presented in Algorithm 3.2. Table
3.2 reports the redirection table for N2 (scenario mcs_1_a). From the algorithm it
can be seen how the first check somehow mimics the filtering module by check-
ing whether the desired destination node is allowed. This is indeed a redundant
task, which however is implemented at application level and thus can have a differ-
ent purpose. The actual redirection is implemented by generating the redirection
packet, which can either request or not the actual redirection (i.e., to make use of
Nre−transmission). In detail, if the re-transmission is required, the address of node in
charge of re-transmitting the packet becomes new destination address. A REDIR tag
is added to the payload, followed by the actual destination address. In case Ndestination
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can be reached without any actual redirection, the NO_REDIR tag is added to the
payload. Once the redirection packet is generated, it is normally transmitted. This
means that it’s payload and destination address will be received by the NoC driver
and processed by the filtering module described in the previous section.
Algorithm 3.2 redirection module: transmission part.
1: procedure TRAFFIC_REDIRECTION_TX( dst_addr, payload )
2: //redirection_table is internally defined
3: if redirection_table[dst_addr].ALLOWED then
4: if redirection_table[dst_addr].RDR > −1 then
5: //generate redirection packet
6: new_dst_addr = redirection_table[dst_addr].RDR
7: new_payload = (REDIR,dst_addr, payload)
8: else
9: //generate redirection packet
10: new_dst_addr = dst_addr
11: new_payload = (NO_REDIR, payload)
12: end if
13: transmit_packet(new_dst_addr,new_payload)
14: else
15: return error_code
16: end if
17: end procedure
On the other hand, when a NC_app receives a packet, it executes the reception
part of the redirection module, as described by Algorithm 3.3. As can be observed,
the tag placed by Algorithm 3.2 is checked and the packet is processed accordingly,
and it is either re-transmitted or forwarded to the application software.
Algorithm 3.3 redirection module: reception part.
1: procedure TRAFFIC_REDIRECTION_RX( payload )
2: if payload.tag = REDIR then
3: actual_dst_addr = payload.actual_dst_addr
4: actual_payload = payload.actual_payload
5: RAFFIC_REDIRECT ION_T X(actual_dst_addr,actual_payload)
6: else
7: actual_payload = payload.actual_payload
8: forward actual_payload to application software
9: end if
10: end procedure
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Table 3.2 Placement scenario mcs_1_a: redirection table for N2
DESTINATION
NODE ALLOWED
REDIRECTION
NODE
0 0 X
1 1 -1
3 1 6
4 1 -1
5 1 -1
6 1 -1
7 1 6
8 1 -1
9 1 -1
10 1 -1
11 1 10
12 1 -1
13 1 -1
14 1 -1
15 0 X
The redirection table is computed for each node and describes whether a node is
reachable and in case the redirection is needed, which is the address of Nre−transmitter
the traffic must be redirected to. The redirection table is computed off-line, based on
the same information used to compute the connectivity table. The connectivity tables
themselves can be used, to infer the redirection tables, by creating paths between
each couple of non-critical nodes. Several well-known approaches to compute
such information does exist, thus techniques are considered out of the scope of this
dissertation. It is important to highlight how, the redirection table computation, does
not require the certification effort to be as high as the one required by the connectivity
table computation. The redirected traffic will be considered as a normal traffic by
the filtering module, thus a low DAL will no way affect the temporal (and spatial)
solution described in the previous section.
The advantage of redirection feature can be observed by comparing the AL-
LOWED columns of redirection and filtering tables. For the considered example,
comparing Table 3.2 and Table 3.1, it can be observed how the N2 is able to reach
all the nodes, apart those which belong to the C_app. In case the redirection feature
would not be implemented, N2 would not be able to reach N3, N7 and N11.
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3.5 Experimental Evaluation
Experimental evaluation has been performed using a simulation environment, con-
sidering the VHDL implementation of the NoC model. The proposed solution has
been validated by considering a faulty partition generating high volumes of random
traffic.
The logic-based distributed routing (LBDR) [41] architecture was used to im-
plement NoC model described in Section 3.2.1. The overall NoC implementation
is a simplified version of the NoC architecture presented in [38]. The LDBR router
is configured to implement an XY routing algorithm, which is a fairly common,
deadlock-free routing algorithm. Section 3.1 presents the reasons for the choice of
such simple architecture as well as the considerations on the applicability of the
proposed solution for different and more complex NoC models.
The experiments have been done considering the mcs_1_a scenario described
in Fig. 3.4.a. Two simulation campaigns have been performed, considering the
baseline system setup (with no temporal partitioning implemented) and the system
implementing the proposed solution. In both cases, to evaluate the effects of temporal
interference, the NC_app is implemented to have a faulty behavior. In detail, each
node of NC_app randomly selects destination of the packets it injects inside the
NoC. It worth to mention that the proposed solution only discriminates the NC_app
from C_app for what it concerns the redirection feature to provide to the former. I.e.,
the proposed solution creates temporal (and spatial) isolation between any partition,
even those having the same DAL. This means that, considering a more complex
scenario (e.g., mcs_2_b) would add nothing to the proposed solution validation.
Experiments were performed considering several packet injection rates (PIRs),
defined as the number of packets injected in the NoC at each clock cycle by any
given node. For each considered PIR, 10,000 packets were injected by each node in
the NoC.
The experimental results, related to baseline setup evaluation, are presented in
Table 3.3. The figures exhibit the uncertainty in the communication latency among
the two critical nodes (N0 and N15), as the non-critical traffic introduces congestion
on the critical traffic path.
Once implemented, the proposed filtering module prevents the non-critical traffic
to interfere with the critical traffic. This traffic isolation has the effect to cancel
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Table 3.3 Critical traffic latency (ns): baseline setup.
PIR MAX MEAN STD. DEV.
0.020 815 334.8 55.6
0.010 665 315.1 30.4
0.007 655 311.6 24.4
any variance in the critical communication. This is experimentally confirmed by
evaluating the setup where the proposed solution has been implemented. The figures
related to the system implementing the proposed solution are presented in the Table
3.3. As can be observed, the latency for the critical traffic to traverse the NoC
becomes deterministic as it is always 305 ns. The proposed filtering solution allows
to enforce the temporal partitioning between software components (partitions). This
is crucial requirement to compute WCET by static timing analysis method.
Table 3.4 Critical traffic latency (ns): proposed solution implemented.
PIR MAX MEAN STD. DEV.
0.020 305 305 0
0.010 305 305 0
0.007 305 305 0
The proposed solution, without the redirection feature, has the side effect of
significantly reduce the logical connectivity for the NC_apps. The reasons of such
reduction have been already explained in Section 3.2.4.
In the scope of this dissertation I will define reachability metric of Ni as the
number of nodes to which Ni is able to send a packet. This metric must not be
confused with the connectivity metric, which is usually defined as number of nodes
to which a given node is physically connected. In fact, the existence of a physical
connection between the two nodes is a necessary condition for these nodes to able
to send a packet to each other, but it is not a sufficient condition. In fact, a further
requirement to allow the traffic flow is the routing algorithm to allow the logical
connection for the given physical connection existing between those nodes.
The reachability metric has been introduced to measure the logical connectivity
improvement given by the redirection feature. This metric will be only considered
for NC_apps, as C_apps already have all the required connectivity (see Section 3.2.2)
and in any cannot use redirection feature. On the other hand, NC_apps are BE QoS
level and thus can benefit from the extra connectivity given by the redirection feature.
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Reachability figures of the setup which does not implement the redirection feature,
related to mcs_1_a scenario, are reported in Table 3.5. The average reachability
obtained in this case is 10.7, while the maximum reachability for each node is 13 (it
cannot communicate with the two critical nodes and with itself). This means that, on
average, each node cannot send packets to 1 other node. The redirection extension is
implemented with the purpose of improving the reachability for NC_apps, in order
to have a more usable system. Implementation of the redirection feature, allows to
obtain the perfect reachability, rising the average reachability to 13. The cost of this
reachability improvement is some additional communication latency for non-critical
nodes, due to the intervention of the software module during transmission. However,
this cost does not affect in no way the C_apps.
Table 3.5 Reachability without redirection for mcs_1_a scenario (non-critical nodes only).
NODE ID UNREACHABLE NODES REACHABILITY
1 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14 6
2 3, 7, 11 10
3 7, 11 11
4 11 12
5 11 12
6 11 12
7 11 12
8 4 12
9 4 12
10 4 12
11 4 12
12 4, 8 11
13 4, 8, 12 10
14 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13 6
AVERAGE N/A 10.7
Considering the placement scenarios mcs_1_b (Fig. 3.4), mcs_2_a and mcs_2_b
(Fig. 3.5), the redirection module allows to have the maximum reachability as well.
Although, the redirecting feature provides a huge boost in logic connectivity, it
is still possible to have a node completely cut-out from the NoC. Fig. 3.6 presents a
system with a further C_app with respect to the mcs_2_a. For this placing scenario,
the presence of communication between N1 and N0 makes N2 de facto isolated from
the NoC. I.e., N2 is not able to communicate to no one of the nodes. It worth to be
80 NoC partitioning and RTOS filtering module: COTS NoC-based MCS
noticed that in case there were no communication between N1 and N0, N2 would not
be isolated.
The considered examples of placement, especially the last one, show the limit
of the proposed solution. When the number of C_apps grows, some nodes can be
prevented from communicate with each other; some node can be even completely
isolated from the other nodes. In order to avoid this connectivity reduction overhead,
there is a rule of thumb to minimize the size of the critical regions. However, as
Fig. 3.6 shows, this is just a rule of thumb. In the real system, there is a set of
applications to be mapped on the MPSoC, each with some resource requirements.
On the other hand, the MPSoC has a set of resources and the premise is that these
resources are sufficient to host the applications without the proposed approach. The
applications must be mapped on the available resources during the design phase.
At this phase, the placement algorithm should first of all find a placement for all
the applications as described in Section 3.2.2. During this process, the placement
algorithm will try to find a placement which would avoid reachability reduction and
node isolation.
Fig. 3.6 MPSoC with 4x4 mesh topology NoC, XY routing;
mixed-criticality system example mcs_3: three C_apps, one NC_app;
black arrows: critical traffic paths;
gray-shaded: critical regions (or domains)
placing scenario mcs_3_a: C_app_1 - N0 and N10, C_app_2 - N5 and N13, C_app_3 - N3 and
N15, NC_app_1 - all the remaining nodes;
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3.6 Summary
Considering COTS MPSoC, this chapter proposes the main contribution of this
dissertation: a solution to face the temporal isolation issues related to implicit
contention of NoC interconnection, mainly targeting avionic field. The proposed
solution is applicable to any NoC with a deterministic routing as far as the topology
and the routing algorithm are known.
The proposed solution is developed targeting simple NoC architectures. As
already explained, this choice allows to keep certification costs low. It is worth to
highlight how a more complex architecture is perfectly suitable to adopt the proposed
solution; the problem is not the proposed solution but instead that architecture
itself, as its complexity will be a huge issue from the certification point of view.
For instance, in case an architecture featuring VCs mechanism is considered, our
solution is perfectly usable by simply not using the virtual networks.
In the scope of this dissertation the proposed solution will be explained for a
specific NoC architecture, although the proposed solution can be applied to any
NoC using a deterministic routing as well as having known routing algorithm and
topology.
The proposed solution is a partitioning technique based on resource privatization,
thus there is no resource sharing between software components (i.e., applications).
At the applications placing phase, NoC is seen as a set of resources (i.e., links, FIFOs,
etc.) to be partitioned between the applications. Each application has a dedicated
partition, formed by the resources used by that application. In order to exhibit the
lowest complexity possible, the proposed solution considers a scenario where no
inter-partition resource sharing exist. This means that each application is using the
NoC without traffic to interfere with the traffic of any other application. The core
of the proposed partitioning technique is the monitoring and enforcement feature.
This feature is implemented by a (software) filtering module, which prevents the
faulty packets from being injected inside the NoC. Thus, the filtering module allows
to ensure the temporal partitioning between software modules even if one of these
is faulty. The filtering module is implemented as purely software module to be
inserted inside the RTOS. The overall solution is deliberately simple to exhibit a
high certification potential.
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From the QoS point of view the proposed techniques offer two levels of service:
guaranteed service (GS) and best effort (BE). An application running assigned with
GS level is guaranteed to have bounded latency and throughput. On the other hand,
applications running under BE level have no guarantees. The proposed techniques
support an unbounded number of criticality levels, as each application running under
the GS level is granted with the temporal isolation.
Furthermore, this chapter presents a technique to reduce the communication
reduction overhead provoked by the proposed partitioning solution. This technique
implements the redirection feature at application level and allows to restore a perfect
connectivity between non-critical nodes by sacrificing some of the communication
bandwidth and performance power.
Chapter 4
QoSinNoC: hardware-implemented
NoC partitioning for mixed criticality
This chapter describes the second contribution of this dissertation: (i) a set of specific
hardware —related techniques to allow the usage of the related NoC architectures in
the context of mixed criticality, and (ii) QoSinNoC framework, which allows an easy
comparison between these NoC architectures for a given set of software components
to be executed.
The presented techniques, each related to a simple NoC architecture, are derived
to address the software components temporal isolation issue. Where the latter is the
main issue related to the usage of MPSoC in the context of mixed criticality. Thus,
in this chapter these techniques will be sometime referred to as mixed criticality
enforcement techniques. The proposed techniques are based on NoC resource
privatization (thus sharing avoidance) paradigm. The overall solution is based
on a one-to-one bound of each NoC internal resource to a software module (i.e.,
application). Thus, the NoC is partitioned between the applications and the resources
are prioritized to avoid any traffic interference. Furthermore, the solution does
not allow any inter-application resource sharing. In this way, the temporal (and
spatial) partitioning between software modules is achieved by denying any NoC
inter-partition interaction.
An important part of the overall contribution (described in this chapter) is
QoSinNoC framework, which facilitates the comparison between the considered
NoC architectures. QoSinNoC framework can be seen as the union of: (i) a set of
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considered NoC architectures, (ii) the related techniques to allow their usage in the
context of mixed criticality and (iii) a module in charge of computing a set of figures
of merit in order to compare which architecture will better fit the implementation of
a given set of applications.
The considered NoC architectures as well as the related mixed criticality —
enforcement techniques are deliberately as simple as possible. This approach is
adopted to make the overall solution be simple, thus, to exhibit a high certification
potential. The proposed solution also implements spatial partition between critical
applications. However, the focus put on the temporal domain as the spatial parti-
tioning is much easier to achieve and does not represent an open issue. Some of the
security issues, for instance DoS attack, are solved by the proposed solution as well.
However, the security aspects are out of the scope of this dissertation and will not
be considered. This partitioning scheme is enforced by physically isolating each
critical partition (i.e., by making impossible any NoC usage that would break the
partitioning scheme). This actual isolation is physically implemented by hardware
means which are specific to each of the considered NoC architectures. The proposed
approach supports an arbitrary high number of levels of criticality as each critical
software component is granted with temporal (and spatial) isolation. The proposed
approach allows to overcome a strict domain-based partitioning by performing NoC
resource reservation at router level, instead of node level. The latter represents an
advantage of the state-of-the-art solutions.
The techniques to allow the mixed criticality usage, used by QoSinNoC, are
not limited to the particular kind of NoC architecture they were created for. On
the contrary, these techniques can be applied for whatever COTS MPSoC as far
as the latter presents the key characteristics for their applicability. I.e., the NoC
architecture used by that COTS MPSoC should present the similarities with the NoC
the technique was developed for (i.e., the NoC considered in QoSinNoC).
The QoSinNoC frameworks as well as the first implementations of the proposed
privatization-based partitioning was first presented in [101]. The proposed techniques
and the QoSinNoC framework itself were then improved in [40].
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 presents the state-of-
the-art solutions to face the NoC temporal partitioning issue, focusing on hardware-
implemented solutions; Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 presents the proposed partitioning
solution. Section 4.2 explains the general technique used to achieve temporal isola-
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tion as well as the NoC model such technique can be applied to. Whereas, in Section
4.3 the implementation specific details of the proposed techniques are explained for
the relative NoC architectures. Section 4.4 presents QoSinNoc framework, created to
facilitate the comparison between the considered NoC architectures for a specific set
of applications to be implemented. Section 4.5 presents the experimental evaluation
of the proposed solution; finally, Section 4.6 summarizes the key aspects of the
proposed solution;
4.1 Custom NoC–based MCS: State-of-the-art
To cope with the temporal isolation issue in MPSoC, the literature provides several
solutions. Some of these solutions are adopted from bus-based multi-core related
techniques, while the other have been created specifically for NoC-based MPSoC.
The main issue with these solutions is certification potential, as them only indirectly
consider the industrialist’s perspective.
This section will provide an extended analysis of the state-of-the-art related to
the usage of custom NoC architectures in the scope of critical systems.
The techniques targeting the usage of COTS NoC design are also relevant in the
scope of this chapter, as a custom solution can implement some of the features of a
COTS design. Those techniques have been already analyzed in Section 4.1, in the
scope of the main contribution of this thesis, thus will not be repeated here.
This section presents the state-of-the art solutions concerning the time isolation
issue in the context of custom NoC architectures. Where the term custom NoC
architecture is used as the opposite to COTS NoC architecture (used by COTS
MPSoC).
Considering the techniques relying on custom NoC architecture design, I will
use the same classification used for techniques related to COTS MPSoC.
QNoC [26] was one of the first efforts to design a NoC architecture suitable
for the creation of an MCS. The proposed architecture was based on preemptive
priority scheduling. The architecture makes use of wormhole packet-based round-
robin scheduling which is used by the NoC architectures of many modern MPSoC.
Several similar solutions, also based on the concept of priority based preemptive
packet-based usage of the NoC were derived [27–33]. Each of these solutions is
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characterized by some peculiarities, but all make use of virtual channels, which is
their main disadvantage when certification potential is considered.
One of the first solutions was also Æthereal [34] architecture implementing
time-division multiplexing (TDM)-based circuit switching approach, where wires
and buffers remain reserved for certain points in time. The resources are reserved
for critical applications, while the non-critical applications use leftover bandwidth
from the critical applications. This solution however presents several problems like
the difficulty to support communication between distant nodes and also present not
negligible complexity.
The authors in [35] present a NI modification to allow TT-based scheduling of
the NoC. This solution grants a bounded latency on high-criticality traffic by using
a contention-free channel. However, to support the proposed approach the overall
system should present a high level of complexity.
A different approach to the problem is link division multiplexing technique [36].
In this solution, each physical link is partitioned to simultaneously transmit serialized
packets belonging to distinct traffic flows. The idea of this solution is appealing;
however, it presents a high complexity from both hardware and conceptual point of
view.
Apart from the (NoC) resource sharing technique presented so far, there are some
solutions based on avoiding resource sharing. In this macro-category, the NoC is
not seen as a monolithic resource, instead it is considered as a set of resources (i.e.,
links, FIFOs, etc.) potentially independent from each other.
The authors in [37] use hardware-enforced segregation between a safety-critical
domain and a non-safety-critical domain. The main limit of this solution, as it was
for [24], is the high cost required to connect two distant nodes. The authors in [38]
present a NoCDepend method to allow communication between critical regions,
implemented by a set of nodes used as input and output gateways. Thus, this feature
can solve the issue of connecting two (or more) distant nodes. However, this solution
presents a certain complexity which can be a prohibitive for the certification cost.
In addition, the authors in [38] present a dynamic reconfiguration technique. This
can be used as an alternative to the inter critical region communication, however this
solution presents the same disadvantages of circuit-switching—based solutions.
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From the state-of-the-art analysis it can derived the list of issues of the existing
approaches in dealing with temporal isolation issue. The main issue is the complexity
of the solution, which has the direct impact on the certification feasibility. On the
other hand, the low-complexity solutions are not complete as a set of issues is only
cursorily and indirectly addressed. Finally, the solutions that seem to be complete and
sufficiently simple are presenting a high implementation cost. The solution proposed
in this chapter aims to be a low-complexity one, still addressing the main issues of
the temporal partitioning. Considered the state-of-the-art, the proposed solution is
close to the one presented for Tilera Tile processor [24]. However, the similarity
only refers to the resource privatization approach. Differently from the [24], my
solution allows a much flexible NoC usage as it overcomes the strict domain-based
partitioning.
4.2 Proposed Partitioning Solution
Considering a set of NoC architectures, a solution is derived to face the temporal
isolation issues related to implicit contention of NoC interconnection, targeting
critical domain. The proposed solution is a partitioning technique based on resource
privatization, thus there is no resource sharing between critical software components
(i.e., applications). The overall solution is implemented in hardware, although this
hardware is supposed to be configured (by software at bootstrap time). The proposed
solution is implemented entirely at system design time. In detail, critical applications
are placed is such a way to avoid any contention for NoC internal resources (from
the critical applications). Thus, the temporal isolation is achieved for the critical
applications. In order to enforce this temporal isolation, thus prevent that a failure
can propagate from an application to another, each proposed technique exploits the
hardware characteristics of the NoC architecture it is used on. Thus, the partitions
are physically isolated from each other.
4.2.1 Considered NoC Model
The proposed solution is developed targeting simple NoC architectures. As already
explained, this choice allows to keep certification costs low. It is worth to highlight
how a more complex architecture is perfectly suitable to adopt the proposed solution;
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the problem is not the proposed solution but instead that architecture itself, as its
complexity will be a huge issue from the certification point of view.
In the scope of this chapter the proposed solutions will be explained and validated
for a specific set of NoC architectures, although the proposed solution can be applied
to any NoC presenting the same characteristics. All the NoC architectures are a 2D
mesh topology, as can be seen in Fig. 4.1. The figure also shows the path taken by a
packet send by N0 towards N5, according to XY routing algorithm.
Fig. 4.1 A schematic view of a 3x3 (2D) mesh topology NoC; N0 to N5 packet path under
XY routing algorithm.
The considered NoC model allows to implement two routing algorithms for the
critical traffic. For the non-critical traffic, deadlock-free adaptive routing algorithms
will be used. However, in the scope of the proposed approach, there is no constrain
on the routing algorithm used for non-critical traffic, thus whatever algorithm can be
used by the latter. The first routing algorithm used for critical traffic (rout_alg_A)
is presented in in Fig. 4.2.a. This XY and YX routing this approach will allow
to achieve minimal path routing while still prevent any deadlock since only two
nodes are considered in this case. The second routing algorithm used for critical
traffic (rout_alg_B) is the normal XY routing and it is presented in in Fig. 4.2.b.
The rout_alg_A allows to minimize the critical region extension. On the other hand,
rout_alg_B generally has a lower cost in terms of connectivity reduction.
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Fig. 4.2 MPSoC with 4x4 mesh topology NoC;
mixed-criticality system example: one C_app, one NC_app;
black arrows: critical traffic paths;
gray-shaded: critical regions (or domains)
a) placing scenario mcs_1_a: C_app_1 - N0 and N15, NC_app_1 - all the remaining nodes,
rout_alg_A is used for C_app_1;
b) placing scenario mcs_1_b: C_app_1 - N0 and N15, NC_app_1 - all the remaining nodes,
rout_alg_B is used for C_app_1;
All the considered NoC designs use wormhole switching and input-buffered
ports. As mentioned in Section 2.1.1 these architectural characteristics are the most
commonly used. Finally, all the considered NoC architectures are based on a single
physical network (i.e., not featuring VCs mechanism) implemented by links made
of two physical channels, one per direction. This characteristic falls under the
simplicity requirements discussed shortly above (in the previous paragraph). In case
an architecture, featuring VCs mechanism, is considered, our solution is perfectly
usable by simply not using the virtual networks. More information on the NoC
implementation choices is present in Section 2.1.1.
Fig. 2.2, provides a detailed view of the NoC, showing how each node is made by
a connected element (CE) connected to its dedicated network interface (NI) which is
in turn connected to its router through two physical channels (one per direction). Fig.
2.3 depicts router architecture of the considered NoC design. More information on
the NoC building blocks and the router implementation is present in Section 2.1.1.
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4.2.2 Application Placement Phase
The partitioning is done during the applications placing phase. During this phase, for
each application, it is decided which MPSoC resources (e.g., processing elements,
peripherals, memory) will be used by that application. The NoC interconnection
itself is seen as a set of resources (i.e., links, FIFOs, etc.) to be partitioned between
the applications. Each critical application has a dedicated partition, formed by the
resources dedicated to that application. In order to exhibit the lowest complexity
possible, the proposed solution considers a scenario where no inter-partition resource
sharing exist for critical partitions. This means that each critical application is
using the NoC without its traffic to be able to interfere with the traffic of any other
application. Thus, concerning the critical applications, the temporal partitioning
is done not only between applications having different levels of criticality but also
between those having the same criticality. For what it concerns the non-critical
applications, these do not have a per-application dedicated partition. This means
that it does exist a macro partition made of all non-critical applications. Thus, the
non-critical applications share the MPSoC resources (not dedicated to any critical
application). The proposed solution does not impose any resource sharing policy for
non-critical applications; thus, any resource sharing policy can be implemented for
the latter.
As can be implied from the aforementioned constrains and definitions, from the
QoS point of view, the proposed solution implements two levels of service: GS and
BE. Critical software modules are granted with GS level, and are guaranteed latency
and throughput as no NoC contention do exist. Non-critical applications exhibit BE
level, as only the guarantees originally provided by the MPSoC (which are usually
best-effort) are in place. The proposed techniques support an unbounded number of
criticality levels, as each application running under the GS level is granted with the
temporal isolation.
Since there is no resource sharing between critical partitions, the proposed
approach implements the spatial isolation (in the simplest way possible). However,
the focus put on the temporal domain as the spatial partitioning is much easier to
achieve and does not represent an open issue.
The proposed partitioning technique overcomes the classic strict domain (o
partition) segregation scheme (e.g., the one proposed in [24]), for instance, partitions
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can overlap (without violating traffic isolation). The main aspect is that a router
can be used in parallel (and simultaneously) by different software components (thus
different partitions) as far as there is no contention of the router’s internal resources.
This means that a router, as the NoC itself, is shared by several software components
(even having different levels of criticality). However, de facto there is no sharing
as each component of the NoC is privatized by one and only one partition (i.e.,
software component). This is a strong point of the proposed solution as it exhibits a
much higher flexibility and allows communication between distant nodes without
reducing the overall NoC connectivity. Considering a heterogeneous MPSoC, this
flexibility characteristic allows a much better system utilization with respect to the
strict partition segregation approach. This advantage becomes even more relevant
considering the issues like the hot spots or dark silicon.
The detailed discussion of the placement algorithms is out of the scope of
this dissertation. However, some considerations must be done. The main aspect
to consider is permanent bound of a set of NoC components to a given (critical)
partition, which deny any other partition from using those reserved NoC composts.
This represent the most delicate aspect of any solution which is based on resource
privatization instead of resource sharing. The direct consequence of this aspect is the
connectivity reduction of the what-is-left after a partition is placed. This reduction
can provoke the isolated CE issue when a CE becomes unusable because no logic
connection can be established with that CE. To cope with this issue, the proposed
solution allows two routing algorithms (see Section 4.2.1) to be used for a critical
partition (for each critical partition one of the two is chosen during the application
placement phase).
To limit the connectivity reduction overhead, the placement algorithm should
find a placement which will minimize the number of NoC components reserved
by each critical partition. It exists a direct relation between the size of a partition
and the number of NoC components it will need to sustain the intra-partition com-
munication. Thus, the placement algorithm should try to find a placement which
minimizes the size of each critical region. The obvious rule of thumb to achieve the
small size of critical regions is to minimize the distance between the nodes which
should communicate with each other. To minimize the critical partition size can
be far from being a trivial task when some issues, like for instance hot spots, are
faced in a heterogeneous MPSoC. On the other hand, placement algorithms are
created to minimize the resource usage, optimizing communication speed, power,
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etc. considering a set of constraints. However, the final goal of the placement
algorithm is to avoid isolated CE issue. The critical region minimization is a sort of
necessary condition and it is for sure not sufficient condition to achieve this goal. The
minimization considerations are related to critical partitions placing only, as there is
only one non-critical partition and it just uses the resources which are still available
after critical partitions have been mapped. However, the final goal is to avoid the
isolated CEs and the critical region minimization is not a necessary condition for
this goal. Thus, in case a CE is not used by non-critical partition due to its isolation,
the placement algorithm can attempt a non-minimal placement for critical partitions,
trying to make an isolated CE gain a logical connection.
4.2.3 Partitioning Enforcement
The NoC components privatization described in Section 4.2 only provides temporal
(and spatial) partitioning under the assumption of fault-free system. Thus, this
technique represents only a partial solution as in the context of mixed criticality
the partitioning must hold under the software components unexpected behavior
(e.g., bug, DoS attack, etc.). The main element of the overall solution proposed in
this chapter is the isolation enforcement feature. This feature is implemented by
differently for each of the considered architectures and thus will be described in the
relative section (Section 4.3).
4.3 NoC Architectures and Partitioning Solution Im-
plementation
This section will present the considered NoC architectures and the relative partition-
ing enforcement technique. All the considered architectures match the NoC model
described in Section 4.2.1, thus only the particularities of each architecture will be
presented in this section.
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4.3.1 Baseline LBDR
The first considered architecture is the baseline LBDR (B_LBDR) [41], a scalable
mechanism for implementing routing algorithms in for 2D architectures. LBDR
depends on two fixed sets of bits: connectivity and routing bits. The former describes
the underlying topology, whereas the latter defines the allowed/disallowed turns
dictated by the routing algorithm.
Connectivity bits describe whether a physical link (a bit for each direction) is
active or not. Thus, by un-setting these bits it is possible to create a set of completely
isolated domains inside the NoC. Considering the mcs_1_a (Fig. 4.2.a) and the
router model as in Fig. 4.1, to implement the partitioning enforcement, the following
bits has to be un-set: the S channel connectivity bits of N0, N1 and N2 as well as the
W channel connectivity bits of N7, N11 and N15.
Regarding the routing algorithm used for the critical region, it must be chosen
among the two described in Section 4.2.1. Although rout_alg_A creates a smaller
critical region, the NoC resources it occupies are exactly the same compare to the
rout_alg_B (as can be observed in Fig. 4.2). Furthermore, rout_alg_A is more likely
to create dead nodes, i.e., nodes which cannot use the NoC because all the router
resources are reserved by another partition. In other words, dead nodes are logically
disconnected from the NoC. An example of dead node is N3 of mcs_1_a.
The B_LBDR architecture is considered as a baseline architecture, having almost
no means to implement the partitioning enforcement. Due to this characteristic,
for B_LBDR there is a further cause for dead nodes. Each node located inside a
critical partition, which does not belong to that partition, must be powered off. In
fact, B_LBDR has no means to deny a node the usage of each and every resource of
its router.
4.3.2 Extended LBDR
The second considered architecture is the extended LBDR (E_LBDR), which has
been created to overcome the limitations of the previous architecture. The extended
routing mechanism is implemented by means of some additional bits to flank the
5 connectivity bits which codify the connection of each router to the N, E, W,
S and L channels (already present in B_LBDR). These extra 20 bits denote the
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allowed/restricted turns at each router. E_LBDR not only has extra bits to allow a
fine-grained control of the CE to the N, E, W and S channels, instead the turn model
implementation for the E_LBDR differs as well. B_LBDR considers the turns at
one hop away for setting the values of routing bits (8 routing bits per router). For
E_LBDR there are the 20 routing bits per router to encode the turns at the current
router (from an input port to an output port, including L output port), thus, the 20
bits allow codifying the 90-degree turns (i.e. N2E, N2W, E2N, etc.), the straight
paths (i.e. N2S, S2N, etc.) and the paths from/to L port (i.e. N2L, L2N, etc.).
This architecture allows to solve the dead nodes created by B_LBDR because of
location inside critical region. Thus, a non-critical node can now be located inside
the critical region which allows to overcome the strict partitioning and thus achieve
a much better usage of the NoC.
It must be highlighted how the additional bits of E_LBDR are not able to address
the dead nodes generated because of all resources of their router have been reserved.
Thus N3 of mcs_1_a will be a dead node also in case E_LBDR is used.
4.3.3 Routing-table Based
In this architecture, for each input port of the router (N, E, W, S and L) a routing table
is implemented, which stores the candidate output direction(s) for each destination
in the network. Therefore, each table for each input must have 4 entries showing
whether the flit should be forwarded to N, E, W or S direction. For the L port, it is
handled separately in the routing logic; The information regarding routing table needs
to be stored for each destination in the table of the same input. The region separation
is implemented by just non supporting any which would violate the partitioning. As
the stored bits in routing tables translate into memory elements, it does not scale
well with growing network size and number of nodes [102]. However, routing tables
allow implementation of any routing algorithm (also non minimal) in any topology.
4.4 QoSinNoC
QoSinNoc is an important part of the overall contribution described in this Chapter.
The goal of the framework is to facilitates the comparison between the considered
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NoC architectures for a specific set of applications to be implemented. Given a
set of applications to be mapped, a set of requirements on the application mapping
constrains the goal of the framework is to infer the best setup for the considered
architectures and to collect some figures of merit.
Reachability is one of the most important metrics for the partitioning techniques
based on resource privatization. In the scope of this dissertation I will define reacha-
bility metric of Ni as the number of nodes to which Ni is able to send a packet. This
metric must not be confused with the connectivity metric, which is usually defined as
number of nodes to which a given node is physically connected. In fact, the existence
of a physical connection between the two nodes is a necessary condition for these
nodes to able to send a packet to each other, but it is not a sufficient condition. In fact,
a further requirement to allow the traffic flow is the routing algorithm to allow the
logical connection for the given physical connection existing between those nodes.
The reachability metric has been introduced to measure the logical connectivity
improvement given by the redirection feature. This metric will be only considered
for NC_apps, as C_apps already have all the required connectivity (see Section 3.2.2)
and in any cannot use redirection feature. On the other hand, NC_apps are BE QoS
level and thus can benefit from the extra connectivity given by the redirection feature.
In order to exploit potentialities of LBDR-based and Table-based architectures,
QoSinNoC framework optimizes the reachability for the particular considered place-
ment scenario. The existing constrains on the nodes that should be able to communi-
cate with each other are also considered by the framework.
Proof of deadlock-freeness is also provided in [103], which is based on the
concept of proving the absence of cycles in routing graph. By traversing the routing
graph, it is possible to find the paths from each source to destination. Both in the case
of using E_LBDR and also Table-based, since it is assured that no cycles exist in the
routing graph corresponding to the chosen turn model, therefore, even non-minimal
paths would not lead to any deadlock.
The total power consumption (in mW) consists of static and dynamic power,
where the latter consists of internal and switching power. The power results are
obtained via Synopsys Design Compiler using AMS 180 nm CMOS technology
library. In order to obtain the power results, first each architecture has been simulated
under each scenario using a specific packet injection rate (PIR). Simulation traces
are collected in form of VCD files. The switching activity of the components and
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signals are then stored in SAIF format (switching activity interchange format) which
is generated by ModelSim. Further, during the synthesis process, the annotated
switching activities (the SAIF files) are fed into the synthesis tool (Synopsys Design
Compiler) in order to calculate the final static and dynamic power consumption (in
mW).
4.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section QoSinNoC framework better described by evaluating a set of simple
placement scenarios. These placement scenarios are mcs_1_a, mcs_1_b, mcs_2_a
and mcs_2_b, presented respectively in Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.3. All the considered
placement scenarios refer to the same MCS scenario: one critical application (C_app)
and one non-critical application (NC_app), where C_app uses exactly two node and
NC_app_1 — all the remaining nodes. Both mcs_1_a and mcs_1_b are related
to the same nodes placement, however they differ in NoC resources placement
(links, FIFOs, etc.), due to the different routing algorithms they use (rout_alg_1
and rout_alg_2 respectively). The two routing algorithms are described in detail in
Section 4.2.1. The same considerations are true for mcs_2_a and mcs_2_b.
Thus, the considered scenarios are extremely simple and very similar to each
other. This has been done on purpose, to evaluate how small placing differences
provide very different figures of merit, even in extremely simple case of only two
nodes are used by a unique critical application. Furthermore, to better stress the
critical points of the proposed approach, the considered scenarios are far from being
best case placement. In fact, mcs_1_a and mcs_1_b are the worst-case scenario
(critical nodes) placement scenario as they exhibit the maximum Manhattan distance
between their critical nodes. Also, mcs_2_a and mcs_2_b are quasi-worst-case
scenario, having the property to create two non-critical regions isolated by the
critical one.
As explained in previous sections, the proposed techniques (for both rout_alg_A
and rout_alg_A) are not limited to systems with one critical application nor to critical
application using only two CE. Instead, an arbitrary number of critical nodes are
supported as far as the size of the critical regions and the consequent connectivity
reduction are considered. However, to simulate a scenario having more than 2 critical
nodes will not add much to the general discussion as the scheduling of a critical
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Fig. 4.3 MPSoC with 4x4 mesh topology NoC;
mixed-criticality system example: one C_app, one NC_app;
black arrows: critical traffic paths;
gray-shaded: critical regions (or domains)
a) placing scenario mcs_2_a: C_app_1 - N0 and N14, NC_app_1 - all the remaining nodes,
rout_alg_A is used for C_app_1;
b) placing scenario mcs_2_b: C_app_1 - N0 and N14, NC_app_1 - all the remaining nodes,
rout_alg_B is used for C_app_1;
application should be designed (best practice) considering the access time for each
shared resource in order to avoid intra-partition contention. As interconnection is a
shared resource itself, this means that only congestion-free figures make sense for
C_apps.
While the congestion-free metrics of the NoC can be computed theoretically,
the presence of congestion makes the estimation extremely difficult. To this end,
QoSinNoC uses the simulation approach to evaluate the system behavior and collect
relevant metrics. The proposed framework allows the generation of traffic that
mimics the actual traffic patterns of an application. This is done by fine-grained
simulation set-up. The architectures are evaluated by simulation of RTL description
of the architectures. The traffic is generated and injected by custom traffic generators
which allow to easily configure the synthetic traffic generation. An infinite input
buffer at the Network Interface (NI) of each node is assumed in order to maintain the
packet injection rate fixed.
Both the considered scenarios were simulated injecting 5000 packets per node.
Each node always sent 8-flit packets. The destination of non-critical nodes has been
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computed randomly to achieve a random uniform traffic pattern. Table 4.1 compares
the placement-independent characteristics of each architecture. Table 4.2 is related
to the mcs_1 while the Table 4.3 is related to the mcs_2.
Table 4.1 Architectural only figures of merit (4x4 network).
Architectures
B_LBDR E_LBDR Table-based
Scalability + + -
Non-minimal Path Support - - +
Area (um²) 1.49 × 10e6
1.54 ×
10e6
2.12 ×
10e6
Area Overhead 0 % 2.9 % 41.9 %
Critical Path Delay (ns) 9.1 9.0 9.0
Critical Path Delay Overhead 0 % -0.9 % -0.9 %
Table 4.2 Figures of merit: mcs_1.
Architectures
Metrics Routing B_LBDR E_LBDR Table-based
Non-critical nodes related metrics
rout_alg_A 5 1 1Number of
dead nodes rout_alg_B 10 0 0
rout_alg_A 8.0 8.3 12.0
Average reachability
rout_alg_B 3.0 7.5 11.9
rout_alg_A 3.0 3.4 1.1Saturation throughput
(flits/clk cycles/nodes) rout_alg_B 1.9 3.2 0.8
Critical nodes related metrics
rout_alg_A 30.5 30.5 30.5congestion free latency
(clk cycles) rout_alg_B 30.5 30.5 30.5
rout_alg_A 0.37 0.37 0.37Saturation throughput
(flits/clk cycles/nodes) rout_alg_B 0.37 0.37 0.37
Before commenting the figures reported in the Table 4.2 and Table 4.3,it is worth
to consider some aspects of the reported metrics. First of all, the number of dead
nodes can easily be considered as the most important figure of merit. The reachability
metric could be considered the second important, as the throughput and latency are
dependent on such metric. Often, high reachability means that also distant nodes
can communicate with each other, which increase the congestion and thus makes
throughput and latency be worse. However, it should be clear that this will not be a
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Table 4.3 Figures of merit: mcs_2.
Architectures
Metrics Routing B_LBDR E_LBDR Table-based
Non-critical nodes related metrics
rout_alg_A 4 0 0Number of
dead nodes rout_alg_B 8 0 0
rout_alg_A 4.2 7.6 13.0
Average reachability
rout_alg_B 2.3 7.9 12.5
rout_alg_A 3.7 3.5 1.2Saturation throughput
(flits/clk cycles/nodes) rout_alg_B 2.3 2.9 1.2
Critical nodes related metrics
rout_alg_A 27.5 27.5 27.5congestion free latency
(clk cycles) rout_alg_B 27.5 27.5 27.5
rout_alg_A 0.37 0.37 0.37Saturation throughput
(flits/clk cycles/nodes) rout_alg_B 0.37 0.37 0.37
ceteris paribus comparison (as different reachability implies different traffic patterns),
so the throughput and latency figures must be considered accordingly.
From Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 it can be observed how the B_LBDR suffers
a doubling of isolated nodes. Indeed, rout_alg_B is not suitable for B_LBDR
architecture, at least all the nodes of a critical region are used by that region. Apart
B_LBDR, considering the mcs_1, rout_alg_B allows to solve the issue of dead nodes.
Thus rout_alg_B is better than rout_alg_A for this placement scenarios. Considering
the mcs_2, where there are no dead nodes for both rout_alg_A and rout_alg_B, it
can be observed how rout_alg_B provides a reachability metric improvement for
E_LBDR, while Table-based has better reachability with rout_alg_A.
4.6 Summary
Considering hardware-implemented temporal isolation of software components
running on the same NoC-based MPSoC, this chapter describes: (i) a set of specific
hardware —related techniques to allow the usage of the related NoC architectures in
the context of mixed criticality, and (ii) QoSinNoC framework, which allows an easy
comparison between these NoC architectures for a given set of software components
to be executed.
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The presented techniques, each related to a simple NoC architecture, are derived
to address the software components temporal isolation issue. Where the latter is the
main issue related to the usage of MPSoC in the context of mixed criticality. Thus,
in this chapter these techniques will be sometime referred to as mixed criticality
enforcement techniques. The proposed techniques are based on NoC resource
privatization (thus sharing avoidance) paradigm. The overall solution is based
on a one-to-one bound of each NoC internal resource to a software module (i.e.,
application). Thus, the NoC is partitioned between the applications and the resources
are prioritized to avoid any traffic interference. Furthermore, the solution does
not allow any inter-application resource sharing. In this way, the temporal (and
spatial) partitioning between software modules is achieved by denying any NoC
inter-partition interaction.
An important part of the overall contribution (described in this chapter) is
QoSinNoC framework, which facilitates the comparison between the considered
NoC architectures. QoSinNoC framework can be seen as the union of: (i) a set of
considered NoC architectures, (ii) the related techniques to allow their usage in the
context of mixed criticality and (iii) a module in charge of computing a set of figures
of merit in order to compare which architecture will better fit the implementation of
a given set of applications.
The considered NoC architectures as well as the related mixed criticality —
enforcement techniques are deliberately as simple as possible. This approach is
adopted to make the overall solution be simple, thus, to exhibit a high certification
potential. The architectures currently supported by the framework are:
• a basic version of LBDR with no direct support for mixed criticality;
• a modification of LBDR to better support the mixed criticality;
• a basic version of routing table —based routing, to also consider an architecture
able to support a non-minimal routing.
The proposed solution also implements spatial partition between critical applications.
However, the focus put on the temporal domain as the spatial partitioning is much
easier to achieve and does not represent an open issue. Some of the security issues,
for instance DoS attack, are solved by the proposed solution as well. However, the
security aspects are out of the scope of this dissertation and will not be considered.
This partitioning scheme is enforced by physically isolating each critical partition
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(i.e., by making impossible any NoC usage that would break the partitioning scheme).
This actual isolation is physically implemented by hardware means which are specific
to each of the considered NoC architectures. The proposed approach supports an
arbitrary high number of levels of criticality as each critical software component
is granted with temporal (and spatial) isolation. The proposed approach allows to
overcome a strict domain-based partitioning by performing NoC resource reservation
at router level, instead of node level. The latter represents an advantage of the
state-of-the-art solutions.
The techniques to allow the mixed criticality usage, used by QoSinNoC, are
not limited to the particular kind of NoC architecture they were created for. On
the contrary, these techniques can be applied for whatever COTS MPSoC as far
as the latter presents the key characteristics for their applicability. I.e., the NoC
architecture used by that COTS MPSoC should present the similarities with the NoC
the technique was developed for (i.e., the NoC considered in QoSinNoC).
Chapter 5
High-level ranking of candidate
software susceptibility to soft errors
This chapter describes the third contribution of this dissertation: a technique to
address the reliability aspect of the software running on a MPSoC. The reliability
definition is given in Section 2.2.1. This attribute of the overall system dependability
is directly related to the probability of a failure. A system failure (or simply failure)
is any mismatch in the system actual output with respect to the intended output,
where this mismatch concerns both the content of the output and its timing. The
reliability aspect is an important aspect, especially for a (safety- or mission-) critical
system, as a failure for such system has catastrophic consequences (Section 2.3).
A failure can be provoked by several causes (i.e., faults): from a software bug to
a problem inside the manufacturing process of the hardware. Section 2.2.2 provides
an exhaustive taxonomy of the faults as well as the details on the process of a fault
evolving into a failure. This chapter will focus on a precise type of failures: the
radiation-induced failures and the related soft errors (single event upset - SEU). SEU
is the most relevant for the radiation induced errors, as it has the highest probability
to take place. Section 2.2.2 contains a dedicated subsection, entitled Radiation-
Induced Faults and Errors, which provides more detail on radiation induced faults
and the related errors and failures. The contribution described in this chapter targets
the problem of assessing the robustness, against radiation-induces soft errors, of a
software component. The particular case is considered: the early design stage of the
system, where it exists a function which can be implemented by different candidate
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software modules. Thus, this assessment will provide a ranking of these candidates
according to their robustness against the considered error. As the early design stage
is addressed, the whole analysis is aimed to be as hardware-independent as possible.
The robustness ranking technique presented in this chapter is mainly based on
[104], which extends the research proposed in [105]. The latter, in turn is derived
from the research published in [106, 107].
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 presents some
state-of-the-art related the radiation effects evaluation; Section 5.2 presents proposed
solution to perform candidate software ranking; Section 5.3 presents the experimental
evaluation of the proposed solution; finally, Section 5.4 summarizes the key aspects
of the proposed solution;
5.1 Radiation Effects Evaluation: State-of-the-art
Evaluating the dependability characteristics of a software module when no infor-
mation about the target executing platform is available yet is a challenging task.
Considering the early phases of the design process, only a high-level version of the
algorithms (e.g., in C or C++) to be considered available, while the target executing
platform has still to be decided.
At this early design stage, a possible approach for performing a meaningful
reliability analysis of a software component is based on executing it using a mean-
ingful workload, injecting faults and observing the resulting behavior. Where, in
case radiation induced faults must be evaluated, the faults model related to radiation
effects have to be used.
From a technical point of view, such a kind of analysis typically adopts simulation-
based fault injection [42], where bit flips are injected inside the data structures of the
program [43–49]. In some cases, other representations of the compression program
may also exist (e.g., a Matlab’s Simulink model): in these cases, a preliminary
analysis can be performed by executing fault injection campaigns on this model [50].
The formal technique [51, 52] can be used as an alternative to the fault injection
simulation.
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The main issue concerning the aforementioned is the lack of precision. Having
no information about the hardware, the injected faults could never precisely model
the radiation effects [53].
5.2 Proposed Ranking Technique
5.2.1 The Overall Approach
The proposed technique has been derived to perform a ranking of a set of software
modules, candidate to implement a given function of the system (e.g., data com-
pression function). Thus, the proposed ranking technique is intended to use in the
early design stage, when for a given function, one possible implementation must be
chosen among several candidates. This will give to the system designer information
about the reliability dimension of the design space, thus helping the designer in his
choice of the most suitable candidate. The overall solution also provides some infor-
mation to be used during an eventual hardening phase, as an extra feature (naturally
implemented by the ranking process).
The proposed ranking technique is implemented at variables-level and requires
minimal information about the executing hardware platform. This aspect implies
several specific usages and advantages of the proposed technique. First of all, the
ranking technique is particularly suitable for COTS components, as their netlist
is confidential, thus precluding the usage of low-level approaches. Furthermore,
the quasi-independence from the target hardware makes the proposed technique
applicable during the early stages of the design cycle.
On the other hand, the high-level approaches are known to not be able to provide
high precision and not to be able to exactly capture the actual reliability figures.
Indeed, the proposed approach is only applicable for the comparative purposes and
only for a set of alternative implementations of a same function.
This comparative characteristic of the proposed approach is the key point to
achieve a sufficient level of precision. Given a specific MPSoC (or a simple mi-
croprocessor), a low-level approach would be able to capture hardware-specific
reliability information. Such information is impossible to be captured by the pro-
posed high-level approach. On the other hand, a very particular case is a comparison
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between a set of software modules, running on the same hardware and implementing
the same function. The key point of such kind of ranking analysis is the focus on the
difference between the reliability figures, instead of the reliability figures itself. This
main characteristic of the ranking allows to neglect the common-mode effects, as
these are meaningless in comparative terms.
However, for what it concerns the comparison of software modules, running
on the same hardware and implementing the same function, this hardware-specific
information can be at high extent considered as a common-mode contribution. Thus,
a low-level approach will provide information that is mostly negligible for the
comparison (i.e., ranking) purposes. The detailed discussion on this topic can be
found inside Section 5.3.1.
As no architectural information about the executing hardware is considered dur-
ing the fault injection phase, the collected information mostly concerns the algorithm-
and implementation-specific aspects of the considered software component. The
latter are mostly: the fault masking and self-convergence capabilities as well as
intrinsic capabilities to detect errors. This aspect of the proposed technique provides
the useful for the hardening purposes information, as a secondary and free feature of
the overall ranking technique.
As the radiation induced soft errors (in particular SEUs) are considered, the
approach mainly targets space and avionic domains. However, as the issue becomes
more relevant also for the on-ground applications, the proposed solution could be
considered for automotive and other domains as well.
In detail, the proposed technique is based on (i) the execution of the software
component and injecting single bit-flip faults in the program variables during its
execution, followed by (ii) a post-processing of the obtained figures to obtain a
normalized and thus more suitable to for the comparison purposes information. It
worth to highlight how the fault injection does not aim the precise reliability figures
computation, instead, it aims to achieve a level of precision which is sufficient to
perform a comparison.
In order to be ranked by the proposed technique, each software module must
be available as source code (C code only) and shall not have any dependency
with specific libraries or system calls. These requirements are stemming from the
purpose of analyzing the intrinsic — implementation-specific —robustness, without
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considering any platform-specific details (e.g., operating system/hardware-specific
services);
The scheme of the experimental environment, which implements the proposed
technique, is presented in Fig. 5.1. This scheme will be described in detail in Section
5.2.4 and Section 5.2.5.
Fig. 5.1 The experimental environment.
To explain the proposed ranking technique, a set of lossless data compression
programs will be considered (ranked).
The rest of this section is structured as follows. Section 5.2.2 will present set
of lossless compression algorithms to be ranked as well as the realistic workload
considered for this purpose. Some of the figures of merit of such programs will
be presented as well. Section 5.2.3 will describe a candidate executing hardware
platform, considered to evaluate the proposed ranking solution. Section 5.2.4 and
Section 5.2.5 explain the experimental environment. Where the former concerns its
run-time part, while the latter – fault injection part. Finally, Section 5.2.6 describes
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the post-processing of the results obtained by means of fault injection campaign
performed by the experimental environment.
5.2.2 Use Case: Sensor Data Lossless Compression
The ranking technique presented in this chapter, has been evaluated considering a set
of different (software) implementation for the data compression function. In detail,
this compression function is the core for a data logger system to be deployed in a
satellite launcher, thus the lossless telemetry sensor data compression is considered.
The different lossless compression programs, used to demonstrate the proposed
ranking technique, belong to completely different groups and are based on completely
different paradigms. This is a perfect example of the situation; the proposed ranking
technique is meant for: one function to be implemented in software and multiple
candidates to become that software module.
In order to improve the precision of the considered high-level approach, it
is crucial to consider a realistic workload. Thus, this chapter will evaluate the
considered software module candidates on actual telemetry data collected during
Ariane launcher missions.
This section will first briefly describe the data used as realistic workload for
the considered compression programs. Then, the implementation details of these
compression programs will be briefly presented. Finally, the characteristics and the
figures of merit of the considered programs will be presented.
Considered Workload
As a realistic workload I used two data sets collected during Ariane missions. Pres-
sure sensor data (1,531 samples, 8 bits per sample) and vibration sensor data (3,072
samples, 8 bits per sample).
LZW_12
Dictionary-based techniques [108] take advantage of commonly occurring pattern
sequences by using a dictionary in such a way that repeating patterns are replaced by
a codeword that points to the index of the dictionary containing the pattern.
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In particular, the LZ78 (Lempel-Ziv 1978) technique has been considered. This
technique achieves compression by replacing repeated occurrences of data with
references to a dictionary that is built based on the input data stream.
The pseudocode of the considered LZW implementation is presented in Algo-
rithm 5.1. The particular implementation is characterized by using 12 bits per LZW
code and will be referred to as LZW_12.
Algorithm 5.1 Pseudocode of LZW_12.
1: procedure LZW_12( input_data, out put_bu f f er )
2: CLEAR hash table
3: INITIALIZE LZW_dictionary with values from 0 to 255
4: SET found_string to NULL
5: SET curr_string_to_encode to NULL
6: for each element to encode do
7: APPEND element to encode to curr_string_to_encode
8: SEARCH (using hash table) curr_string_to_encode inside
LZW_dictionary
9: if previous search successful then
10: found_string ← curr_string_to_encode
11: else
12: WRITE the code of found_string to output_buffer
13: found_string ← NULL
14: if LZW_dictionary is full then
15: REINITIALIZE LZW_dictionary
16: end if
17: code_curr_string_to_encode← (code_last_element_LZW_dictionary
+ 1)
18: APPEND curr_string_to_encode to the LZW_dictionary
19: curr_string_to_encode ← NULL
20: end if
21: end for
22: if found_string not equal to NULL then
23: WRITE the code of found_string to output_buffer
24: end if
25: return (number of codes written to output_buffer)
26: end procedure
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RICE
Golomb-Rice-based techniques [108] are a subset of Golomb-based techniques,
which exploit variable-length codes based on a model of the probability of the data
dealt as natural numbers. To code a number according to Golomb paradigm we must
find the quotient and remainder of the division by a pre-defined divisor. The quotient
is then expressed in unary notation, and the remainder is expressed in truncated
binary notation. A Golomb-Rice code is a Golomb code where the divisor is a power
of two, enabling an efficient implementation using shift and mask operations rather
than division and modulo. The interesting aspect of these techniques is that they are
suitable for compressing streams of data, such as those acquired by the telemetry
system, without using memory-demanding data structures such as dictionaries, and
thus they are suitable when resource-constrained implementations are necessary.
The pseudocode of the considered Golomb-Rice implementation is presented in
Algorithm 5.2. In this dissertation, this implementation will be called RICE.
RLE
Run Length Encoding (RLE) technique [108] consists in encoding each sequence
of consecutive symbols as the symbol followed by the number of times the symbol
is repeated in the sequence. This technique is extremely simple but able to provide
good results if the data to compress presents sufficiently long sequences of repeated
symbols.
A straightforward implementation of RLE technique is considered, featuring
no pre-processing stage. The pseudocode of this implementation is reported in
Algorithm 5.2.
Code Size and Memory Footprint
Table 5.1 reports the characteristics of the considered compression software modules
in term of lines of code and memory occupation, where:
• Lines of code, which is the number of lines of code composing the considered
compression programs;
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Algorithm 5.2 Pseudocode of RICE.
1: procedure RICE( input_data, out put_bu f f er )
2:
3: WRITE the first element to encode to output_buffer
4: block_size ← 16
5: for each block of block_size elements to encode do
6: // “zeros_block_counter” counts consecutive mapped_diff blocks con-
taining only zeros
7: zeros_blocks_counter ← 0
8: start_index ← 0, except for the first block, in that case start_index is set
to 1
9: for each element j of the of the block, from start_index to block_size do
10: diff_var ← difference between element j and element (j-1), where
element -1 corresponds to the last element of the previous block
11: // COMPUTE the “mapping to positive”
12: if (diff_var >= 0) then
13: mapped_diff[j] ← (diff_var*2)
14: else
15: mapped_diff[j] ← (-diff_var*2 - 1)
16: end if
17: if mapped_diff contains only zeros then
18: INCREASE zeros_blocks_counter
19: else
20: if zeros_blocks_counter not equal 0 then
21: WRITE to output_buffer the code related to the value of
zeros_blocks_counter
22: end if
23: COMPUTE Rice code for the current block mapped_diff[j], with
j from start_index to block_size
24: WRITE to output_buffer the just computed code
25: end if
26: end for
27: end for
28: if zeros_blocks_counter not equal 0 then
29: WRITE to output_buffer the code related to the value of ze-
ros_blocks_counter
30: end if
31: return (number of codes written to output_buffer)
32: end procedure
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Algorithm 5.3 Pseudocode of RLE.
1: procedure RLE( input_data, out put_bu f f er )
2:
3: // “run_length” counts the number of consecutive repetitions of the current
element to encode
4: run_length ← 0
5: for each element to encode do
6: if current element differs from the previous then
7: WRITE to output_buffer the current element to encode followed by
one byte binary coding of run_length
8: run_length ← 0
9: else
10: INCREASE run_length
11: end if
12: end for
13: if run_length not equal 0 then
14: WRITE to output_buffer the current element to encode followed by one
byte binary coding of run_length
15: end if
16: return (number of codes written to output_buffer)
17: end procedure
• Memory occupation of the considered compression programs. In this column,
we reported only the size of the data structure needed for the compression,
while the input/output buffers have been neglected.
Table 5.1 Compression programs characteristics.
Compression
program
Lines of
code
Memory
occupation [B]
RICE 180 64
LZW_12 110 21,091
RLE 20 17
From this column, the much higher footprint of the LZW_12 is evident. Indeed,
being based on a dictionary, LZW_12 requires a much higher amount of memory
compared to the others;
Table 5.2 reports the figures of merit of the considered compression software
modules when the aforementioned telemetry sensor data is considered, in particular
compression ratio and compression rate, where:
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• Compression ratio is defined as number of bytes of the original data set over
the number of bytes of the compressed data set;
• Compression rate is defined as the number of compressed bytes over the
time required for the compression. The time required for the conversion is
computed considering the compression performed by the OpenRISC 1200 ISS,
running at 100 MHz clock frequency.
Table 5.2 Compression programs figures of merit: compression ratio and compression rate.
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Compration
ratio 12.6 20.1 25.5 2.4 0.6 2.4 5.8 7.1 10.1
Compression
rate [MB/s] 1.4 5.8 1.9 0.9 4.8 0.7 1.1 5.1 1.1
5.2.3 Candidate Executing Hardware Platform
The proposed ranking solution will be evaluated considering OR1200 [109, 110] as
a candidate executing hardware. The OR1200 is a 32-bit scalar RISC with Harvard
microarchitecture. It features 5 stage integer pipeline, virtual memory support
(MMU) and basic DSP capabilities.
5.2.4 Run-time Environment
The run-time environment, in charge of executing the considered software compo-
nents, has been implemented by an Intel Core i7 powered workstation running a
64-bit Linux distribution. Each software component (to be analyzed) is considered
composed of three modules, reported in Fig. 5.1, which are:
• Input acquisition module: this module is usually in charge of loading the data
to processed, from the file system, to the final memory location. In case and
operating system is present, this operation is done exploiting the dedicated
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system APIs. However, in the embedded systems domain, a file system is not
always present. As this module is not related to the compression itself, it is not
considered for the proposed technique purposes. To address the general case
and to avoid dependencies with any operating system, the input memory array
is pre-initialized with the data to be compressed. Thus, the input acquisition
module is made by a function only passing to the processing module a pointer
to the data to compress;
• Processing module: this module implements the actual compression, by pro-
cessing the input memory array and producing an output memory array. This
module is coded in C language and does not make use of any operating system
API. Thanks to this approach, the compression program is highly portable, and
can be reused in any target hardware platform (e.g., an embedded processor,
as well as an ASIC or FPGA after high-level synthesis);
• Output module: this module is usually in charge of downloading the output
memory array into the file system. In case and operating system is present,
this operation is done exploiting the dedicated system APIs. However, in
the embedded systems domain, a file system is not always present. As this
module is not related to the compression itself, it is not considered for the
proposed technique purposes. In order to address the general case and to avoid
dependencies with any operating system, this module is symbolic and has not
been actually implemented. I.e., the execution of the compression program
terminates when all the compressed data are inside the memory.
5.2.5 Fault Injection Environment
To rank the robustness against the radiation-induced soft errors of each compression
program, a high-level fault injection campaign is performed using the selected
workload (see Section 5.2.2). The effects of radiations are approximated as single bit
flips in the data structures of the compression program (see the related to radiations
part of Section 2.2.2).
The proposed solution is aware that the main drawback of any high-level approach
is the limited capability to capture the exact behavior of the hardware affected by
radiation-induced soft errors [53]. Indeed, the aim of the proposed technique is to
perform a ranking of a set of software components, while any usage to compute the
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quantitative reliability figures is discouraged. Thus, this technique benefits from
the fact that a comparison requires a lower level of precision with respect to the
quantitative reliability figures computation. However, the main challenge of the
overall technique is indeed to achieve a sufficient precision to allow a meaningful
comparison.
The adopted fault injection environment allows to evaluate the effects of radiation
induced soft errors, modeled as single bit flips of program variables. The fault
injection environment, described in Fig. 5.1, is composed of five modules:
• Golden output generator, which is in charge of running the compression
program once, without any fault injection. The run-time environment is used
to collect the binary file storing the correct compressed data array (i.e., the
golden output), to be used as a reference for classifying the effects of the
injected faults. The execution time of the compression program is collected as
well;
• Fault list generator, which is in charge of producing, for each considered
program, the list of faults to be injected. The fault list generator produces
a predefined number of faults (i.e., the fault list), each defined as the tuple
(injection time, identifier name, bitmask), which values are chosen randomly.
The injection time is chosen based on the execution time of the compression
program. The identifier is randomly chosen based on the set of data structures
of the compression program (including both scalar variables, such as temporary
variables, indexes, as well as data arrays). The bitmask corresponds to the
single bit in the selected identifier that must be bit-flipped at the injection time;
• Fault injector, which is a GDB-based script that for each fault starts the
execution of the considered compression program in debug mode, advances
the execution until injection time, injects the bit-flip inside the identifier
to attack, and resumes the execution of the program until its termination.
The fault injection makes use of the run-time environment for compression
program execution. Fault injection takes place after the input acquisition
module completed its activity, and before the compression module completed.
As a result, faults are injected only during the execution of the compression
program;
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• Decompressor, which decompresses the compressed data to evaluate the intrin-
sic masking and detection capabilities. In order to avoid useless computations
only corrupted data is decompressed, avoiding decompressing data which is
identical to the golden data. This module is implemented outside the run-time
environment because the decompression is supposed to take place on earth,
thus it is not subject to the radiation-induced soft errors;
• Result classifier, which is implemented by a set of BASH scripts, analyzes the
termination status of the compression program under fault injection as well as
the produced output. In particular, the termination of the program could be
normal, or caused by the detection of an exception (e.g., segmentation fault).
In case the program terminates normally, the output produced by the program
is compared to the golden output. In case the produced output differs from
the golden output, the decompressor is used to evaluate whether the data can
be still perfectly decompressed or at least the corruption is detected by the
decompressor.
Faults are classified (by the result classifier) according to the following categories:
• Silent: the faulty execution completes within a pre-defined amount of time and
produces either the same compressed data as the golden run or (in case com-
pressed data corruption took place) the decompressor can perfectly decompress
the corrupted data;
• Run-time detected: the faulty execution triggers some error detection mecha-
nism. Considering both the specificity of the compression algorithms and the
nature of soft errors, in case a soft error is detected, the recovery can be done
by simply repeating the compression. The sub-classification differs for the
two considered levels of fault injection. This category is further detailed in:
– Timeout error: the faulty execution does not complete within a pre-
defined amount of time;
– Segmentation fault error, when a memory access violation takes place.
• Detected by decompressor: this category groups faults for which the compres-
sion execution produced a corrupted compression and no run-time detection of
the corruption took place. Thus, the corrupted compression data has been sent
to earth. In this category, the decompressor is not able to tolerate the corruption,
thus it is not able to obtain the correct data. The data have been permanently
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lost and no recovery is possible, still the data corruption has been detected
by the decompressor, preventing the corrupted data from being considered
as correct. Furthermore, this implementation-specific (or algorithm-specific)
detection capability can be exploit during the hardening phase in order to
implement run-time detection mechanism;
• Wrong output: this category groups faults for which the compression execution
had produced a corrupted compression, and no run-time error detection took
place. Thus, the corrupted compression data has been sent to earth. In this
category, the decompressor is not able to tolerate the corruption, thus it is not
able to obtain the correct data. Furthermore, the decompressor was not able to
identify the corruption either, thus the corrupted data is considered correct.
5.2.6 Post-processing and Candidate Ranking Process
The proposed approach aims to be as hardware-independent as possible, however,
to provide a sufficient level of precision, some target hardware information has still
to be considered. This kind of information does not require the actual usage of
the target hardware, thus the proposed technique is suitable for the design space
exploration, as a set of possible execution platform can be quickly analyses.
Considering the fault classification as in Section 5.2.5, the outcomes considered
as a measure of unreliability are Wrong output outcomes as well as Detected by
decompressor outcomes. The latter is considered in this category because the
detection is done in a moment when no recovery action can be taken any more. In
order to avoid confusion and to keep notation simple, I define a further outcome
category Corrupted outcome, defined in Equation 5.1, as a sum of the aforementioned
two.
Corrupted =Wrong out put+Detected by decompressor (5.1)
To perform a meaningful comparison, the following basic information related to
the target executing hardware platform should still be considered: (i) the execution
time of the compression and (ii) the number of actually used registers. This informa-
tion must be known for each compression program and it is required to normalize
the results of fault injections. In particular, the execution time must be considered
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because programs having longer execution time are likely to experience a higher
number of soft errors during their execution [111]. Whereas, programs using less
registers have a lower probability to be affected by a soft error during their execution.
However, this information does not require a candidate executing hardware to be
actually used to execute the investigated software modules. Indeed, the execution
time can be collected by an instruction set simulator, which availability is fairly
common. While, the number of used registers can be collected from the compiled
code, thus a compiler is sufficient to provide this information.
To consider the different amount of used registers, the normalization of Silent
outcome is presented in Equation 5.2, where:
• Sprogram_i is the number of Silent outcomes obtained for the i-th considered
program;
• NUR_Sprogram_i is the, normalized per register usage, amount of Silent out-
comes, obtained for the i-th considered program;
• URprogram_i is the number of actually used registers by the i-th considered
program.
NUR_Sprogram_i = Sprogram_i×MAXi{URprogram_i}URprogram_i (5.2)
To consider the difference in execution times, the normalization of Corrupted
outcome is presented in Equation 5.3, where:
• Cprogram_i is the number of Corrupted outcomes obtained for the i-th considered
program;
• NET _Sprogram_i is the number of Corrupted outcomes normalized per execu-
tion time, obtained for the i-th considered program;
• ETprogram_i is the execution time of the i-th considered program.
NET _Cprogram_i =Cprogram_i× ETprogram_iMINi{ETprogram_i} (5.3)
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5.3 Experimental Evaluation
This section will first describe the environment used to validate the proposed ranking
technique (Section 5.3.1). Then, in Section 5.3.2, the proposed technique is used to
rank the considered set of compression programs (see Section 5.2.2), considering
the candidate executing hardware platform (see Section 5.2.3).
5.3.1 Validation Environment
The validation environment has the same structure as the experimental environment
(Fig. 5.1). Its run-time part is the same described in Section 5.2.4, with the exception
that it is implemented by an instruction set simulator of the candidate executing
hardware, namely OR1ksim [112].
To validate the proposed approach, the results of high-level fault injection have
been compared with those gathered using register-level fault injection simulation.
In detail, general-purpose registers (GPRs) of a candidate executing platform have
been considered. The injection of faults inside the memory has not been considered,
as memories (both on chip and external) used in space applications, are typically
protected by error detection/correction capabilities [54, 55]. Thus, the memories can
be considered as immune to radiation-induced soft errors.
Despite the GPRs-level fault injection simulation does not provide precise figures
about the real behavior of the hardware, it is reasonable to assume that their precision
allows the comparison among software modules implementing the same function
(e.g., data compression). In particular, in [53] the authors provide a detailed analysis
of the flip-flop error propagation for a considered in-order processor. According
to this analysis, about 18.6% of the injected flip-flop errors lead to a failure which
is not related to the register file. This means that 18.6% of radiation induced soft
errors cannot be modeled by only injecting faults inside the register file. However,
these errors are related to either processor state corruption (e.g., program counter
corruption), cache/interrupt controller malfunctioning or memory subsystem mal-
functioning. Considered the nature of these errors, it is reasonable to assume that
them have a common mode effect for all the considered software components, thus
could be neglected for what it concerns the comparison between these software
components.
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The fault injection environment used to validate the proposed approach is similar
to the one described in Section 5.2.5. The differences are the following:
• for what it concerns the Fault list generator, a single bit-flip injection in the
General-Purpose Registers (GPRs) is used;
• for what it concerns the Run-time detected outcome, it is further detailed in:
– Timeout error: the faulty execution does not complete within a pre-
defined amount of time;
– Bus error, when the injected fault leads the program to access an invalid
memory address;
– Alignment error, when the fault leads the program to access a misaligned
memory address;
– Illegal instruction, when the fault leads the processor to access a memory
area not containing valid instructions.
5.3.2 Results Analysis
The candidate hardware’s compiler has been used to collect the information about
the number of registers actually used by the proposed architectures. These figures,
reported in Table 5.6, have been used to process (Equation 5.2) the fault injection
campaign results gathered by the experimental environment. These normalized
results of 100,000 injected faults, are reported in Table 5.4. The results further
normalized by execution time, as in Equation 5.3, are reported in Table 5.5. From
the figures of Table 5.5, the RLE compression program turns to be the most robust,
followed by LZW_12 and RICE. However, the small difference existing between
RLE and LZW_12 suggests using the ranking between the two carefully.
Table 5.3 Number of actually used general purpose registers.
Compression program
LZW_12 RLE RICE
Number of used GPRs 18 13 18
To validate the proposed technique, the validation environment described in
Section 5.3.1, has been used to inject 100,000 faults and the collected figures are
reported in Table 5.6. Table 5.7 reports figures achieved applying the normalization
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Table 5.4 Results of fault injection into program variables, normalized per number of used
registers.
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Silent 99.1 64.3 46.7 94.6 66.7 39.5 96.1 65.9 41.9
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Bus error
exception 0.1 17.4 5.9 0.1 16.4 5.3 0.1 16.7 5.5
Wrong output 0.1 1.5 5.0 0.8 2.5 0.6 0.6 2.2 2.1
Detected by
decompressor 0.7 16.8 42.4 4.5 14.4 54.6 3.2 15.2 50.5
Table 5.5 Results of fault injection into program variables, normalized with respect to both
the number of used registers and the execution time.
LZW_12 RLE RICE
Wrong output undetected at run-time
(Wrong output + Detected by decompressor) 18,083 17,400 250,274
of Equation 5.3 to the figures of Table 5.6. The figures of Table 5.7 show the same
ranking obtained by applying the proposed approach (Table 5.5), i.e., RLE is the
most robust one, followed by the LZW_12 and finally by RICE. Thus, the proposed
high-level approach is considered validated by a more precise one.
5.4 Summary
This chapter describes the third contribution of this dissertation: a technique to
address the reliability aspect of software running on a MPSoC. In detail, the reliability
is considered for what it concerns the robustness against radiation-induced soft
errors. The proposed technique has been derived to perform a ranking of a set of
software modules, candidate to implement a given function of the system (e.g., data
compression function). Thus, the proposed ranking technique is intended to use
in the early design stage, when for a given function, one possible implementation
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Table 5.6 Results of fault injection into general purpose registers.
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Silent 80.8 82.0 49.0 80.5 84.0 53.9 80.6 83.3 52.3
Timeout
error 1.4 3.7 9.1 1.7 3.5 8.7 1.6 3.6 8.8
Bus error
exception 12.0 5.4 15.3 11.8 5.0 15.0 11.9 5.1 15.1
Alignment
exception 0.4 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.8 1.2 0.4 0.9 1.0
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Illegal instruction
exception 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Wrong output 1.8 0.9 13.5 2.6 1.1 11.4 2.3 1.0 12.1
Detected by
decompressor 3.5 7.0 12.4 3.0 5.5 9.8 3.2 6.0 10.7
Table 5.7 Results of fault injection into general purpose registers, normalized with respect to
the execution time.
LZW_12 RLE RICE
Wrong output undetected at run-time
(Wrong output + Detected by decompressor) 26,172 7,187 108,483
must be chosen among several candidates. This will give to the system designer
information about the reliability dimension of the design space, thus helping the
designer in his choice of the most suitable candidate. The overall solution also
provides some information to be used during an eventual hardening phase, as an
extra feature (naturally implemented by the ranking process).
The proposed approach aims to be as hardware-independent as possible, however,
to provide a sufficient level of precision, some information about target executing
hardware has still to be considered. In detail, the proposed ranking technique is
implemented at program-variables-level. This aspect implies several specific usages
and advantages of the proposed technique. First of all, the ranking technique is
particularly suitable for COTS components, as their netlist is confidential, thus
precluding the usage of low-level approaches. Furthermore, the quasi-independence
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from the target hardware makes the proposed technique applicable during the early
stages of the design cycle.
On the other hand, the high-level approaches are known to not be able to provide
high precision and not to be able to exactly capture the actual reliability figures.
Indeed, the proposed approach is only applicable for the comparative purposes and
only for a set of alternative implementations of a same function.
This comparative characteristic of the proposed approach is the key point to
achieve a sufficient level of precision. Given a specific MPSoC (or a simple mi-
croprocessor), a low-level approach would be able to capture hardware-specific
reliability information, which are impossible to be evaluated by the proposed high-
level approach. However, for what it concerns the comparison of software modules
(running on that specific hardware), considering the literature on the flip-flop fault
injection effects, it is reasonable to consider this hardware-specific information as a
common-mode contribution. Thus, the base assumption of the proposed technique
is that a low-level approach will provide information that is mostly negligible for
the comparison (i.e., ranking) purposes. For what it concerns the fault injection sim-
ulation done at program-variables-level, the former assumption has been validated
by comparing the achieved ranking to the one derived with the register-level fault
injection simulation.
As no architectural information about the executing hardware is considered
during the fault injection phase, the collected information mostly concerns the
algorithmic- and implementation-specific aspects of the considered software compo-
nent. The latter are mostly: the fault masking and self-convergence capabilities as
well as intrinsic capabilities to detect errors. This aspect of the proposed technique
provides the useful for the hardening purposes information, as a secondary and free
feature of the overall ranking technique.
As the radiation induced soft errors (in particular SEUs) are considered, the
approach mainly targets space and avionic domains. However, as the issue becomes
more relevant also for the on-ground applications, the proposed solution could be
considered for automotive and other domains as well.
In detail, the proposed technique is based on (i) the execution of the software
component and injecting single bit-flip faults in the program variables during its
execution, followed by (ii) a post-processing of the obtained figures to obtain a
normalized and thus more suitable to for the comparison purposes information. It
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worth to highlight how the fault injection does not aim the precise reliability figures
computation, instead, it aims to achieve a level of precision which is sufficient to
perform a comparison.
The proposed approach aims to be as hardware-independent as possible, however,
to provide a sufficient level of precision, some target hardware information has still
to be considered. In particular, an estimation of the execution time and the number
of used registers allows to better correlate the results of the fault injection campaign
to the real behavior of the candidate executing hardware platform. However, this
information does not require a candidate executing hardware to be actually used
to execute the investigated software modules. Indeed, the executing time can be
collected by an instruction set simulator, which availability is fairly common. While,
the number of used registers can be collected from the compiled code, thus a compiler
is sufficient to provide this information.
The proposed approach is evaluated by ranking a set of lossless compression
programs, candidate for the data logging sub-system. To validate the proposed
approach, the results of high-level fault injection have been compared with those
gathered with register-level fault injection simulation. In detail, general-purpose
registers (GPRs) of a candidate executing platform have been considered. The
injection of faults inside the memory has not been considered, as memories (both
on chip and external) used in space applications, are typically protected by error
detection/correction capabilities, and can be considered as immune to radiation-
induced soft errors.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
The usage of multi-core microprocessors is today normally avoided by the critical
application domain. This is particularly true for the avionics domain, where an
independent certification entity exists. The main issue related to the multi-core
architectures is the lack of predictability due to the presence of shared resources.
This issue is of paramount importance in a very complex system, which proper
functioning must be rigorously demonstrated at each level of abstraction. In fact, an
avionic certification process is extremely complex and thus expensive, and although
possible, can easily be not feasible from economical point of view.
Driven by the even-growing complexity and number of required applications,
aviation domain community constantly increase their attention towards multi-core
processor–based MCSs. While some certification is expected by the end of 2019, at
the best of author’s knowledge no multi-core–based MCS exists yet.
While the certification of a quad-core microprocessor is reportedly close to
be achieved, the market is offering much more advanced devices — MPSoC —
integrating tens or hundreds of cores on the same chip.
It is expected that one day a multi-core–based MCS will become a common
practice. And it is also expected that sometime later, this solution will not be
able to provide the required computational power, thus the MPSoC usage will go
under avionic community investigation. The same way it happened for multi-core
microprocessors, investigated to replace the single-core ones.
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The situation in avionic domain, described so far, is not much different from the
other critical domain.
In this dissertation I investigate the usage of NoC-based MPSoC in the context
of mixed criticality. The particular focus is put upon the lack of predictability issue
related to the intrinsic NoC contention, which is identified as the main obstacle
for the multi-core usage in the context of critical systems. In fact, this lack of
predictability has a direct impact on the functional safety aspect.
In this last chapter, the three contributions of this thesis are first summarized
(Section 6.1, Section 6.2 and Section 6.3). Finally, Section 6.4 will present some
ideas to extend the presented line of research as such as well as the proposed solutions
individually.
6.1 Contribution 1
The first and the main contribution of this dissertation is a technique derived to solve
the main issue that prevents the usage of MPSoC in the context of mixed criticality.
In detail, I address the software components temporal isolation issue. In fact, the
parallel execution of a set of software components, on the same COTS NoC-based
MPSoC, represents the main threat for the functional safety of the systems.
The proposed solution is based on resource privatization–based NoC partitioning,
where each critical application has a dedicated partition. The proposed solution
enforces this partitioning and ensures the absence of both inter-partition NoC implicit
contention and inter-partition communication. Thus, each critical partition is isolated
from any other partition. The partitioning technique, used by the proposed solution,
is based on resource privatization and software-implemented on-line monitoring and
enforcing of the aforementioned partition isolation.
The isolation monitoring (and enforcement) task is the core of the proposes
technique and it is based on the deterministic (or de facto deterministic) routing used
by NoC. Thus, this particular routing characteristic is the main requirement for the
target NoC design. The other and only requirements are that both routing algorithm
and NoC topology must be known.
The traffic filtering is implemented as purely software module to be inserted
inside the RTOS, in order to provide a modular and reusable design.
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The proposed approach supports an arbitrary high number of levels of criticality
as each critical software component is granted with temporal (and spatial) isolation.
Advantages
There are several advantages of proposed approach with respect to the existing
partitioning and resource privatization–based approaches.
The main advantage is the low complexity, for what it concerns both (i) the
implementation of the technique itself and (ii) the NoC architecture targeted by the
proposed approach. This aspect is crucial as the complexity is the main issue for the
certification process, which is mandatory for any critical system.
Furthermore, the proposed solution overcomes the strict domain-based segrega-
tion. This means that what is normally defined as a critical region of the NoC, in
the proposed solution, can overlap with a non-critical region without any temporal
isolation loss. This allows a much flexible and thus more efficient NoC utilization,
allowing in turn more application to be mapped on the same MPSoC.
To further improve the NoC utilization, the proposed solution also features a
redirection functionality for the non-critical applications. This feature allows to
extend the overall routing algorithm of non-critical traffic. The resulting extra
connectivity is used to mitigate the connectivity reduction eventually provoked by
the proposed resource privatization paradigm.
Limitations
The natural limitation of the proposed solution concerns deterministic or de facto
deterministic characteristic, the routing algorithm used by the NoC is expected to
exhibit. This requirement is due to the really core functionality of the proposed
approach to exploit this particular characteristic. On the other hand, this is not a big
limitation, if critical domain is considered. In fact, an adaptive routing algorithm can
be easily considered excessively complex from the certification point of view.
The other requirements concerning the routing and topology to be both known,
follows the same reasoning. In a context of critical systems, the computing hardware
must be sufficiently known. Thus, it is natural to conclude that an MPSoC, which
routing algorithm or topology are unknown, cannot be used in context of critical
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systems, irrespective of the fact whether the proposed solution is applicable, or it is
not.
Another natural limitation of the proposed approach is a potential connectivity
reduction cost, which is presented by any resource privatization–based approach.
Thus, a particular cure must be put during the placement phase in order to avoid
distant nodes and large critical regions.
A limitation of the proposed solution is the absence of inter-partition commu-
nication. This limitation comes directly from the decision to have such limitation.
The reason, of such choice, is a much simpler certification process, which is a big
advantage. On the other hand, the presence of inter-partition communication would
make the overall solution more flexible. This aspect will be discussed more in detail
in the Section 6.4, which concerns the future work.
6.2 Contribution 2
The second contribution of this dissertation (Chapter 4) is a solution to the same
issue addressed the first contribution in Chapter 3. The main difference between the
two is that while the first contribution presents a purely software solution targeting
fairly generic COTS components, the second contribution presents a set of hardware-
specific solutions and a framework to facilitate their comparison.
The addressed issue is the software components temporal isolation one, which is
the main issue to prevent the usage of MPSoC in the context of mixed criticality. In
fact, the parallel execution of a set of software components, on the same NoC-based
MPSoC, represents the main threat for the functional safety of the systems.
Thus, the second contribution of this dissertation presents: (i) a set of specific-
hardware–related techniques to allow the usage of the related NoC architectures in
the context of mixed criticality, and (ii) QoSinNoC framework, which allows an easy
comparison between these NoC architectures for a given set of software components
to be executed.
The presented techniques, each related to a simple NoC architecture, are derived
to address the software components temporal isolation issue. Where the latter is the
main issue related to the usage of MPSoC in the context of mixed criticality. Thus,
in this chapter these techniques will be sometime referred to as mixed criticality
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enforcement techniques. The proposed techniques are based on NoC resource
privatization (thus sharing avoidance) paradigm. The overall solution is based
on a one-to-one bound of each NoC internal resource to a software module (i.e.,
application). Thus, the NoC is partitioned between the applications and the resources
are prioritized to avoid any traffic interference. Furthermore, the solution does
not allow any inter-application resource sharing. In this way, the temporal (and
spatial) partitioning between software modules is achieved by denying any NoC
inter-partition interaction.
An important part of the overall contribution (described in this chapter) is
QoSinNoC framework, which facilitates the comparison between the considered
NoC architectures. QoSinNoC framework can be seen as the union of: (i) a set of
considered NoC architectures, (ii) the related techniques to allow their usage in the
context of mixed criticality and (iii) a module in charge of computing a set of figures
of merit in order to compare which architecture will better fit the implementation of
a given set of applications.
The considered NoC architectures as well as the related mixed-criticality enforce-
ment techniques are deliberately as simple as possible. This approach is adopted to
make the overall solution be simple, thus, to exhibit a high certification potential.
The proposed solution also implements spatial partition between critical applications.
However, the focus put on the temporal domain as the spatial partitioning is much
easier to achieve and does not represent an open issue. Some of the security issues,
for instance DoS attack, are solved by the proposed solution as well. However,
the security aspects are out of the scope of this dissertation and will not be con-
sidered. This partitioning scheme is enforced by physically isolating each critical
partition (i.e., by making impossible any NoC usage that would break the partitioning
scheme). This actual isolation is physically implemented by hardware means which
are specific to each of the considered NoC architectures. The proposed approach
allows to overcome a strict domain-based partitioning by performing NoC resource
reservation at router level, instead of node level. The latter represents an advantage
of the state-of-the-art solutions.
The techniques to allow the mixed criticality usage, used by QoSinNoC, are
not limited to the particular kind of NoC architecture they were created for. On
the contrary, these techniques can be applied for whatever COTS MPSoC as far
as the latter presents the key characteristics for their applicability. I.e., the NoC
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architecture used by that COTS MPSoC should present the similarities with the NoC
the technique was developed for (i.e., the NoC considered in QoSinNoC).
The proposed approach supports an arbitrary high number of levels of criticality
as each critical software component is granted with temporal (and spatial) isolation.
Advantages
There are several advantages of proposed approach with respect to the existing
hardware-specific partitioning and resource privatization–based approaches.
The main advantage is the low complexity, for what it concerns both (i) the
implementation of the technique itself and (ii) the NoC architectures targeted by the
proposed approach. This aspect is crucial as the complexity is the main issue for the
certification process, which is mandatory for any critical system.
Furthermore, the proposed solution overcomes the strict domain-based segrega-
tion. This means that what is normally defined as a critical region of the NoC, in
the proposed solution, can overlap with a non-critical region without any temporal
isolation loss. This allows a much flexible and thus more efficient NoC utilization,
allowing in turn more application to be mapped on the same MPSoC.
Limitations
The natural limitation of each of the proposed mixed criticality enforcement tech-
nique is the specific hardware characteristics, exploited by the former.
Another natural limitation of the proposed approach is a potential connectivity
reduction cost, which is presented by any resource privatization–based approach.
Thus, a particular cure must be put during the placement phase in order to avoid
distant nodes and large critical regions.
A limitation of the proposed solution is the absence of inter-partition commu-
nication. This limitation comes directly from the decision to have such limitation.
The reason, of such choice, is a much simpler certification process, which is a big
advantage. On the other hand, the presence of inter-partition communication would
make the overall solution more flexible. This aspect will be discussed more in detail
in the Section 6.4, which concerns the future work.
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6.3 Contribution 3
The third contribution of this dissertation (Chapter 5) is a methodology to address
the reliability aspect of COTS MPSoC used for space and avionics systems.
The proposed technique allows to perform a ranking of a set of different software
implementations of a given functionality. A typical situation, the proposed technique
is intended to be used for, is when different algorithms or even paradigms exist
to implement the required function (e.g., data compression function). Thus, the
proposed solution is intended to help the designer in the choice of the most suitable
(in terms of reliability) software implementation for a given system function, when
more candidates for that function exist. The overall solution also provides some
information to be used during an eventual hardening phase, as an extra feature
(naturally implemented by the ranking process).
The proposed ranking technique is implemented at variables-level and requires
minimal information about the computing hardware platform. This aspect implies
several specific usages and advantages of the proposed technique. First of all, the
ranking technique is particularly suitable for COTS components, as their netlist
is confidential, thus precluding the usage of low-level approaches. Furthermore,
the quasi-independence from the target hardware makes the proposed technique
applicable during the early stages of the design cycle.
On the other hand, the high-level approaches are known to not be able to provide
high precision and not to be able to exactly capture the actual reliability figures.
Indeed, the proposed approach is only applicable for the comparative purposes and
only for a set of alternative implementations of a same function.
This comparative characteristic of the proposed approach is the key point to
achieve a sufficient level of precision. Given a specific MPSoC (or a simple mi-
croprocessor), a low-level approach would be able to capture hardware-specific
reliability information, which are impossible to be evaluated by the proposed high-
level approach. However, for what it concerns the comparison of software modules
(running on that specific hardware), this hardware-specific information can be at
high extent considered as common-mode contribution. Thus, a low-level approach
will provide information that is mostly negligible for the comparison (i.e., ranking)
purposes.
6.3 Contribution 3 131
As no architectural information about the computing hardware is considered
during the fault injection phase, the collected information mostly concerns the
algorithmic- and implementation-specific aspects of the considered software compo-
nent. The latter are mostly: the fault masking and self-convergence capabilities as
well as intrinsic capabilities to detect errors. This aspect of the proposed technique
provides the useful for the hardening purposes information, as a secondary and free
feature of the overall ranking technique.
As the radiation induced soft errors (in particular SEUs) are considered, the
approach mainly targets space and avionic domains. However, as the issue becomes
more relevant also for the on-ground applications, the proposed solution could be
considered for automotive and other domains as well.
In detail, the proposed technique is based on (i) the execution of the software
component and injecting single bit-flip faults in the program variables during its
execution, followed by (ii) a post-processing of the obtained figures to obtain a
normalized and thus more suitable to for the comparison purposes information. It
worth to highlight how the fault injection does not aim the precise reliability figures
computation, instead, it aims to achieve a level of precision which is sufficient to
perform a comparison.
The proposed approach is evaluated by ranking a set of lossless compression
programs, candidate for the data logging sub-system. To validate the proposed
approach, the results of high-level fault injection have been compared with those
gathered with register-level fault injection simulation. In detail, general-purpose
registers (GPRs) of a candidate executing platform have been considered. The
injection of faults inside the memory has not been considered, as memories (both
on chip and external) used in space applications, are typically protected by error
detection/correction capabilities, and can be considered as immune to radiation-
induced soft errors.
Advantages
As the proposed solution is implemented at high level its main advantage it cost, as
the techniques implemented at lower levels of abstraction are more expensive both
in terms of time and money.
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Limitations
The proposed technique only performs a ranking of a set of candidates for the same
function. Furthermore, this ranking is just an indication as the overall precision is
not estimated.
6.4 Future Work
Considering this thesis line of research as such, a possible future work consists in
putting the focus on the automotive domain. In fact, although considering critical
systems in general, this thesis’ focus mainly on space and especially on avionic
domains. On the other hand, automotive industry presents similar — yet different —
requirements, thus the applicability to the automotive domain should be explicitly
investigated.
This future work is justified by the ever-growing need of performance the auto-
motive domain ex experiencing. While the avionics and space industry have SWaP
reduction as their main driving factor (towards multi-core microprocessor adaptation),
the automotive industry has its own factors as well. These factors are the evolution
of infotainment functionalities but first of all the rise of autonomous driving vehicles.
The latter will require a huge computational power and will be safety critical, thus a
perfect match for an MPSoC-based MCS. Furthermore, avionics and space domains
are particularly conservative, and the new technology adaptation is particularly slow
for them. This means that probably the first usage of MPSoC in the context of mixed
criticality will be done in automotive domain instead.
Apart from the future work concerning this thesis line of research as such, the
rest of this section will list possible future work which is specific to each of the
presented contributions.
For what it concerns the first contribution, presented in Chapter 3, several possible
extensions and future activities can be identified.
1. Inter-partition communication implementation. The current solution does
not allow inter-partition communication. The reason for such limitation is
the easiest certification process. However, it could be possible that the extra
flexibility, given by the inter-partition communication, will worth the extra
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complexity given by its implementation. A possible future work can explore
the cost of the mechanisms able to provide such inter-partition communication.
2. Tolerance to hardware faults. The solution proposed in Chapter 4 was specifi-
cally developed to address the partitioning issue related to the MPSoC usage,
and in particular the temporal isolation between software components running
of such system. However, the proposed approach appears promising from the
(hardware) fault tolerance point of view, thus this aspect could worth a further
investigation.
3. Testing of the proposed solution on a COTS MPSoC. The next step for the
proposed solution validation is to identify a COTS MPSoC and to test the
proposed solution on such hardware platform.
For what it concerns the second contribution, presented in Chapter 4, several
possible extensions and future activities can be identified. As both the first and the
second contributions target the same issue (i.e., temporal isolation of the software
components) the future activities are somehow similar.
1. Inter-partition communication implementation. The current solution does
not allow inter-partition communication. The reason for such limitation is
the easiest certification process. However, it could be possible that the extra
flexibility, given by the inter-partition communication, will worth the extra
complexity given by its implementation. A possible future work can explore
the cost of the mechanisms able to provide such inter-partition communication.
2. Further NoC architectures. The set of considered architectures can be extended
with further architectures, e.g.., source routing -based. Different form the mesh
topologies can be investigated as well.
3. Tolerance to hardware faults. The solution proposed in Chapter 4 was specifi-
cally developed to address the partitioning issue related to the MPSoC usage,
and in particular the temporal isolation between software components running
of such system. However, the proposed approach appears promising from the
(hardware) fault tolerance point of view, thus this aspect could worth a further
investigation.
For what it concerns the last contribution of this dissertation, presented in Chapter
5, several possible extensions and future activities can be identified as well.
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1. More precision: hardware timer–based system. So far, the proposed solution
was implemented on a common workstation computer, were the time of injec-
tion was affected by the operating system services. A possible improvement to
be investigated is the creation of a dedicated processor-based system featured
with a hardware timer. Such system will thus allow to achieve a much better
precision in fault injection process, thus will increase the precision of the
overall solution.
2. Not only compression function: verification on other functions. The technique
presented in Chapter 5 was derived to be applied to a set of software com-
ponents, which all implement the same function, which are candidates to be
actually used by the system to implement that function. However, so far only
the compression function has been evaluated. Thus, the future work should
evaluate the proposed solution applicability in general case, by evaluating
more functionalities.
3. More candidate executing hardware platforms. More candidate executing
hardware platforms evaluated by the proposed technique will better validate
the general applicability of the proposed solution
4. More precise techniques for validation. So far, the proposed technique was
only validated by fault injection inside the processor register file. A future
work will consider more precise fault injection techniques to better validate
the precision of the proposed technique.
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